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Abstract 
 
Nathaniel Cadle:  The Mediating Nation: 
American Literature and Globalization from Henry James to Woodrow Wilson 
 
(Under the direction of Jane Thrailkill) 
 
The Mediating Nation:  American Literature and Globalization from Henry James to 
Woodrow Wilson reconstructs the history of American globalization between 1875 and 1920 
through an analysis of literary and public discourse about the United States’ place in the 
world.  Engaging the work of sociologists like Roland Robertson, who locates the origins of 
globalization in this period, I argue that American identity emerges only in relation to—and 
interaction with—the rest of the world.  This approach therefore rejects exceptionalist readings 
of American literature, offering instead a functionalist account of the formation of American 
identity and culture that focuses on America’s position in the international community.  The 
Mediating Nation integrates and expands the work of several recent literary critics, including 
Walter Benn Michaels, who reveals how racial and cultural anxiety shaped American writers’ 
sense of national identity, and Amy Kaplan, who demonstrates how American authors 
underwrote U.S. policies of imperial expansion.  In the first section of this project, I establish 
how global theory contributes to our understanding of American literary scholarship and what 
historical events and developments turned the United States into a globalized nation.  Then, I 
explore the language that politicians and public intellectuals like Woodrow Wilson and 
William James used to make sense of these developments.  In subsequent chapters, I 
demonstrate that, through their writing, such authors as Jack London, Abraham Cahan, and 
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Henry James engaged with and elaborated on the emerging features and problems of 
globalization, including imperialism, immigration, and the global cultural economy, in order 
to propel the United States into a more important and powerful position in the international 
community. 
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Introduction:  Global Theory, Radical Empiricism, and American Literary Studies 
 
 
In the January 2001 issue of PMLA, Paul Jay sounded a call for further study of 
“literature’s relation to the processes of globalization as they manifest themselves in a 
variety of historical periods” and “literature’s facilitation of economic and cultural 
globalization.”1  Drawing attention to the increasingly porous boundaries between the 
national literatures that have traditionally defined the discipline of English, Jay 
challenged his colleagues not only to embrace that porosity but also to trace and 
understand its historical origins.  Doing so, he suggested, would bring to literary analysis 
a more dynamic means of accounting for the functionality of literary texts as cultural 
commodities and historical artifacts.  In the seven years since Jay’s article appeared, the 
discipline of English, as well as many other humanities disciplines, has experienced an 
explosion of discourse about globalization.  That is not to say that Jay’s article was itself 
responsible for the recent rise of interest in globalization among literary scholars.  In their 
attempts to internationalize both American Studies and the study of American literature, a 
cadre of scholars known collectively as the “New Americanists,” of whom I shall say 
more in the following pages, has been discussing topics closely related to globalization, 
including imperialism, immigration, cultural economy, and international diplomacy, since 
the early 1990s.2  Yet I have singled out Jay’s article partly because of the clarity of its 
                                                 
1
 Paul Jay, “Beyond Discipline?  Globalization and the Future of English,” PMLA 116.1 (2001):  35. 
 
2
 The New American Studies:  Essays from Representations, ed. Philip Fisher (Berkeley:  California UP), 
was published in 1991, and Duke University Press inaugurated its New Americanists series in 1993 with 
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central challenge to literary scholars and partly because its appearance in PMLA signaled 
a discipline-wide willingness to engage the topic of globalization and thereby legitimize 
it as never before.3  Moreover, implicit in Jay’s argument is the appealing hope that, if the 
field of literary studies can benefit from a broader engagement with global theory, then it 
also carries the potential to return the favor by providing a fuller understanding of the 
historical and cultural dimensions of globalization. 
In some ways, I consider this project a direct response to Jay’s challenge, insofar 
as it offers a study of “literature’s relation to the processes of globalization as they 
manifest themselves” in a particular historical period.  Specifically, The Mediating 
Nation presents a history of the emergence of globalization through an analysis of the 
literary and public discourse of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century America that 
helped propel the United States into a more powerful and important position in the 
international community.  In the following four chapters, I demonstrate how such 
authors, politicians, and public intellectuals as Woodrow Wilson, W.E.B. Du Bois, Henry 
James, Jack London, and Abraham Cahan developed and articulated fluid conceptions of 
national identity that could accommodate the United States’ newly formed status as a 
member of the so-called Great Powers.  Recognizing that technology, trade, immigration, 
and diplomacy were increasingly interconnecting the world’s societies, these and other 
writers formulated new literary, political, and psychological vocabularies for describing 
this interconnectedness and its impact upon daily life in America.  Consequently, this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cultures of United States Imperialism, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, and Robert J. Corber’s In the 
Name of National Security:  Hitchcock, Homophobia, and the Political Construction of Gender in Postwar 
America. 
 
3
 In fact, the entire January 2001 issue of PMLA was dedicated to the special topic “Globalizing Literary 
Studies.” 
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project examines how these writers actively addressed the problems and opportunities of 
globalization, not only reflecting an awareness of the permeability of their nation’s 
borders but also devising the political and cultural strategies of U.S. expansionism.  In the 
next few pages of this introduction, I would like to examine more generally the 
opportunities that a theoretical and methodological turn to globalization presents to 
literary studies and outline what intervention I expect to make by analyzing American 
literature through the lens of global theory.  But first, in order to avoid the mystification 
that sometimes accompanies vague discussions of globalization, it will prove useful to 
address a somewhat larger question:  What precisely does the word globalization mean? 
Since global theory extends across a wide range of academic disciplines, each 
with its own locus of study, there are a number of possible definitions and formulas for 
what globalization constitutes, and throughout this project, I embrace the complexity that 
such diverse methodologies bring to global theory.  Indeed, I take the view that, as a 
concept, globalization derives much of its current appeal from its applicability to an array 
of both abstract and everyday questions and problems:  economic, political, social, 
cultural, technological, and so forth.  At the same time, however, I also agree with 
Anthony Giddens that, at its most basic level, globalization posits that worldwide social 
relations are so interconnected that local events are determined to a large extent by 
occurrences elsewhere on the globe.4  Such a statement is not as commonsensical as it 
might seem, for it is incredibly difficult to explain just how certain decisions made in 
distant boardrooms, courtrooms, and parliaments actually affect everyday life in a 
particular community.  There are, of course, various technologies of globalization that 
have enabled faster, more direct, and more extensive travel and communication between 
                                                 
4
 See Anthony Giddens’ The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford:  Stanford UP, 1991) 64.   
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distant regions of the planet, making the world “smaller” and more widely accessible than 
ever before.  The jet engine, for example, allows world leaders to meet with one another 
more frequently now than at any other time in history, and the decisions and agreements 
made at the annual G8 summits profoundly affect each of the member nation’s trade, 
healthcare, and environmental policies.  More commonly, however, jet engines also 
enable many people to work or study in countries other than their own.  Cellular phones 
likewise increase physical mobility.  ATM machines and credit cards facilitate rapid 
financial transactions no matter the local currency.  The Internet, e-mail, and satellite 
television give media outlets the ability to reach a far wider and more dispersed range of 
consumers than in the past, even as many consumers use the same technologies to 
circumvent or supplement traditional media, as the widespread use of MP3s or file-
sharing programs illustrate. 
Technology in general has helped make globalization possible, but I argue that 
there is more to globalization than these technologies in and of themselves.  Malcolm 
Waters, for instance, identifies “social change” as the operative factor in the upsurge of 
interest in globalization since the early 1990s.5  From scholars and pundits to politicians 
and average citizens, most people use the word globalization as a catchall for the various 
effects they perceive the world’s increasing interconnectedness having upon their daily 
lives.  In other words, globalization is “about” the transformation that occurs within a 
society when it comes into sustained contact not just with another society, but seemingly 
with all of the planet’s societies at once.  These changes play out in diverse and 
sometimes surprising ways, but I would classify such changes broadly along four 
                                                 
5
 Malcolm Waters, Globalization, 2nd ed. (London:  Routledge, 2001) 1. 
  
 
5 
common dimensions:  economic, cultural, social, and political.6  These dimensions are 
not, however, a laundry list or universal blueprint with which every instantiation of 
globalization must overlap.  Instead, they are categories by which we can organize the 
ways that people perceive globalization’s effects. 
First, globalization exhibits an economic dimension, of which the clearest 
example is the emergence of wealthy and powerful multinational corporations.  These 
corporations reaffirm the commitment of western democratic governments to global 
capitalism, and they enable economic and symbolic routes of exchange to become faster 
and more fluid, especially across national borders.  The economic dimension of 
globalization is best summed up with the phrase “the global market.”  The second 
dimension is cultural.  In a globalized world, culture becomes deterritorialized insofar as 
geographic proximity no longer remains the most important organizing principle of social 
life.  Borders become more permeable when it comes to forms of cultural expression 
(music, literature, film, etc.), and physical mobility is increasingly prized.  Cultural 
objects themselves are often reshaped by distant audiences in ways unintended by their 
originators.  Globalization’s third dimension is social.  The physical mobility mentioned 
above weakens people’s commitment to territorial loyalties and opens up the possibility 
of people forming hybrid or cosmopolitan identities.  This hybridity sometimes, though 
not always, comes about through intermarriage across racial, ethnic, or national lines; 
more often, it arises through transnational commitments, such as dual citizenship or guest 
                                                 
6
 Waters lists the same four dimensions in his definition of globalization:  “A social process in which the 
constraints of geography on economic, political, social and cultural arrangements recede, in which people 
become increasingly aware that they are receding and in which people act accordingly” (5).  For some 
reason, he subsequently excludes the social dimension from the “three regions of social life that have come 
to be recognised as fundamental” to globalization (17).  It seems to me, however, that certain social 
arrangements, such as (inter)marriage, cannot be fully explained by the other three dimensions. 
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worker status.  Finally, globalization exhibits a political dimension.  Transnational 
political bodies (the United Nations, the European Union, etc.) come into being, and 
nationalism becomes a less powerful affective force.  Nation-states nevertheless continue 
to exist and exert power, but they no longer define themselves in racial or ethnic terms, 
turning from myths of pre-historical origins to comparative or international 
understandings of nationhood.  That is, the nation-state and ideologies of nationalism are 
continually in transition in a globalized world. 
While these technologies and dimensions of globalization help us understand its 
causes and effects, I also view globalization as a conceptual problem.  Roland Robertson 
refers to this problem as “the problem of the form in terms of which the world becomes 
‘united.’”7  What Robertson means is that globalization must also serve as a theoretical 
framework upon which we can construct explanatory and predictive, rather than merely 
descriptive, accounts of how and why worldwide social relations continue to become 
interconnected.  Robertson continues, “Social theory in the broadest sense—as a 
perspective which stretches across the social sciences and humanities […] and even the 
natural sciences—should be refocused and expanded so as to make concern with ‘the 
world’ a central hermeneutic, and in such a way as to constrain empirical and 
comparative-historical research in the same direction.”8  No doubt it is the potential 
explanatory power of globalization that has made it, in Waters’ words, “the concept, the 
key idea by which we understand the transition of human society into the third 
                                                 
7
 Roland Robertson, Globalization:  Social Theory and Global Culture (London:  Sage, 1992) 51, original 
emphasis. 
 
8
 Robertson 52. 
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millennium.”9  In that sense, globalization has replaced postmodernism at the center of 
most contemporary discussions of the human condition, though Waters goes on to note 
that globalization is a “far less controversial” term than postmodernism.10 
My own understanding of global theory has been heavily influenced by 
Robertson’s work, particularly his discussion of “global consciousness.”  According to 
Robertson, globalization involves, but is not limited to, “the intensification of 
consciousness of the world as a whole.”11  This holistic consciousness of the earth as a 
single place expresses itself in various modes, both in highly specialized discourse and in 
everyday usage.  In the business world, for example, advertisers and economists talk 
about global markets.  Similarly, environmentalists draw attention to the biosphere, and 
journalists and political scientists discuss geopolitics.  In each of these cases, “the global” 
exists to a large extent because people can conceive of it as such.  In other words, 
globalization is characterized by reflexivity.  Literary scholars might be sorely tempted to 
stop right there, with the presumption that globalization can be understood as the result of 
an act of imagination, as if it were merely a larger, more universal and unitary vision of 
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities.”12  There are, of course, important cultural 
dimensions to globalization in which the realm of the imaginary features prominently.  
Arjun Appadurai, who has provided perhaps the finest discussion of the relationship 
between imagination—both individual and collective—and globalization, points out that 
“the work of the imagination […] is a space of contestation in which individuals and 
                                                 
9
 Waters 1, original emphasis. 
 
10
 Waters 1. 
 
11
 Robertson 8. 
 
12
 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:  Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
rev. ed. (London:  Verso, 1991). 
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groups seek to annex the global into their own practices.”13  Nevertheless, it is important 
to remember that “consciousness of the world as a whole” represents only one half of 
Robertson’s definition of globalization; the other half involves “the compression of the 
world” through an acceleration of empirically observable historical processes.14  Any 
cultural application of global theory that fails to account for both “consciousness” and 
“compression” risks eliding the very real and complex set of historical processes involved 
in the emergence of globalization.  For that reason, Robertson’s two-part definition is 
particularly useful to the historical study of globalization, and I take pains to foreground 
the relationship between history and literature as much as possible throughout this 
project.  In my first chapter, for example, I provide an overview of the key events and 
developments that transformed America into a globalized nation. 
Due to these concerns with history and historicism, one of the primary objectives 
of this project is to find and examine historical parallels to Robertson’s conception of 
globalization in order to establish how Americans at the turn of the twentieth century 
understood, exploited, and helped to articulate the processes that globalized the United 
States.  One important parallel may be found in the writings of the American philosopher 
William James (1842-1910).  Although James himself does not explicitly discuss 
globalization, I argue that globalization can and should be understood in light of James’ 
Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912).  In the second chapter of this work, “A World of 
Pure Experience,” James identifies two “kind[s] of thing experienced”:  terms (facts or 
otherwise concrete things) and relations (less tangible lived experiences that nevertheless 
                                                 
13
 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large:  Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis:  Minnesota 
UP, 1996) 4. 
 
14
 Robertson 8. 
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“must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system”).15  James’ distinction 
provides a particularly dynamic means of understanding globalization for several reasons.  
First, terms and relations parallel Robertson’s distinction between compression (events, 
technologies, and historical developments that have increased the world’s 
interconnectedness over time) and consciousness (awareness, discussion, and intellectual 
exploitation of that increased interconnectedness).16  Thus in subsequent chapters, I shall 
examine both the “terms” and the “relations” of the history of America’s globalization—
what in my first chapter I call the “facts on the ground” (historical material realities) and 
the specific language that turn-of-the-century Americans used to make sense of, support, 
or oppose those facts.  Second, in revealing that relations are just as “real” as terms, 
James pointedly refuses to privilege physical over mental experiences.  In other words, 
the “relations” (i.e., conceptualizations or consciousnesses) of globalization are just as 
important as its material realities—a point upon which Robertson agrees.  James goes 
even further, however, and argues that facts and our experiences of those facts are not 
independent of one another but that our “reality” emerges only through the interaction 
between the two.  “In radical empiricism,” he writes, “there is no bedding; it is as if the 
pieces clung together by their edges, the transitions experienced between them forming 
their cement. […]  Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected. […]  
These relations of continuous transition experienced are what make our experiences 
                                                 
15
 William James, “A World of Pure Experience,” Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912; Lincoln:  Nebraska 
UP, 1996) 42. 
 
16
 I am grateful to John McGowan for drawing this parallel to my attention; for an excellent introduction to 
James’ philosophy and its potential applications for literary studies, see McGowan’s “Literature as 
Equipment for Living:  A Pragmatist Project,” Soundings:  An Interdisciplinary Journal 86.1-2 (2003):  
119-48. 
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cognitive.”17  In other words, while we may highlight particular “facts,” isolating them 
from the context of their relations for the sake of convenience, there is no qualitative 
difference between terms and relations, between facts and our experiences of them. 
It seems to me that James’ radical empiricism thus offers a powerful formula that 
bypasses the question of whether a particular writer helps constitute or merely reflects the 
ongoing processes of globalization.  To think about—or, as Robertson might put it, to 
demonstrate “consciousness” of—globalization is, in some part, to contribute to its 
development.  That is not the same thing as ignoring evidence of reflexivity, though.  The 
Mediating Nation focuses specifically upon the globalization of the United States and the 
efforts of American writers and public figures to translate that experience into greater 
cultural prestige and political power for their nation within the international community. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, James’ emphasis on relational thinking and 
particularly on the importance of both “conjunctive” and “disjunctive” relations offers an 
innovative way of thinking about globalization and its history:  I suggest that 
globalization involves a reformulation of relations whereby existing “terms” are thrown 
into new “relation” with one another or with new terms.18  To cite an obvious example, a 
new technology, such as the radio or the Internet, can juxtapose people and cultures that 
were not formerly in contact with each other by creating a means of communication 
where one did not previously exist.  This radical empiricist approach thus poses 
globalization as a web of interconnection (i.e., relations between terms) and focuses upon 
how newly formed connections or relations alter both the material conditions of life at 
                                                 
17
 James 86-88. 
 
18
 See pp. 47-52 in James for his discussion of “continuous transition” and “discontinuity-experience.”  
McGowan recognizes the potential impact of a reformulation of relations in James’ philosophy:  “And the 
very being of those individuals [i.e., terms] will be altered […] if those relations are changed” (121). 
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one point in the web and the perceptions of those people who live there about their own 
location and its relationship to other locations.  Fully realized, then, globalization is about 
much more than just “international relations” or “international exchange” because it is 
about the increase in the total number of possible relations.  In other words, as I put it a 
few paragraphs earlier, globalization is about what happens when a particular society or 
culture seems to come into simultaneous contact with all other societies or cultures.  This 
web-like simultaneity, I argue, is the single most important contribution of global theory 
to literary studies.  Globalization is not the “international scene” writ large.  Rather than 
focusing on the exchange between two societies, as in, say, traditional readings of 
expatriate novels, globally-inflected literary criticism requires attentiveness to the web-
like interconnections that develop between and among authors, cultures, and nations.  
Thus in each of my four chapters, I highlight the various representations of America that 
emerge through a genuinely global, as opposed to a merely international, perspective:  
W.E.B. Du Bois locating in Africa both the causes of the outbreak of the First World War 
in Europe and the future empowerment of African-Americans; Henry James rewriting an 
early novel that was set in Paris in light of his encounters with Armenian immigrants in 
New England and Native Americans in Washington, D.C.; Abraham Cahan and Knut 
Hamsun illustrating the importance of return migration to the circulation of American 
culture throughout Europe; and Jack London interpreting Japanese culture for his 
American readers while observing a Japanese military campaign in Korea. 
Through embracing both radical empiricism and historicism, my approach to 
globalization stands in opposition to three fairly common assumptions that inform much, 
though not all, current global theory, and this project aims to correct these three 
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conceptual flaws.  First, The Mediating Nation seeks to reassess the history of 
globalization itself, arguing that it is not exclusively a product of late-twentieth-century 
technological innovation.  Technologies themselves have histories, and as I demonstrate 
in my first chapter, such inventions as the steam engine, the telegraph, the telephone, and 
the radio revolutionized travel and communication throughout the nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.  In short, I suggest that globalization is as much the result of the 
Industrial Revolution as it is of the Digital Revolution, and this project is designed, in 
part, to correct the tendency to treat globalization as a relatively recent phenomenon by 
tracing the early history of its impact upon American social, cultural, and intellectual life. 
Second, in focusing on globalization’s web-like patterns of interconnection and 
exchange, The Mediating Nation does not equate its subject necessarily with 
“westernization” or “Americanization.”  Globalization is not a “one-way street” that 
enables American corporations to ram their products and services down the unwilling 
throats of foreign consumers, nor is it a monolithic force that has made the rest of the 
world subscribe to American practices and values, whatever those might be.  As the 
British economist Philippe Legrain has pointed out, “Even though American consumer 
culture is widespread, its significance is often exaggerated. You can choose to drink Coke 
and eat at McDonald's without becoming American in any meaningful sense. One 
newspaper photo of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan showed them toting Kalashnikovs—
as well as a sports bag with Nike's trademark swoosh.”19  Legrain’s reference to the 
Taliban illustrates that there are, in fact, transnational movements that operate in 
opposition to American interests.  The radicalization and spread of Islam during the past 
                                                 
19
 Philippe Legrain, “Cultural Globalization Is Not Americanization,” The Chronicle Review 49.35 (9 May 
2003):  B7. 
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few decades, for example, can be interpreted as a reaction against westernization, and the 
likely appeal of the European Union is the challenge it extends to American economic 
and political hegemony in western markets.  Likewise, thanks to the Internet and credit 
cards, many Americans have relatively easy access to international e-tailers and, in the 
case of, say, CDs and DVDs, to albums and films released earlier or even in superior 
editions to what might be available on the U.S. market.  Even more relevant to this 
project are the uses to which migrant workers put the American economy before and after 
returning to their respective homelands—a historical phenomenon that I explore in my 
third chapter. 
Finally, The Mediating Nation opposes some global theorists’ view that the 
political dimensions of globalization spell an end for the nation-state as the most basic 
form of government and for feelings of nationalism as a form of collective 
identification.20  There is little chance of the nation-state disappearing any time soon, and 
patriotism and nationalistic fervor remain strong and potentially volatile forces, as 
demonstrated by events that occurred in the United States following September 11, 2001.  
These events ranged from the innocuous, such as the surge in sales of American flags,21 
to the far more serious, such as the harassment of Middle Eastern immigrants.  Of course, 
as the social dimensions of globalization indicate, individuals are increasingly able and 
                                                 
20
 Perhaps the most important and provocative recent example of this line of thinking may be found in 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard UP, 2001).  For Hardt and Negri, 
“empire” is a decentered form of sovereignty that has emerged to fill the vacuum left by “the decline in 
sovereignty of nation-states” (xi).  More generally, a writer’s choice between the terms transnational and 
postnational is indicative of what position he or she takes in this debate.  The difference in meaning 
between the prefixes trans- and post- is more than semantic, with the use of postnational indicating a 
perspective similar to that of Hardt and Negri.  I employ the term transnational exclusively. 
 
21
 The news sources reporting this phenomenon are too numerous to name.  To cite only one, Anthony 
Burgos describes the reactions of naval personnel stationed in Sicily and their families in “Flag Sales at 
Overseas Military Stores Reflect Surge in Patriotism,” Stars and Stripes 22 Sep. 2001, European ed., 7 
Sept. 2006 <http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=3973&archive=true>. 
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willing to form affective ties that stretch beyond borders and that sometimes undermine 
patriotism, but the nation-state still enables and constrains an individual’s ability to 
interact with the rest of the world.  Again, Legrain neatly summarizes the continued 
significance of nation-states to our daily lives in a globalized world: 
Individuals are forming new communities, linked by shared interests and 
passions, that cut across national borders.  Friendships with foreigners met on 
holiday.  Scientists sharing ideas over the Internet. […]  Does that mean national 
identity is dead?  Hardly.  People who speak the same language, were born and 
live near each other, face similar problems, have a common experience, and vote 
in the same election still have plenty of things in common.  For all our awareness 
of the world as a single place, we are not citizens of the world but citizens of a 
state. […]  You can like foreign things and still have strong bonds to your fellow 
citizens.22 
What Legrain seems to be getting at is that, in some ways, nationalism and globalization 
function as what Raymond Williams called “residual” and “emergent” structures of 
feeling, respectively.23  Even as the emergence of globalization has reshaped our 
relationships with other people in far-flung corners of the world, nationalism retains its 
powerful affective force—both politically (as exhibited in ongoing debates about the 
future of illegal immigrants in the United States) and culturally (as displayed every four 
years during World Cup).  To account sufficiently for so many people’s continued 
commitment to national identity, in whatever form, we cannot casually dismiss either 
nationalism or the nation-state as being in decline; rather, they are in transition, adapting 
to new social, cultural, and economic conditions of possibility. 
                                                 
22
 Legrain B7. 
 
23
 Williams discusses “residual” and “emergent” structures of feeling in Marxism and Literature (Oxford:  
Oxford UP, 1977). 
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 How the nation-state continues to adapt itself today is a question I must leave to 
others, since my inquiry is historical.  Indeed, one of the most significant conceptual 
dangers facing any study of globalization’s history is falling into the trap of presentism.  
In order to combat the inclination to apply our current understanding of globalization 
retroactively to what Americans actually wrote about a century ago, I have designed this 
project to serve primarily as an account of the coalescence of globalization from an 
American perspective.  That is why, as I mentioned before, Robertson’s two-part 
definition of globalization as involving both “consciousness” and “compression” is 
particularly useful for historical research.  Calling attention to “the acceleration in both 
concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the global whole,”24 Robertson 
enables subsequent scholars to think through the relationship between empirically 
observable occurrences (events, inventions, etc.) and people’s awareness of how those 
occurrences have seemingly “compressed” the world.  Any account of the coalescence of 
globalization must therefore be attentive to the concerns of historicism, especially the 
conditions of possibility that allowed for globalization to emerge.  Equally pertinent for 
my purposes, however, is the language that writers had at their disposal for describing 
and making sense of the events and developments that were reshaping their relationship 
with—and access to—the rest of the world.  In a sense, then, I also suggest that we 
approach globalization as a simple abstraction—that is, as an idea or category that stands 
in for complex historical processes now obscured by its very existence as an 
abstraction.25  The Mediating Nation is dedicated, in part, to ascertaining what historical 
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processes brought globalization into being as something that Americans can think of now 
as a simple abstraction. 
Considered as a simple abstraction, globalization’s relevance to the humanities 
(and vice versa) becomes more apparent, for unraveling the tangled histories that lie 
behind taken-for-granted “truths” or categories is one of the most important practices of 
historically-oriented humanities disciplines, including literary studies.  Now that global 
theory has begun to reshape our conception of identity and the location of culture, it is 
my hope that literary projects, including this one, can reciprocate and contribute to this 
interdisciplinary discourse a fuller understanding of the historical and cultural roots of 
globalization.  No doubt this is what Paul Jay had in mind when he appealed for broader 
engagement with globalization across the traditional historical periods of our field.  Fair 
enough, but to return to an earlier question, what does globalization add to American 
literary criticism? 
 The first and most obvious answer to that question is that global theory decenters 
the nation from its position as the primary means of organizing our study of literature, 
thereby challenging our basic assumptions about what constitutes “American” (or 
“British” or any other national) literature.  What precisely gives “American” literature its 
identity is, of course, a well-known ontological problem, dating back at least to such 
prominent nineteenth-century writers as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and 
Henry James, who struggled to find ways of conceptualizing American literature as 
something different from British literature, despite sharing a common language, history, 
and culture.  Likewise, the American literary canon has always contained texts by authors 
                                                                                                                                                 
abstraction in “Introduction:  Dialectical Method in Literary History,” The Origins of the English Novel, 
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who were not born in North America (e.g., the Puritans and other immigrant writers) and 
texts that were written by American-born authors residing in—and culturally identifying 
with—other countries (e.g., T.S. Eliot, James Baldwin, and other expatriates).  On a very 
basic level, embracing a global approach to American literature would necessitate 
embracing and extending the implications of this ontological problem by adopting a 
rigorously comparativist perspective.  Thus globally-inflected American literary criticism 
would examine canonical and non-canonical American-born and Americanized authors in 
relation to canonical and non-canonical authors from other countries who addressed 
similar issues and questions.  Again, comparativism is not in itself new to American 
literary criticism.  Malcolm Cowley, Robert Weisbuch, and other critics who have 
studied American expatriate authors and other figures in the so-called “international 
scene” certainly discuss how residence in foreign locations and intellectual exchanges 
with foreigners have influenced American authors’ own writing.26  Such criticism, 
however, does not take full advantage of the implications of global theory.  Instead, 
Cowley, Weisbuch, and similar critics tend to suggest that experiences abroad and 
international intellectual exchange merely help American authors discover or rediscover 
an already fixed, essential national character.  Comparativism, then, is not synonymous 
with a global literary perspective, and it does not wholly account for American writers’ 
reflexive engagement with international and domestic politics and social movements or 
how this engagement shaped the writers’ sense of national selfhood. 
The comparativism I am suggesting here must therefore embrace the web-like 
understanding of globalization that I have described above.  To borrow from William 
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James once more,  however, it must also approach national identity in functionalist terms, 
as something that emerges only in relation to—and interaction with—the rest of the 
world.27  Global theory suggests that the insistent focus on questions of origin and the 
formation of identity that has dominated American literary criticism may, in fact, benefit 
from a shift in focus to questions of position and role.  Instead of asking, “What cultural 
identity or account of origins does America carve out for itself?” I therefore ask, “What 
position or role within the global community does America occupy?”  While the two 
questions are certainly related, they are not the same, and the difference is more than 
semantic.  Words like role and position shift literary analysis away from describing static 
forms of identity to exploring more functionalist ones.  They offer a more dynamic means 
of reading the same texts and thinking through the same issues because, from a global 
perspective, national identity makes sense only when it functions within an international 
context.  In other words, American identity is the product of the United States’ and 
individual Americans’ actions upon the international stage; America is, in a sense, what 
America does.  And in this interactive context, non-Americans’ perceptions of—and 
writings to and about—Americans themselves matter insofar as they oppose, comment 
upon, or contribute to the global circulation of a particular conception of the United 
States’ role in the world.  Thus in subsequent chapters, I examine what non-Americans, 
such as the Norwegian novelist Knut Hamsun and the Japanese political theorist Seiji 
Hishida, have to say about American imperialist expansion and American attitudes 
toward immigrants.  These non-American writers help locate America’s global position. 
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In this respect, my argument owes a great deal to—but goes even further than—
the recent scholarship of the so-called “New Americanists,” whose attentiveness to the 
discursive formation of American identity has already done much to decenter the nation 
as the exclusive organizing principle of American literary studies and to move beyond 
Anglo- or even Euro-centric transnational comparativism.  For instance, in The Anarchy 
of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (2002), Amy Kaplan has demonstrated the 
extent to which U.S. imperialism in Latin America and the Pacific Rim determined the 
development of American identity throughout the nineteenth century; in Our America 
(1995), Walter Benn Michaels has revealed the impact of the nativist ideologies that 
American modernist authors constructed in order to exclude blacks and non-Anglo-Saxon 
immigrants from their portraits of the body politic; and in Constituting Americans (1995), 
Priscilla Wald has examined the ways in which cultural anxiety shaped official narratives 
of American identity at the expense of marginalized peoples who disrupt those national 
narratives.28  Collectively, their work has gone a long way toward reframing the study of 
American literature and culture along the lines that Donald E. Pease and Robyn Wiegman 
have laid out:  “a pluralistic rather than a holistic approach to American culture, the 
rediscovery of the particular, the repudiation of American exceptionalism, and the rise of 
comparativist and cross-cultural approaches to American studies.”29  Nevertheless, I 
contend that The Mediating Nation encompasses a larger, more multifaceted process at 
work in American literature at the turn of the twentieth century.  The respective foci of 
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Kaplan, Michaels, and Wald—empire, immigration, and cultural definitions of 
citizenship—are instantiations of globalization, and I seek to resituate these scholars’ 
contributions to American literary studies within a methodological framework that 
embraces global theory.   To that end, I have organized this project in such a way that 
subsequent chapters specifically examine cultural economy, immigration, and empire, 
reframing these instantiations of globalization within their larger context. 
Besides employing globalization as a more dynamic methodology and drawing 
heavily upon the philosophy of William James, I also differ with the New Americanists 
in two key theoretical ways.  First, as a group, they have never clarified whether their 
understanding of globalization is postnational or transnational.  Pease and Wiegman, for 
instance, seem to assume that the advent of globalization signals the decline of the 
nation-state:  “Comparative American studies calls for a rethinking of cultures and 
identity formations in the face of the nation-state’s failure to function as guarantor. […]  
The global analytic of the new American studies would no longer move from the U.S. 
center.”30  At any rate, in their criticisms of the flaws and hypocrisies of American 
national identity and in their appeal to a set of ethical standards that supersede national 
commitments, the New Americanists’ politics clearly imply a postnational outlook—for 
which they have been severely criticized.31  While I do not disagree with the impulse 
behind the New Americanists’ criticisms of U.S. national policy and the history of U.S. 
cultural imperialism, I am less convinced of the complete failure or decline of the nation-
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state and prefer to discuss globalization in transnational terms.  Second, and more 
importantly, the New Americanists regularly pose the “global” in opposition to the 
“national,” thereby reducing that relationship to a false binary.  In fact, because of the 
transitional nature of the nation-state, national and global processes and affective ties 
frequently overlap and exploit one another.  Likewise, the “global” is not a monolithic 
entity but a composite, dynamic, and interconnected one, made up of multiple interacting 
“national” (and “local”) entities.32  The Mediating Nation therefore seeks to foreground 
the complex ways in which global and national modes are imbricated in one another.  As 
a result, my work also differs from that of the New Americanists in that it is less intensely 
focused on the dangers of national solidarity and tends to oppose the reification of 
national identity in favor of a more fluid understanding of such identity. 
  *  *  *  *  *   
 The interactive relationship between the terms and relations of globalization, 
between “compression” and “consciousness,” guides this study of the globalization of 
America and supplies the point of departure for my first chapter, where I examine how 
the reformulation of relations played out historically in three specific ways.  First, I lay 
out the events and developments that transformed America into a globalized nation, 
including economic and imperial expansion in Latin America and throughout the Pacific, 
increased diplomatic prestige among the Great Powers, and the development of faster 
technologies of transportation and communication.  Second, I explain how politicians and 
public intellectuals developed a vocabulary for making sense of those developments, 
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ranging from Josiah Strong’s representation of the United States as a “world-salvation” in 
Our Country (1885) through Woodrow Wilson’s description of America’s role in the 
world as a “mediating Nation” (1915)—the latter, which lends this project its title, 
providing a particularly powerful example of turn-of-the-century functionalist 
understandings of the nation in a global context.  Finally, I argue that this vocabulary 
possessed a reflexive dimension, which enabled Strong, Wilson, and W.E.B. Du Bois to 
push for the United States’ greater involvement in international affairs, including 
arbitration between warring nations and missionary and economic uplift of nonwhite 
societies. 
The chapters that follow highlight three important facets of globalization:  the 
global cultural economy, immigration, and empire.  Through analyses of both canonical 
and non-canonical texts, these chapters reveal the intricacies of globalization’s cultural 
and socio-political dimensions.  In chapter two, for example, I explore the transformation 
in Henry James’ understanding of America’s relationship to Europe by analyzing his 
extensive revisions of his early novel The American (1876-77/1907) in light of his 
account of his return to the United States after a twenty-year absence in The American 
Scene (1907).  In particular, I demonstrate how James’ reencounter with American 
society and culture led him to downplay the symbolic chasm he had originally depicted 
between the two societies in the original version of The American.  The revised version of 
this novel, as well as The American Scene, rejects the notion of a rupture between 
Europe’s and America’s cultural heritage and economic interests, embracing the global 
cultural economy that aligns them instead. 
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In chapter three, I focus on immigration as a process of circulation rather than 
absorption, involving not just one-way trips to the United States but also physical and 
cultural returns to the homeland.  This attentiveness to the transnational dimensions of 
immigration serves as a corrective to traditional models of assimilation, forced 
Americanization, and ethnic and cultural anxiety as depicted by Werner Sollors and 
others.  Specifically, I explore the international circulation of American money, products, 
and culture that Abraham Cahan portrays in The Rise of David Levinksy (1917), his 
classic but deeply ambivalent novel of immigration.  Then I analyze the Norwegian 
Nobel-laureate Knut Hamsun’s lesser-known accounts of his own failed immigrant years 
and the descriptions of American society and culture he disseminated upon his return to 
Europe (c. 1889). 
My fourth chapter addresses the question of U.S. imperialism by focusing on the 
unique relationship between America and Japan, two nations that rose to international 
prominence at the same time and on mutually agreeable terms.  An examination of Jack 
London’s Russo-Japanese War correspondence (1904) and two of Lafcadio Hearn’s 
nonfiction books about Japan (1896 and 1904) problematizes Edward Said’s Orientalist 
model.  I reveal how London and Hearn found in Japan an example of what the 
philosopher Charles Taylor terms “alternative modernities,” the existence of modernized 
but non-westernized cultures.  This recognition provoked different but equally global 
responses from London and Hearn; Hearn embraced Japan as a means for evaluating 
America’s shortcomings, while London attempted to allay his own fears of the threat 
Japan posed to America’s imperial ambitions in the Pacific. 
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Finally, in a coda, I depict the growing concerns that Americans held about the 
uncontrollability of globalization after the First World War by analyzing the reactions of 
John Dos Passos, Edmund Wilson, and Katherine Anne Porter to the influenza pandemic 
of 1918-19 in light of Priscilla Wald’s discussion of “carrier narratives” in “Imagined 
Immunities.”  Even as the United States increasingly retreated into isolationism through 
the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, the closing of its 
borders to immigrants, and the federalization of Jim Crow laws, the Spanish Flu proved 
that Americans were literally not immune to global events and that the United States was 
a globalized nation whether its leaders wanted it to be or not.
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1:  “World-Salvation”:  The History and Rhetoric of 
the Globalization of America 
 
 
“World history did not always exist; history as world history is a result.” – Karl Marx1 
 
On April 20, 1915, as the First World War continued to divide most European 
nations into armed camps, Woodrow Wilson justified his administration’s commitment to 
U.S. neutrality in a speech that was remarkably devoid of references to domestic 
concerns or national self-interest.  Instead, Wilson appealed to the United States’ status as 
a “melting pot”—what we now call the nation’s multicultural identity—claiming: 
We are the mediating Nation of the world.  I do not mean that we undertake not to 
mind our own business and to mediate where other people are quarreling.  I mean 
the word in a broader sense.  We are compounded of the nations of the world; we 
mediate their blood, we mediate their traditions, we mediate their sentiments, their 
tastes, their passions; we are ourselves compounded of those things.  We are, 
therefore, able to understand all nations; we are able to understand them in the 
compound, not separately, as partisans, but unitedly as knowing and 
comprehending and embodying them all.  It is in that sense that I mean that 
America is a mediating Nation.  The opinion of America, the action of America, 
is ready to turn, and free to turn, in any direction. […]  The United States has no 
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racial momentum.  It has no history back of it which makes it run all its energies 
and all its ambitions in one particular direction.2 
On one level, this passage is peppered with typical Wilsonian idealism.  America, he 
argues, can rise above the petty nationalistic squabbles that plunge other nations into war 
because the United States remains free from any driving racial or ethnic agendas.  
Furthermore, America must continue to stand apart and offer itself as a disinterested 
arbiter of the eventual peace that will come.  On another level, there is something deeply 
troubling about Wilson’s conception of mediation.  Perhaps most notably, his claims 
stand in stark contrast to his own dismal record on civil rights.  Even as Wilson was 
proclaiming the United States’ lack of “racial momentum,” his administration was 
pushing for ever more stringent Jim Crow legislation.  During Wilson’s first term in 
office, the House of Representatives passed a law making racial intermarriage a felony in 
the District of Columbia.  Wilson’s postmaster general, Albert Burleson, and his 
secretaries of the treasury and navy, William McAdoo and Josephus Daniels, 
respectively, ordered that their offices be segregated.  Wilson himself declined to follow 
tradition and appoint a black ambassador to Haiti, and he approved a new requirement 
that all applicants for federal jobs submit photographs of themselves with their 
applications.3  In short, Wilson helped federalize Jim Crow at a time that he was claiming 
for himself and his nation the ability of “knowing and comprehending and embodying” 
all the peoples of the world.  This hypocrisy and the contestation over who really makes 
up Wilson’s “mediating Nation” are two of the central problems that frame turn-of-the-
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twentieth-century discussions of America’s position and role in the international 
community, as I examine in more detail later in this and other chapters. 
For now, however, I wish to draw attention to the language of Wilson’s rhetorical 
claims.  What is most striking about his choice of words is how unexpected they are.  
Instead of casting the United States’ relationship with other countries in terms of 
economics, trade routes, alliances, and so forth, Wilson talks about blood, sentiments, 
passions, and tastes.  The fact that he avoids discussing the war itself in this passage 
serves to highlight his administration’s stated commitment to avoiding any binding 
alliances:  America is “free to turn in any direction.”  The course of history would force 
him to change his policy and rhetoric; less than a month later, the German submarine U-
20 would torpedo the Lusitania, killing over 100 Americans and helping to elicit greater 
sympathy and public support for France and Great Britain.  Nevertheless, as it stands, 
Wilson’s language displays a deep concern with the aesthetics of conceptualizing the 
nation; he describes the body politic in both corporeal and affective terms.  His account 
rests upon the notion that the United States is unique among the community of nations 
because its population and culture are “compounded” of all other nations.  In a sense, 
Wilson offers his own answer to the seemingly ever-present question of what constitutes 
American identity:  it is a composite identity whose chief characteristic is its 
multivocality, its ability to give expression to other nations’ “sentiments” and “passions.”  
But Wilson is less concerned with fixing a static definition of American identity than he 
is with constructing a more pragmatic narrative of America’s role in world events.  
Wilson characterizes this role as one of mediation, which he is clear does not equate with 
merely settling disputes.  Rather, he uses the word mediate both in its relational sense of 
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connection and in its symbolic sense of transmission; America’s role involves “knowing 
and comprehending and embodying” every other nation.  Although Wilson is almost 
certainly referring to the actual physical presence of various ethnic groups within the 
United States, he also moves into the realm of the symbolic, implying that America’s job 
is to interpret the world and then transmit that interpretation back to the world.  
Presumably, once incorporated into the United States, different ethnic groups cancel out 
each other’s “racial momentum” and serve instead to produce complementary frames of 
reference for viewing and understanding the world.  In Wilson’s vision, therefore, 
America itself becomes both a microcosm that can physically embody all of the earth’s 
peoples and a globalizing force of representation that can read and represent all other 
nations and cultures from a position of privilege. 
In other words, the above passage stands as a culmination of Wilson’s twenty-
year-long attempt to provide a politically and historically savvy but also, crucially, a 
rhetorically and aesthetically satisfying account of America’s position in international 
affairs.  In making the rhetorical claims about American identity that he does, he also 
privileges the importance of telling a story that can encompass both the United States in 
particular and the rest of the world at large.  Wilson’s simultaneous employment of the 
word mediate in its diplomatic sense of peace-brokering, its relational sense of 
connection, and its symbolic sense of transmission offers a powerful formula for 
rethinking American identity because he examines such implied questions in insistently 
functionalist terms:  What is the United States?  It is “the mediating Nation of the world.”  
What does it mean to be American?  It means possessing the ability to “understand all 
nations.”  Oddly enough for a man who was a historian by training, Wilson goes so far as 
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to dismiss history’s ability to tell us anything about either question.  After all, he claims 
confidently, the United States “has no history back of it which makes it run […] in one 
particular direction.”  In order to understand who you are, Wilson tells his fellow 
Americans, you need to recognize what it is you do, not where you come from or how 
you got where you are.  In one sweeping statement, Wilson shifts the language of 
national identity away from essentialism to functionalism, even if his administration did 
not follow through on that rhetoric. 
But an even more dynamic set of ideas is at work in Wilson’s speech as well.  For 
his definition of America as “the mediating Nation” to work, he must also acknowledge 
the existence of a closely integrated international system of nation-states, which Wilson’s 
own nation-state simultaneously mediates and is compounded of.  Thus what we find in 
this 1915 speech is not only a picture of America’s emerging place as a powerful member 
of the international community, or simply a gesture toward a new definition of American 
identity, but just as important, a highly sophisticated and carefully formulated description 
of a globalized world.  In short, Wilson provides us with one of the fullest early 
articulations of global theory.  Nowhere, of course, does Wilson actually use the words 
global, globalized, or globalization.4  The trouble he takes to define mediate and to 
provide synonyms for compounded indicates that he was fully aware of the paucity of 
terms at his disposal for communicating the complexity and novelty of his ideas.  
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Nevertheless, the key problems and concerns of global theory are nascent in the above 
passage and throughout many of his other writings. 
Wilson was not alone in grappling with these problems; indeed, as I suggested in 
my introduction, these concerns helped shape the public and literary discourse of late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century America.  For instance, as early as 1867, Henry 
James penned an even more explicitly literary analogue to Wilson’s political concept of a 
“mediating nation.”  In a letter written to his friend Thomas Sergeant Perry on September 
20 of that year, James writes: 
We have exquisite qualities as a race, and it seems to me that we are ahead of the 
European races in the fact that more than either of them we can deal with forms of 
civilization not our own, can pick and choose and assimilate and in short 
(aesthetically, etc.) claim our property wherever we find it.  To have no national 
stamp has hitherto been a defect and a drawback; but I think it not unlikely that 
American writers may yet indicate that a vast intellectual fusion and synthesis of 
the various national tendencies of the world is the condition of more important 
achievements than any we have seen.5 
In subsequent chapters, I examine in more detail how such American authors as James, 
Abraham Cahan, Jack London, Katherine Anne Porter, and others constructed new 
national narratives that could accommodate the United States’ emergence as a world 
power and make sense of ongoing concerns over the influx of immigrants, American 
political leaders’ imperial ambitions, and America’s increasing diplomatic and military 
authority among the so-called Great Powers.  In this chapter, however, I present a history 
of both the “compressions” (i.e., events and conditions of possibility) and 
“consciousnesses” (i.e., discursive practices) that transformed the United States into a 
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globalized nation.  In other words, I argue that Wilson’s speech represents a culmination 
of a series of events, developments, discussions, and debates that globalized America, 
and the bulk of this chapter is dedicated to establishing the history that enabled Wilson’s 
formulation and the genealogy of his rhetoric.  In the process of tracing this history and 
genealogy, I also provide an account of the emergence of globalization and its impact on 
American public discourse.  To borrow from the quotation by Karl Marx that heads this 
chapter, I argue that globalization and “world history” possess a history, that 
globalization is itself “a result.”  What globalization resulted from, and how Americans in 
particular attempted to describe both the result and the sources of that result, are the two 
questions that will guide the pages that follow.  First, however, in order to avoid the trap 
of presentism and to establish exactly what sort of vocabulary Wilson and his 
contemporaries, like James, had at their disposal to talk about what we now think of as 
globalization, I will return briefly to a closer examination of Wilson’s speech. 
For instance, Wilson’s—and, to a lesser extent in his letter, James’—concept of 
world is unprecedented.  Unlike the words mediate and compounded, Wilson does not 
bother to define or provide synonyms for world—perhaps because, in many ways, it is an 
even vaguer term.  Instead, he uses the word twice (“We are the mediating Nation of the 
world”; “We are compounded of the nations of the world”) and moves on.  According to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, the chief usages for the word world (in some cases dating 
as far back as ninth-century Old English) tend to refer either to the earth itself, though 
often the writer/speaker means only that portion he or she personally inhabits and knows, 
or to the totality of human existence, frequently connoting the vastness of everything that 
ever has existed or ever will exist throughout time.  Neither of these more general 
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meanings are entirely absent from Wilson’s conception of world.  Clearly, he is referring 
to the planet earth and its human inhabitants, but he is also referring to a specific, not an 
abstract, totality:  the community of nations.  What distinguishes Wilson’s and James’ 
world is that it is an entity made up of interconnected but quite distinct, easily discernable 
parts known as nation-states.  The whole, as it were, is not greater than the sum of its 
parts, for his world is defined by the nations that inhabit it, not the other way around. 
What we find in Wilson’s speech and James’ letter, then, is a radical shift in the 
meaning of the word world, at least in terms of its traditional usage up until the mid-
nineteenth century, and in the relationship of that word to rhetoric about America.  For 
one thing, Wilson does not view the world simply as a space Americans happen to 
inhabit; rather, Wilson envisions it as something inherently human and social with which 
Americans interact on a daily basis.  More specifically, Wilson’s world is an aggregate of 
nation-states, each with its own independently functioning “traditions,” “sentiments,” 
“tastes,” and “passions.”  Presumably, these nation-states can interact with each other to 
the exclusion of the United States; they go about “quarreling,” after all.  Yet they still 
make up a totality, one in which international borders seem to matter very little.  Even 
more significantly, it is the very act of American mediation that turns them into a totality:  
“we are able to understand them in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but 
unitedly as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all.”  Americans can 
mediate, know, and embody the tastes, sentiments, and passions of all other national 
cultures—apparently from the comfort of their own homes.  Whether immigrants from 
these nations carry their cultures with them to America or, just as likely, expanding 
American businesses transport products from other countries to American markets, the 
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result remains the same:  Within the confines of its own borders, the United States can 
recreate the cultures of other nations completely intact; outside its borders, the United 
States can bring nations closer together by mediating their potentially partisan cultural 
practices.  Finally, Wilson’s claim that Americans are “compounded of the nations of the 
world” is an outright rejection of any dichotomous understanding of America’s 
relationship with the world.  There is little room to insert any binaries, such as I/Other or 
Us/Them, into the equation.  Rather, Wilson tacitly acknowledges the inappropriateness 
of such binaries in a nation inhabited primarily by the descendants of various groups of 
immigrants. 
The OED also draws attention to a linguistic practice that became increasingly 
frequent from the mid-nineteenth century onwards:  the use of the word world as prefix, 
much as German compounds are constructed.  (World-Power appears as a separate entry 
in the OED, for example.)  For nineteenth-century writers, this practice serves as the 
closest approximation of our adjectival term global, taking on much of the same 
complexity that that latter term carries for us.  More generally, this practice gives a 
degree of greater importance and applicability to whichever word makes up the second 
half of the compound, and on the other hand, it gives greater specificity to the word world 
itself by tying it to a more particular object, attribute, or process.  To list just a few 
examples, the OED cites William Dwight Whitney’s prediction in Language and the 
Study of Language (1867) that English would become a “world-language, understood and 
employed on every continent”; William Morris’ reference in News from Nowhere (1890) 
to “a most elaborate system of buying and selling, which has been called the world-
market”; and a claim in the Congressional Record (January 29, 1900) that the United 
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States had “become a ‘world-power.’”6  In each instance, using world as a prefix 
drastically alters the meaning of the word that follows, broadening its meaning—but a 
meaning that only functions conditional to its active application.  Thus English becomes a 
“world-language” only when “employed on every continent,” and the “world-market” 
only exists in the context of “buying and selling” within an “elaborate system.”  Although 
Wilson himself does not follow suit in his speech, he had at his disposal several such 
compounds:  world-order (dating to 1846), world-system (1874), and even international 
community (1894).7  The practice of employing world as a prefix reached its apogee in 
the powerful concept of world-salvation, a phrase that spanned the entire thirty-five-year 
period I am surveying and one examined extensively below.  Now, however, I turn to the 
historical conditions of possibility that allowed for the emergence of globalization. 
 *  *  *  *  *   
A key challenge facing any study of globalization is to make as clear a distinction 
as possible between the facts on the ground and the conceptualization of those facts.  That 
is to say, in order to understand the history of globalization, it is necessary to distinguish 
actual historical events that accelerated the processes of globalization from the language 
and rhetoric people used for making sense of those events.  Drawing such a distinction, 
however, does not necessarily entail labeling every historical event, action, or text as 
either a powerful constituent or a mere reflection of globalization.  On the contrary, the 
boundaries between what constitutes and what reflects globalization are quite permeable.  
Indeed, Wilson’s speech illustrates powerfully just how unsteady the border between 
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such distinctions really is; a president’s speech that announces or outlines national policy 
is clearly a performative utterance.  As I pointed out in the introduction, I view this 
distinction between events and conceptions in much the same way as I view William 
James’ distinction between terms and relations and Roland Robertson’s distinction 
between global compression and global consciousness.  The distinction exists for the sake 
of convenience when examining what conditions of possibility enabled or constrained an 
emerging global consciousness; otherwise, events and conceptions are interactive.  Our 
ability to name globalization as such is the result of considerable interplay between 
historical socioeconomic trends and intellectual attempts at naming and studying these 
trends.  Yet, even while my primary focus is the rhetorical conceptualization of 
globalization, it is important to acknowledge the differences between history and 
discourse and to provide a brief overview of what aspects of the world situation most 
influenced American writers’ thinking at the end of the nineteenth century.  What 
follows, then, is a brief account of the events, developments, and problems that 
distinguished the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century from other periods in U.S. 
history.  It is also a gesture toward explaining how events over 100 years ago connect to 
the present and shape our current concerns and understanding of globalization. 
The history of globalization is not, of course, wholly synchronic with U.S. 
history.  The concept of the nation-state, which is the building-block of the global order, 
predates the United States, as does colonialism, mapmaking, and international commerce.  
And these ideas and practices inhabit analogous histories in other nation-states.  Thus 
while it is necessary to examine the particularities of globalization’s development in 
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relation to U.S. history, it is also important to consider the more general characteristics of 
the history of globalization in the west. 
Roland Robertson, perhaps the foremost historian of globalization, offers what he 
calls a Minimal Phase Model of Globalization that both “indicates the major constraining 
tendencies which have been operating in relatively recent history as far as world order 
and the compression of the world […] are concerned” and delineates “the temporal-
historical path to the present […] high degree of global density and complexity.”8  
Although Robertson is quick to note that his framework may amount to little more than a 
skeletal outline for guiding future research, the Minimal Phase Model attempts nothing 
less than to trace the development of globalization from the early-fifteenth to the late-
twentieth century.  For our purposes, Robertson’s model is helpful for two reasons.  First, 
it persuasively distinguishes several broad historical movements, or phases, from one 
another without erecting an overly rigid system of periodization or failing to register 
continuities between different phases.  Second, it highlights events and developments that 
significantly accelerated the processes of globalization during each of those phases. 
Robertson identifies five distinct phases in the history of globalization:  the 
Germinal Phase (early-fifteenth to mid-eighteenth century); the Incipient Phase (mid-
eighteenth century to 1870s); the Take-off Phase (1870s to mid-1920s); the Struggle-for-
Hegemony Phase (mid-1920s to late-1960s); and the Uncertainty Phase (late-1960s to 
early 1990s).9  Phase III, “the crucial take-off period of globalization itself,” is what 
concerns us most because, according to Robertson, it was this phase that “set firmly in 
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motion” the form of globalization with which we are still familiar.10  Covering the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century, this phase also corresponds to the years under 
study in this project.  Robertson summarizes the “take-off phase” this way: 
Phase III:  The Take-off Phase Lasting from the 1870s until the mid-1920s.  
‘Take-off’ here refers to a period during which the increasingly manifest 
globalizing tendencies of previous periods and places gave way to a single, 
inexorable form centered upon the four reference points, and thus constraints, of 
national societies, generic individuals (but with a masculine bias), a single 
‘international society,’ and an increasingly singular, but not unified conception of 
humankind.  Early thematization of ‘the problem of modernity.’  Increasingly 
global conceptions of the ‘correct outline’ of an ‘acceptable’ national society; 
international formalization and attempted implementation of ideas about 
humanity.  Globalization of immigration restrictions.  Very sharp increase in 
number and speed of global communication.  The first ‘international novels.’  
Rise of ecumenical movement.  Development of global competitions—for 
example the Olympics and Nobel prizes.  Implementation of world time and near-
global adoption of Gregorian calendar.  First world war.11 
While I disagree with Robertson’s use of such universalizing adjectives as single and 
inexorable to characterize globalization, which I view as historically richer and more 
multifaceted, Robertson’s brief description of this period is still useful because his 
examples draw attention to the important distinction between facts and 
conceptualizations. 
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On one hand, Robertson cites the following historical facts:  the publication of the 
first “international novel,” a designation often attributed to Henry James’ The American 
(1877); the development of new, faster, and more extensive forms of communication, 
such as the telephone (patented 1876) and the radio (1896); the arrival of “global 
competitions,” such as the first modern Olympic Games (1896) and the first Nobel Prizes 
(1901); and, as Robertson pointedly concludes, the advent of the “first world war” (1914-
1918).  Significantly, Robertson also mentions the “implementation of world time,” 
which occurred in 1884 when an international conference held in Washington, D.C., 
designated the meridian that passes through Greenwich as the prime meridian for the 
purposes of both timekeeping and geographic longitude.  This particular example points 
directly to the most salient feature of globalization:  that it involves a reformulation of 
relations between different people or objects (discussed at greater length in the 
introduction).  In the case of the 1884 International Meridian Conference, most people’s 
relationship with time itself changed; in order to coordinate transportation and 
communication more effectively, local time everywhere in the world now depended upon 
local time at Greenwich rather than when the sun appeared overhead.  In producing a 
newly global temporality, this event provides dramatic evidence of how globalization 
reshapes the local, everyday aspects of people’s lives as well as their own understanding 
of their relatedness with other communities.  Mark Twain, for instance, reveals the 
impact of the implementation of world time in Tom Sawyer Abroad (1894).  Published 
only ten years after the International Meridian Conference, Twain’s novel begins with 
Tom, Huck, and Jim boarding a giant balloon that eventually transports them to Africa.  
As they travel eastward, they notice that the town clocks they pass over do not match 
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their own watches.  The following exchange reveals the growing frustration of Tom, who 
understands the principles of world time, as he attempts to explain the reason for the 
discrepancy to the increasingly perplexed and disturbed Huck and Jim: 
[Tom:]  “We’ve covered about fifteen degrees of longitude since we left 
St. Louis yesterday afternoon, and them clocks are right.” […] 
Jim was working his mind and studying.  Pretty soon he says: 
“Mars Tom, did you say dem clocks uz right?” 
“Yes, they’re right.” 
“Ain’t yo watch right, too?” 
“She’s right for St. Louis, but she’s an hour wrong for here.” 
“Mars Tom, is you tryin’ to let on dat de time ain’t de same 
everywheres?” 
“No, it ain’t the same everywheres, by a long shot.” 
Jim looked distressed, and says: 
“It grieves me to hear you talk like dat, Mars Tom; I’s right down 
ashamed to hear you talk like dat, arter de way you’s been raised.  Yassir, it’d 
break yo’ Aunt Polly’s heart to hear you.”12 
Eventually, Jim concludes that, if Tom is right and it can be Monday evening in North 
America and Tuesday morning in Europe, there cannot be a literal Last Day, in the 
eschatological sense.  Jim’s encounter with one aspect of globalization shakes his 
religious faith. 
Robertson goes on to acknowledge that globalization is also the result of 
intellectual and rhetorical reformulations.  In the above description of the Take-off Phase, 
he refers to the “inclusion of a number of non-European societies in ‘international 
society.’”  Robertson is probably alluding to the Ottoman Empire, which allied itself with 
Germany and Austria-Hungary during the First World War, and especially to Japan, 
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which underwent rapid modernization in the late 19th century, adopted the European 
model of colonialism in Korea and Taiwan, and fought alongside the Great Powers in 
China during the Boxer Rebellion (1900).  Even more importantly, however, Robertson 
implies that the Take-off Phase was the period during which a formalized conception of 
the precise meaning of “international society” first appeared.  Referring to “a single 
‘international society’” and “increasingly global conceptions of the ‘correct outline’ of an 
‘acceptable’ national society,” Robertson is almost certainly thinking of the League of 
Nations and of Woodrow Wilson himself, whose notion of the international community 
was founded upon the sovereignty of individual nation-states and the inviolable right of 
national communities to self-determination. 
But Robertson is also pointing to the slow but steady replacement of mythic 
conceptions of “the nation” with comparative ones.  By 1882, for instance, the French 
philologist and historian Ernst Renan could categorically reject each of the popularly 
believed pre-historical origins of the nation:  race, language, religion, royal dynasty, 
ethnic character.  Instead, Renan famously declared, the nation was merely the product of 
“a large-scale solidarity,” the result of “a daily plebiscite.”13  Each nation, Renan 
claimed, existed mainly because its citizens found it the most convenient means of 
maintaining law and order and of guaranteeing their own liberty.  While, as Eric 
Hobsbawm has emphasized, it would be inappropriate to attribute Renan’s views to all 
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late-nineteenth-century thinkers,14 Renan’s essay nevertheless demonstrated a growing 
willingness to rethink the relationship between the nation and its citizens. 
Moreover, in a less frequently cited though equally important passage from the 
same essay, Renan went on to note the mutual interdependence of every nation-state:  
“Through their various and often opposed powers, nations participate in the common 
work of civilization; each sounds a note in the great concert of humanity. […]  Isolated, 
each has its weak point. […]  Yet all these discordant details disappear in the overall 
context.”15  The “overall context” that Renan invoked sounds remarkably similar to what 
modern sociologists refer to as the “world society,” in which nation-states legitimize 
themselves and police each other by presenting themselves as models for other nation-
states to follow.  Referring to this process as isomorphism, John W. Meyer echoes Renan 
when he argues that “nation-state forms, in many specific areas, reflect world models, 
change along with these models, and change in similar directions despite obvious 
international diversities in local culture and resources.”16  What Renan viewed as the 
complementary nature of different nation-states participating in the “common work of 
civilization” is, according to Meyer, the result of each nation-state being embedded in a 
much wider global political culture.  Despite whatever regional differences may obtain, 
nation-states are always recognizable as such because they tend to follow each other’s 
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examples, whether this means establishing a parliamentary form of representative 
government or, as it did in Renan’s time, acquiring large-scale overseas empires.  In other 
words, both Renan and Meyer would argue that nation-states do not come into being 
because of some sort of “racial momentum” (to borrow once again from Wilson), but 
rather because they are recognized by other nation-states (the “world society” for Meyer) 
as fitting preexisting models of what nation-states are supposed to look like and do (the 
“common work of civilization” for Renan).  Thus Renan’s 1882 lecture marks the 
transition from a mythic to the comparative understanding of “the nation” and 
international society that Robertson describes. 
But if these wider developments were occurring elsewhere in the world in the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, what specific events and trends characterize 
the American experience of globalization?  What shaped the increasingly international 
views of Woodrow Wilson and other Americans engaged in the public and literary 
discourse of their time?  What events, in short, propelled the United States onto the 
global stage?  These questions have long occupied historians, who have traditionally 
exhibited greater attention to the interplay between domestic and international concerns 
in the shaping of American culture than have scholars of American literature; as a result, 
a considerable body of literature on the history of U.S. foreign policy already exists.17  
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Frequently, these historians disagree in their interpretations of events, such as whether 
economic or ideological concerns played a more important role in motivating overseas 
expansion and whether the 1890s marked a radical departure in U.S. foreign policy or 
illustrated continuity with the policies of earlier administrations.  Nevertheless, they tend 
to trace America’s entry onto the global stage via the same key events and connect those 
events to more diffuse social movements:  1) the appearance of the first anti-immigration 
laws (the first being the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882); 2) the Spanish-American War 
(1898) and the debates about imperialism that it generated; 3) the formulation of the 
Open Door Policy (1899) and the Taft administration’s (1909-13) commitment to “dollar 
diplomacy”; 4) Theodore Roosevelt’s mediation of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) 
and the increased prestige its success—and Roosevelt’s Nobel Peace Prize—brought to 
U.S. diplomacy; and 5) America’s entry into World War I and Woodrow Wilson’s 
prominence during the Peace of Paris (1919-20).  I, however, would like to examine these 
events from an explicitly global perspective, that is, not simply as events that marked the 
United States’ entry onto the international stage as a Great Power but as events that 
transformed America into a globalized nation. 
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the other anti-immigration legislation that 
appeared in the following decades marked a radical shift in U.S. immigration policy.  
Until that point, the United States had pursued a policy of open immigration, despite 
increasing tension over the influx of Irish immigrants as early as the 1850s, and the 
government certainly had not singled out a specific ethnic group for such discrimination.  
Indeed, as late as 1868, the United States and China had agreed to the Burlingame Treaty, 
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which allowed unlimited immigration between the two nations, and the United States had 
actively encouraged Chinese workers to immigrate because of the source of cheap labor 
they provided, especially for the construction of railroads.  Yet the late-nineteenth-
century influx of millions of immigrants, all of them seemingly carrying their native 
cultural practices with them, produced a widespread anxiety that the nation itself was 
fragmenting in even more disturbing ways than the sectionalism that had led to the Civil 
War.  This anxiety, as Michael Hunt demonstrates, “made the unifying effect of an 
assertively nationalist foreign policy particularly attractive,” thus contributing to the idea 
that domestic pressures could be vented through “overseas adventures.”18  Increased 
contact with different ethnic groups led white Americans to commit to what both Hunt 
and Walter LaFeber call “Anglo-Saxonism,” the belief in the superiority of English-
speaking people’s civilization and in the duty of English speakers to protect that 
civilization through the establishment of racial hierarchies that could control other 
peoples at home and abroad.19  Among the results were a domestic policy of closed 
borders and a foreign policy of, at first, territorial and then economic expansion overseas.  
In other words, as an examination of the writings of Josiah Strong will demonstrate 
below, U.S. foreign and domestic policy converged to produce a sort of nativist globalism 
that enabled American politicians and intellectuals to link their exclusion of non-Anglo-
                                                 
18
 Hunt 37.  Amy Kaplan makes a similar connection between imperialist expansion and domestic racial 
tensions in several chapters of The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard UP, 2002). 
 
19
 In Hunt, see pp. 77-91; in LaFeber, New Empire, see pp. 99-100.  In The Globalizing of America, 1913-
1945, Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 3 (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1993), Akira 
Iriye intriguingly suggests that the practices of such racial hierarchies result from globalization itself.  He 
briefly alludes to “the conception of race hierarchy that had always existed but which now became more 
relevant in view of the coming closer together of various races of mankind” (15).  W.E.B. Du Bois agreed 
with this assessment; see note 49 below. 
  
 
45 
Saxon immigrants with their attempts to intervene in global markets elsewhere, such as in 
China and Latin America. 
Nowhere is that transition from a foreign policy of territorial expansion to one of 
economic expansion more dramatically illustrated than in the two watershed moments of 
the McKinley administration:  the Spanish-American War and the formulation of the 
Open Door Policy.  In the decade or so leading up to those events, America’s political 
leaders had faced a series of economic crises, including widespread opposition to the 
government’s continued commitment to the gold standard and a severe depression that 
began in 1893 due in part to overproduction.  Many Americans were also growing uneasy 
at what they perceived to be the encroachment of European imperial powers within U.S. 
spheres of influence (namely, Latin America and the Pacific Rim).  The solution to both 
problems, some argued, was to follow the European imperial model:  to protect existing 
American interests by building a larger navy and to generate new markets for American 
goods by acquiring overseas colonies.  Yet when the Spanish-American War offered the 
United States the opportunity both to test its navy and acquire the Philippines from Spain, 
many prominent Americans, including William Jennings Bryan, opposed colonial 
expansion for a combination of moral and economic reasons.  They argued that not only 
was it a contradiction in terms for a democracy to set itself up as an imperial power, but 
that the costs of running and protecting overseas colonies—not to mention suppressing 
any native populations—would far outstrip whatever economic benefits possessing such 
colonies might produce.  In the end, the protracted and largely unexpected Philippine 
Insurrection (1899-1913) lent credence to the anti-imperialist argument, and American 
policymakers searched for an alternative model of economic expansion. 
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That alternative model already existed in the form of Cuba, which officially 
gained its independence after the Spanish-American War but which remained an 
American protectorate under the Platt Amendment of 1901 and the Reciprocity Treaty of 
1902.  Cuba’s nominal independence, Emily Rosenberg claims, served as “a laboratory 
for methods of influence that fell short of outright colonialism” and proved that “the 
expansion of trade and investment could best proceed without formal colonialism.”20  So 
economically successful did the McKinley administration find this policy of “non”-
colonization that it pursued similar protectorate treaties throughout Latin America, where 
a strong U.S. presence made it possible to enjoy special tariff privileges to the exclusion 
of European nations.  In regions where the United States could not impose such 
beneficial tariffs, it attempted to win the European powers over to its model of “non”-
colonization.  The most notable result was the Open Door Policy, a largely rhetorical 
approach to foreign trade that was first proposed by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899.  
Designed to guarantee the territorial integrity of China and thus to ensure equal trading 
rights in China for all western nations, the Open Door Policy was never officially 
accepted by any other nation, a fact that did not prevent Hay from declaring that it had 
been.  Yet the inaction of most of the other Great Powers made it seem that, in practice, 
the Open Door Policy was a success—at least until Japan began occupying Manchuria 
and other Chinese territories from the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) onwards.  The 
perceived success of Hay’s Open Door Policy (or a willful blindness to its ultimate 
failure) laid the cornerstone for subsequent U.S. foreign policy during the period that 
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Rosenberg labels the “promotional state” (1890-1913),21 which reached its apotheosis 
during the administration of William Howard Taft.  Taft believed that substituting 
“dollars for bullets” was the surest method of expanding American economic interests 
and, as Akira Iriye puts it, of “promoting an economically more interdependent—and 
therefore […] politically stabler—international order.”22  This equation of economic 
growth and geopolitical stability was particularly appealing to American investors, who 
received regular incentives to invest in overseas industries and markets and thus laid the 
groundwork for today’s multinational corporations. 
The final two events, the respective diplomatic prominence of Theodore 
Roosevelt during the Russo-Japanese War and Woodrow Wilson after World War I, were 
perhaps the most important in accelerating the United States’ entry into global 
prominence.  Through their efforts at mediating conflicts between or among major 
powers, both men increased the global prestige of the American presidency significantly.  
Furthermore, the activities of both presidents fed into a widely held sense of mission, an 
almost religious conviction that America faced a special duty to transform the world.  
Next to Roosevelt’s and Wilson’s diplomatic undertakings, however, the most 
conspicuous result of this ideology of global transformation was, as Rosenberg points 
out, the “outpouring of American Protestant missionary activity [that] provided a cultural 
counterpart to the American economic invasion.”23  Missionaries and philanthropists 
subscribed enthusiastically to the notion that extending American culture, particularly 
American religious culture, abroad simultaneously promoted better international 
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understanding and made it easier for U.S. businesses to gain footholds in other countries, 
despite such evidence to the contrary as the targeting of foreign missionaries in China 
during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.  Accordingly, this ideology of global transformation 
and “world-salvation” provided a powerful lens through which Americans could view—
and interact with—the world and coordinate their various political, economic, and 
cultural expansionist practices.  It is to the genealogy of that ideology of “world-
salvation” and the power of its rhetoric I now turn. 
  *  *  *  *  *   
 In 1885, a relatively obscure Congregational minister named Josiah Strong 
published a remarkable book entitled Our Country:  Its Possible Future and Its Present 
Crisis.  Originally intended as little more than an extended plea for contributions to the 
American Home Missionary Society, the text gradually extended into a more complicated 
treatise on the then-current state of American society and its future role in world affairs.  
Strong, who fancied himself an intellectual and social reformer, drew—and attempted to 
synthesize—information from a wide variety of sources:  census reports, Papal 
Encyclicals, the Encyclopǽdia Britannica, Alexis de Tocqueville, articles from The 
Nation and The Century, and so forth.  Linking the importance of missionary work 
(including home missions) to U.S. foreign policy and the duty of Anglo-Saxons to spread 
civilization (namely, Anglo-American culture) throughout the world, Strong produced an 
instant bestseller.  In less than a decade, Our Country sold 175,000 copies in the United 
States alone, making it one of the most popular books of its time.24 
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 Without question, the reason for the book’s enormous popularity lay in the careful 
balance Strong struck between playing to his audience’s patriotic belief in America’s 
cultural, economic, and moral supremacy and, at the same time, playing up their fears 
that alien forces were diluting an alleged national unity that made America’s supremacy 
possible.  In throwing these two affective forces into relation with one another, Strong 
uses Our Country to construct and articulate a particularly virulent and exclusionary 
concept of American identity.  Half of the book’s fourteen chapters are dedicated to 
describing and deploring seven major “perils” to America’s cultural homogeneity:  
immigration, Roman Catholicism, Mormonism, intemperance/alcoholism, socialism, 
financial inequality, and urbanization.  The other half is a paean to the seemingly 
limitless economic resources of the American West and moral resources of the Anglo-
Saxon race and to the providence that brought the Anglo-Saxon race to the American 
West.  Throughout, Strong insists that America can realize its potential only if its citizens 
first civilize and Christianize their rapidly closing western frontier, ensuring that the same 
Anglo-Saxon, Christian culture extends across the continent.  Thus Strong takes a carrot-
and-stick approach to his argument, reassuring his readers that America is indeed 
destined to lead the world yet warning them that the only way to achieve that destiny is to 
act now. 
In essence, Strong places the responsibility for America’s continued greatness at 
the doorstep of his readers, no doubt hoping that the immediate result would be an influx 
of financial contributions to the American Home Missionary Society.  But the length and 
complexity of Strong’s argument—and the fact that he would return twice more to the 
same themes, in The New Era or the Coming Kingdom (1893) and Expansion under New 
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World Conditions (1900)—suggest that Strong’s aims were more ambitious.  Indeed, 
LaFeber claims that Strong wanted nothing less than to influence U.S. foreign policy at 
the highest levels, citing Strong’s later association with expansionist ideologues like 
Alfred Thayer Mahan and Senator William P. Frye of Maine.25  In Our Country, Strong 
repeatedly links domestic issues with global events, and he accepts unquestioningly the 
central principle of home missions:  that “salvation” of the world is inextricably tied to 
“salvation” of the nation.  As a result, he forces his readers to look outwards, beyond 
America’s borders, to perceive existing dangers and to glimpse future opportunities.  
Following the logic of Strong’s argument, LaFeber argues, “American foreign policy 
makers could only operate from the basic assumption of an ever increasing involvement 
in world politics.  The policy makers had no choice, given the discoveries of steam and 
electricity and the resulting unity of the peoples of the world. […]  Salvation lay in the 
fulfillment of the Anglo-Saxon mission to reshape the world in the mold of western 
civilization.”26 
The use of the word salvation in this context is significant and almost certainly 
intentional on LaFeber’s part, for it is precisely this word—and its metonymic status 
within Strong’s reformulation of relations between the United States and the rest of the 
world—that drives the rhetoric behind Strong’s ideology of global transformation.  
Unquestionably, this rhetoric echoes that of John Winthrop and other Puritan writers.  In 
its careful blending of religious and nationalistic language, Our Country can take its place 
comfortably alongside Winthrop’s “A Model of Christian Charity” (1630) and Ronald 
Reagan’s Farewell Address (1989) in the historical trajectory of the rhetoric of American 
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exceptionalism.  Yet the particular ideology that Strong articulates, which I term the 
ideology of world-salvation, is different from Winthrop’s in several respects.  Perhaps 
most importantly, Strong’s grand mission, unlike the Puritans’, is not tied to any one 
religious group.  Indeed, for a minister, Strong’s rhetoric is surprisingly devoid of 
theological particularity.  Rather, for Strong, the secular organizing principle of the 
nation is the key to world-salvation.  Furthermore, Strong’s vision places the United 
States in a far more active international role than Winthrop ever imagined.  As a “city 
upon a hill,” Winthrop’s ideal community is essentially passive; his America leads 
primarily by example.  Strong, on the other hand, advocates a more aggressive and 
interventionist approach to the secular world of international politics.  His America 
harnesses new technologies, pursues far-flung economic interests, and engages in 
diplomacy—all in an effort to effect what he viewed as change for the better in other 
societies.  In short, the ideology of world-salvation is both global and transformative. 
The strand of American exceptionalism found in Our Country thus reflexively 
engages the historical conditions and concerns of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century America.  As the United States emerged as a world power, through imperial and 
economic expansion overseas and greater involvement in international diplomacy, 
American writers, intellectuals, and politicians began interrogating the nature of their 
national identity, the future of their country, and the United States’ role in world affairs.  
Like Strong, these writers were responding to and participating in the changes going on 
within America’s social landscape and in the United States’ relationships with foreign 
nations.  What Strong provided was a powerful formula for making sense of those 
changes and carving out a more active and influential role for the United States within the 
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international community.  For the second half of this chapter, I now turn to the genealogy 
of Strong’s ideology and rhetoric, examining how Strong’s formula provided writers and 
intellectuals leading up to Woodrow Wilson a means for pushing for greater U.S. activity 
on the global stage.  I further show, however, that world-salvation remained a highly 
malleable concept; Strong’s rhetoric could be—and was—taken up by other writers with 
divergent political agendas.  W.E.B. Du Bois, in particular, shared Strong’s global 
perspective but arrived at a different set of conclusions about America’s role in the world, 
acknowledging that the world beyond America also had a role to play in the lives of his 
fellow African-Americans. 
The concept of world-salvation turns up repeatedly throughout Our Country.  It 
makes its first appearance even before Strong’s text begins, in the introduction written by 
Austin Phelps, a fellow Congregational minister and the former president of Andover 
Theological Seminary.  Phelps, whom Strong admired and quoted extensively, quickly 
highlights the central strand of Strong’s argument:  that of a connection existing between 
national and international well-being or, as Phelps puts it, “the idea of crisis in the 
destiny of this country, and through it in the destiny of the world.”27  A few paragraphs 
later, Phelps also summarizes Strong’s solution for averting this two-fold crisis: 
The conflict for the world’s salvation partakes of the same character [as a military 
crisis].  And the facts and their corollaries massed together in this book show that 
nowhere is it more portentously true than in this country.  Our whole history is a 
succession of crises.  Our national salvation demands in supreme exercise certain 
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military virtues. […]  The truth [is] that Christian enterprise for the moral 
conquest of this land needs to be conducted.28 
The salvation of America and, by extension, the salvation of the world can result only 
through ensuring that the “moral conquest” of the United States gets carried out by 
Protestant organizations like the American Home Missionary Society, which provided 
support for new churches in the western territories until they became financially 
independent.  In his use of militaristic language, which was typical of Protestant leaders 
of the time,29 Phelps seems to prescribe a single rule of thumb that guarantees both 
America’s and the world’s salvation:  The spread of Christian civilization must keep pace 
with American expansion—and, presumably, vice versa.  That is, to ensure America’s 
salvation, Phelps believes that Americans must make the cultural and political identity of 
the United States synonymous with Christian civilization, and to ensure the world’s 
salvation, they must actively reshape the world in America’s own image. 
In Phelps’ introduction, therefore, we find the core of Josiah Strong’s argument 
and the starting point of Strong’s career as an apologist for American imperialist 
expansion.  Yet what distinguishes this book in its entirety from other imperialist tracts of 
the time, such as those of the British novelist G.A. Henty,30 is exactly what Phelps 
admires but leaves out of his introduction:  all that mass of “facts and their corollaries.”  
It is, in fact, the sheer amount of information that Strong grapples with and attempts to tie 
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together that transforms his treatise from a mere exercise in fundraising into something 
far more groundbreaking.  Despite the dubiousness of Strong’s politics, it would be unfair 
to dismiss Our Country as misinformed propaganda from a reactionary figure.  On the 
contrary, as a historical document, Our Country remains an intelligent and insightful 
inquiry into a complex set of social and economic questions that intersected in ways the 
author himself barely understood.  Reading the book today, one is consistently surprised 
at how closely Strong’s study resembles our current understanding of globalization.  
Without Strong’s perceptive observations and incisive correlations, it is unlikely that 
Wilson, who knew and read Strong’s work, would have managed to conceive of 
America’s relationship to the world in as sophisticated a way as he did.  In short, the 
importance of Strong’s Our Country rests as much upon its lasting impact on Americans’ 
conceptualization of the world as upon its immediate influence on U.S. foreign policy. 
Take, for instance, Strong’s discussion of immigrants, which is the first and most 
pressing “peril” he addresses in his book.  Although he frets at length over the “noxious” 
and “profound influence on our national life and character” that a “typical” European 
immigrant’s “meager or false religious training” might exert,31 he never once entertains 
the possibility of closing America’s borders or establishing immigration quotas.  To be 
sure, he paints a bleak picture of the extent to which immigrants were beginning to 
transform certain parts of the nation; according to Strong, several cities on the east coast, 
including New York City, are already “essentially foreign” (44).  Instead of viewing 
these immigrants as interlopers, however, Strong portrays them as victims of 
circumstance or, to be more precise, as the necessary and unstoppable result of historical 
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forces of technology and the global economy.  He explains that the mass migration is due 
to faster and cheaper “facilities of travel,” most notably “steam navigation,” that reduced 
the cost of passage from Europe to America by as much as 70%-90% between 1825 and 
1885 (38).  Strong also links this migration to economic and political conditions on both 
sides of the Atlantic and, even more perceptively, to how the conditions on one side can 
affect the conditions on the other.  For example, he points to the invention and production 
of “labor-saving machinery” in America that is then exported to Europe:  “The making of 
this machinery in the United States increases the demand for labor here, and its 
exportation decreases the demand for labor in the Old World.  That means immigration to 
this country.  We are to send our labor-saving machinery around the globe, and 
equivalents in bone and muscle are to be sent back to us” (39).  Thus in Strong’s opinion, 
international migration is as much a historical certainty as are the economic realities of 
production and consumption or the inevitability of technological progress. 
But if Strong does not advocate isolationism, then what remedy for this “peril” to 
American culture does he suggest?  His solution is, quite simply, assimilation.  He writes, 
“Our safety demands the assimilation of these strange populations. […  Either] this in-
sweeping immigration is to foreignize us, or we are to Americanize it” (45).  Coming 
from an advocate for home missions, such a solution is unsurprising.  Once assimilated 
and Americanized—by which Strong means converting them into Protestants and 
instilling in them the values of hard work and frugality—these immigrants will become 
Americans in a way that citizenship alone cannot guarantee.  Whether Strong would 
promote intermarriage as one possible route to assimilation is unlikely; his conception of 
Americanization is largely cultural.  At the end of his chapter on immigration, however, 
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Strong does venture into metaphorical terrain.  Comparing the influx of immigrants to a 
zoo animal being force-fed, he advises that the “only alternative is, digest or die” (46).  In 
its emphasis on corporeality, Strong’s choice of metaphor is strikingly in line with 
Woodrow Wilson’s description of the United States “embodying” all other nations in his 
speech made thirty years later.  Both men depict assimilation as a process of absorption 
into the larger body politic.  Unlike Wilson, though, Strong’s depiction is far less 
celebratory, and his reasons less benign.  Whereas Wilson seems comfortable with some 
degree of cultural diversity, Strong wants greater homogeneity.  Otherwise, he argues, the 
nation cannot function coherently on the global stage.   Yet this seeming paradox that 
Strong espouses—a sort of nativist globalism that employs racism and ethnocentrism to 
further the nation’s international interests—remains both comparativist and functionalist.  
He writes, “With the […] increasing facilities of intercourse, intelligence and influence 
are less centralized, and peoples become more homogenous; and the more nearly 
homogenous peoples are, the more do numbers tell.  America is to have the great 
preponderance of numbers and of wealth, and by the logic of events will follow the 
scepter of controlling influence” (166, original emphasis).  In other words, since centers 
of population and wealth are destined to shift from Europe to America, the United States 
needs to maintain as culturally homogenous an identity as possible in order to direct its 
national efforts towards global prominence.  By sheer weight of numbers (wealth and 
population), America can dominate international politics and the global economy. 
The importance that Strong places on numbers extends to other facets of his 
argument.  For him, numbers are not just about size and power; they also affect the way 
we experience the world and our overall quality of life.  “To preserve republican 
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institutions requires a higher average intelligence and virtue among large populations 
than among small,” he writes.  “The government of 3,000,000 people was a simple thing 
compared with the government of 50,000,000; and the government of 50,000,000 is a 
simple thing compared with that of 500,000,000. […]  In the latter there are multiplied 
relations whose harmony must be preserved.  A mistake is farther reaching.  It has, as it 
were, a longer leverage” (139, original emphasis).  What Strong seems to be saying here 
is that quantitative and qualitative are not discrete paradigms.  An increase in the size of 
any given population entails a simultaneous increase in the number of relations among 
the individuals who make up that population, and an increase in the number of relations 
means that society itself becomes more complicated and less predictable, one of the key 
conditions of globalization.  Preexisting models for understanding society cannot sustain 
themselves when they are unable to account for the new conditions of possibility that a 
wider range of relations opens up. 
Strong fully engages with these new conditions of possibility that were emerging 
at the close of the nineteenth century.  For instance, he accords new technologies, 
especially the steam engine and mass media, special importance in Our Country because 
they were drawing the peoples of the world into closer contact with one another and 
thereby multiplying relations across international borders.  To Strong and others, the 
advent of these new technologies signaled a new era in human history:  “The impetus 
given to inter-communication of every sort by the application of steam was the beginning 
of new life in the world” (2).  Steam power and mass media were working in concert with 
Christianity to transform the globe and its inhabitants into a unified community.  
“Christianity,” he writes, “is slowly binding the [human] race into a brotherhood.  The 
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press transforms the earth into an audience room; while the steam engine, so far as 
commerce is concerned, has annihilated, say, nine-tenths of space” (69).  The “new life” 
that Strong envisions involves a dramatic shift in relations across the board, brought 
about largely by emerging technologies of travel and communication.  Disparate 
audiences think of themselves as a single community of readers, thanks to a press that can 
distribute the same information throughout the world simultaneously.  And thanks to the 
message of Christianity, natives of one nation view citizens of foreign countries as 
brothers rather than rivals.  People’s relationship with space changes due to the steam 
engine, which shrinks the world of commerce by making it possible for a single product 
to appear in any market of the world.  Even time itself alters, since people can experience 
and know more about the world than preceding generations; anticipating Roland 
Robertson’s identification of “compression” as a key feature of globalization, Strong 
suggests that our lives “compress, it may be, years into hours” (70, emphasis added). 
Communication and the exchange of ideas hold special importance for Strong.  
(After all, for a missionary, Christianity is first and foremost a message to be spread.)  
Strong repeatedly links travel and commerce with communication.  For example, he 
refers to steam ships as “steam communication” (4), and Our Country opens with a brief 
history of steam power and its effect on the spread of Western ideas.  And as noted 
above, Strong never advocates an isolationist position.  Instead, he promotes what he 
calls intercourse.  For Strong, intercourse comprises both economic and travel routes, 
neither or which can be fully separated from the other, as well as the exchange of ideas.  
“Isolation leads to stagnation,” he writes.  “Intercourse quickens thought, feeling, action. 
[…]  By bringing the country to the city, the inland cities to the seaboard, the seaports to 
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each other, [steam] has multiplied many-fold every form of intercourse. […]  It has 
greatly complicated business” (69).  In this formula, the distances of time and space no 
longer separate products, people, or ideas.  All exist within a web of intercourse, and as 
demonstrated in the introduction, this attentiveness to web-like interconnectedness is 
integral to the emergence of a global consciousness at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Strong, however, clearly wants this web of intercourse to operate on his own 
terms, or at least he wants to exploit it for his own purposes.  “The elbows of the nations 
touch,” he says.  “Isolation—the mother of barbarism—is becoming impossible” (14).  
But he goes on to equate “barbarism” with whatever is non-Christian:  “The warm breath 
of the Nineteenth Century is breathing a living soul under [Asia’s] ribs of death.  The 
world is to be Christianized and civilized. […]  Commerce follows the missionary” (14-
15).  In other words, Christianity, civilization, and material and economic progress go 
hand in hand.  And as far as Strong is concerned, only America, with its Anglo-Saxon 
and Christian heritage and vast economic resources, can adequately embody these three 
forces and then transmit them throughout the world.  In his concluding chapter, Strong 
assures his readers, “Our plea is not America for America’s sake; but America for the 
world’s sake. […]  If I were a Christian African or Arab, I would look into the immediate 
future of the United States with intense and thrilling interest; for, as Professor Hoppin of 
Yale has said:  ‘America Christianized means the world Christianized’” (218). 
The ideology of world-salvation that Strong formulated pervades the writings of 
many influential historians and political theorists in the decades following the publication 
of Our Country, though the impulse to Christianize that was present, though largely 
nondenominational, in Strong gradually gives way to an ever more secular reliance on the 
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transformative power of the nation.  Specifically, Frederick Jackson Turner, Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, Brooks Adams, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the other men who were 
influenced by Strong’s worldview have become, as Michael Hunt calls them, the “stock 
figures” in political histories of the era.32  Stock figures they may seem, but they were, in 
fact, central players in the history of American expansionism.  All of them exercised 
considerable intellectual influence over the administrations of Roosevelt, Taft, and 
Wilson.  LaFeber notes, for example, that Mahan and Brooks often helped shape official 
U.S. foreign policy and that Turner enjoyed a close friendship with Wilson while also 
influencing Roosevelt’s view of American history through his writing.33  Naturally, not 
all of these men (and all of them were, of course, men) agreed upon the exact course 
America’s political leaders should steer for the nation.  There were frequent and heated 
disagreements both between Republican and Democratic factions within the government 
and, sometimes, within the parties themselves, as the splintering of the Republican Party 
in 1912 demonstrated.  Even Henry Cabot Lodge, whose support for extending U.S. 
influence abroad was as staunch as anyone’s, spearheaded the campaign in the Senate to 
block ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919-20 because of his opposition to 
many of Wilson’s aims, and as we see in the writings of W.E.B. Du Bois, the ideology of 
world salvation itself could transform dramatically when taken up by the writers of an 
alternative political history. 
Nevertheless, what tied these thinkers together was the shared belief that they had 
entered a “new epoch” in American history and that this new epoch was the result of—
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and the continued opportunity for—America’s greater involvement in world affairs.34  
Woodrow Wilson expressed both sentiments quite clearly.  In his address to the Senate 
on July 10, 1919, Wilson proclaimed, “America may be said to have just reached her 
majority as a world power. […]  Our isolation was ended twenty years ago [with the 
Spanish-American War of 1898]; and now fear of us is ended also, our counsel and 
association sought after and desired.  There can be no question of our ceasing to be a 
world power.”35  And as he continued to urge ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and 
entry into the League of Nations, he explained in a speech on September 10 of that same 
year:  “We have managed in the process of civilization […] to make a world that cannot 
be taken to pieces.  The pieces are intricately dovetailed and fitted with one another, and 
unless you assemble them as you do, the intricate parts of a great machine, the pieces 
won’t work.”36  Isolation for the United States has ended, Wilson says, and a return to an 
isolationist foreign policy would be tantamount to ripping one of the most important 
gears out of an intricate machine; the world simply will not work properly if America 
refuses to take part in its affairs. 
These sentiments are expressed more fully and become redirected in support of 
American economic expansion in the writings of Wilson’s friend Frederick Jackson 
Turner.  Like Josiah Strong, Turner is most famous today for the significance he placed 
on the closing of the American west, yet it is important to remember that, in its fullest 
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articulation, Turner’s frontier thesis finds its logical conclusion in overseas expansion.  In 
his 1896 essay “The Problem of the West,” Turner writes, “For nearly three hundred 
years, the dominant fact in American life has been expansion.  With the settlement of the 
Pacific Coast and the occupation of the free lands, this movement has come to a check.”37  
Note that Turner does say that this movement has come to an end, merely to a “check.”  
He goes on, “The demands for a vigorous foreign policy, for an interoceanic canal, for a 
revival of our power upon the seas, and for the extension of American influence to 
outlying islands and adjoining countries, are indications that the movement will 
continue.”38 
Perhaps Turner’s greatest contribution to the development of a global 
consciousness among turn-of-the-twentieth-century Americans, however, is that he 
distinguishes the new conditions of possibility that he, Wilson, and Strong were 
encountering from outright colonialism, making it clear that he did not simply equate the 
emerging processes of globalization with the forms of Western imperialism that were 
already in place at the end of the nineteenth century.  For instance, the subsequent 
“movement” Turner envisions taking place is not limited to—or even primarily about—
people and colonization.  He believes that economic routes of exchange must precede 
other forms of physical movement.  In an earlier essay, he writes that “political relations, 
in a highly developed civilization, are inextricably connected with economic relations. 
[…]  Reciprocity is a word that meets with increasing favor from all parties.  But once 
fully afloat on the sea of worldwide economic interests, we shall soon develop political 
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interests.”39  In an attempt to refute the notion that the United States is or can remain 
isolated from the rest of the world, Turner points to America’s existing interests in 
Samoa, Africa, and South America.  Clearly, Turner’s frontier thesis was never just about 
domestic concerns; it was a means of revealing the need for new frontiers and of 
convincing his fellow Americans to think beyond their national borders. 
For Alfred Thayer Mahan, the intellectual who was perhaps most responsible for 
shaping U.S. foreign policy before Wilson became president, the sea formed such a new 
frontier, and this frontier was omnipresent and could never be permanently closed.  Like 
Turner and Strong, Mahan is remembered primarily for only a small part of his larger 
argument, though that part exerted a profound influence over U.S. foreign policy and 
upon the course of American history.  In his massive 1890 tome, The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History, 1660-1783, Mahan argued that naval power was the decisive factor 
in a nation’s success in modern war and international politics.  Those nations that 
controlled the major sea-lanes and excluded other nations from their use, he explained, 
were historically the most successful at maintaining a stable economy (because they were 
able to export goods safely abroad) and at wielding power over other nations.  In practical 
terms, Mahan’s ideas helped convince the U.S. government to invest in building up the 
navy, a decision that resulted in the famous Great White Fleet as well as in quick naval 
victories during the Spanish-American War of 1898.  Arguably, they also contributed to 
World Wars I and II, since Mahan’s suggestions were followed both by the Germans and 
by the Japanese, whose own aggressive expansionism brought them into conflict with the 
United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. 
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Mahan’s importance to the development of an American global consciousness is 
due to his complex understanding of how global markets work and, especially, to his 
attentiveness to the multidirectionality of international diplomacy.  Mahan’s conception 
of sea power is not unidirectional; he does not suggest that one powerful nation always 
exerts force over other less powerful nations.  Instead, like Turner, he privileges the word 
reciprocity (the principle that exchange between two nations should be open and 
mutually beneficial):  “Reciprocity, increased freedom of movement, is the logical 
corollary of expansion, which is but increase of scope and power to act.”40  Moreover, 
Mahan was not quite the glory-hungry saber-rattler he is often portrayed as being; his 
extensive use of militaristic language is a rhetorical device in much the same way that 
Austin Phelps’ or Josiah Strong’s similarly militaristic metaphors are.  Mahan’s 
battlegrounds are predominently economic ones, and he states that the primary objective 
of U.S. expansion should be “to invade the markets of the world.”41  Even after 
describing his project as “largely a military history,” 42 Mahan avoids depicting the sea as 
a line of defense.  On the contrary, Mahan opens his first chapter of The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History with a description of the sea as a wide complex of routes of travel 
and economic exchange: 
The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political 
and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide 
common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-
worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of 
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travel rather than others.  These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the 
reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the 
world.43 
What Mahan describes here sounds remarkably similar to Strong’s web of “intercourse.”  
Just as Strong does in Our Country and Wilson does in his speech of 1915, Mahan 
acknowledges that a multiplicity of relations exist among the nations of the world and 
that, although these relations seem to operate independently of one another, they intersect 
in various ways that ultimately produce an overall harmony. 
Mahan asserts that the United States can ensure its own safety and prosperity only 
by learning how to control this “wide common”—in a sense, by learning how to play the 
game of international trade and politics.  Elsewhere, Mahan argues that “to seek the 
welfare of the country” and “to affirm the importance of distant markets, and the relation 
to them of our own immense powers of production, implies logically the recognition of 
the link that joins the products and the markets, that is, the carrying trade.”44  In other 
words, maintaining national self-interest means acknowledging and strengthening ties 
with foreign markets.  Such a “view of the relations of the United States to the world [is] 
radically distinct from the simple idea of self-sufficingness.”45  Thus Mahan rejects 
isolationist thinking as wholly untenable now that America has become a mature member 
of the community of nations.  Indeed, Mahan not only agrees with Strong and Wilson that 
the United States has entered a new era in its history; he characterizes this perceived 
rupture with the past in far starker and more dramatic terms, comparing it to “the breach 
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of continuity between the middle ages and modern times.”46  The result:  “Whether they 
will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward.”47  Echoing Strong’s advice to 
“digest or die,” Mahan envisions no other alternative. 
 That all of the men discussed above were intensely interested in social history 
goes without saying, as does the fact that most of them were established intellectuals and 
professional scholars.  Wilson and Turner earned Ph.D.s at Johns Hopkins University; 
Henry Cabot Lodge did the same at Harvard.  Both Lodge and Wilson were respected 
teachers before they entered politics, Mahan taught and served as an administrator at the 
U.S. Naval War College, and Turner enjoyed a long academic career first at the 
University of Wisconsin and later at Harvard.  Perhaps never before in American history 
had so many accredited intellectuals exerted so direct and extensive an influence upon 
official policymakers.  Even when, as in Mahan’s case, the historical research they 
undertook was not always particularly reliable, their work was taken seriously by 
powerful people, and Wilson, of course, remains the only U.S. president to date to have 
completed a research doctorate.  Despite their credentials and sometimes considerable 
intellectual skills, however, all of them were white men who bought wholeheartedly into 
the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism.  Consequently, it would be easy to assume that the 
entire intellectual trajectory outlined above, including the basic rhetoric of world 
salvation, was similarly committed to that same ideology.  But such was not the case.  As 
I demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the emerging forces of globalization and the new 
conditions of possibility that they set up were to some extent (and still are) always 
beyond the control of any one group of people and therefore open to being exploited for 
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competing purposes.  In a sense, then, the concept of world salvation was too powerful 
not to have a life of its own, and it could be—and was—picked up and used purposively 
for alternative objectives by a very different type of intellectual. 
 W.E.B. Du Bois’ own standing as an intellectual and scholar was certainly equal 
to that of any of the other writers discussed so far.  Du Bois, too, had earned his Ph.D. 
from Harvard in 1895, becoming the first African-American to do so, and he began 
teaching at Atlanta University two years later.  Over the next decade, Du Bois’ writings, 
including The Souls of Black Folk (1903), and political activism, including his 
involvement in the founding of the NAACP (1909), would make him one of the foremost 
black intellectuals of his era.  His influence upon U.S. policy may never have been as 
direct, as consistent, or as extensive as that of his white counterparts, but his interest in 
and careful examination of global politics was just as strong.  And that facet of his work 
only intensified as he became more and more interested in Pan-Africanism and the role 
that African-Americans could play in that movement. 
Du Bois’ commitment to the Pan-African movement would lead him in turn to 
interrogate the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism and the relationship between global 
capitalism and imperialism.  His fullest and most satisfying investigation into these 
questions probably remains Darkwater:  Voices from within the Veil (1920).  In “The 
Souls of White Folk,” the second chapter of Darkwater, Du Bois argues that the 
colonization of non-white territories was implicit in the logic of global capitalism and 
that World War I was the logical conclusion of the European scramble for those non-
white territories.  Du Bois writes, “The world market most wildly and desperately sought 
today is the market where labor is cheapest and most helpless and profit is most 
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abundant.  This labor is kept cheap and helpless because the white world despises 
‘darkies.’”48  Even more importantly, Du Bois claims, it is precisely this increased 
contact between whites and non-whites and the (for whites) economic and political 
necessity of establishing racial hierarchies to control such contact that gives “modern 
days” their “newness.”49  Thus despite the fact that Du Bois and Josiah Strong might 
appear irreconcilably at odds, especially in terms of their differing attitudes toward race, 
Du Bois in fact shares Strong’s recognition of there being “new life in the world.”  Du 
Bois’ vision of this “new life” is far bleaker, however, because he knows it is founded 
upon the global institutionalization of racism.  That is why he rejects Wilson’s optimistic 
pronouncements that America had reached “her majority as a world power” and that “fear 
of [America had] ended also.”  “It is curious,” he writes in what could be a direct 
response to Wilson, “to see America, the United States, looking on herself, first, as a sort 
of natural peacemaker, then as a moral protagonist in this terrible time.  No nation is less 
fitted for this role.”50  Far from being the ideal “mediating Nation,” the United States 
represented the ultimate failure of democracy, since it had been guilty of 
institutionalizing racism within in its own borders, not only in far-off colonies.   
 Darkwater, however, is not Du Bois’ only meditation on these problems.  He had 
already conducted a trial run for that work, as it were, in his much shorter but equally 
trenchant essay “The African Roots of the War,” published five years earlier in the May 
1915 issue of Atlantic Monthly—and less than a month after Woodrow Wilson delivered 
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the speech that opens this chapter.  This essay’s central argument is much the same as the 
one in “The Souls of White Folk”:  World War I is the direct result of economic 
competition among the European powers in Africa (i.e., the so-called “scramble for 
Africa”).  Here is how Du Bois words it: 
The present world war is, then, the result of jealousies engendered by the recent 
rise of armed national associations of labor and capital whose aim is the 
exploitation of the wealth of the world mainly outside the European circle of 
nations.  These associations, grown jealous and suspicious at the division of the 
spoils of trade-empire, are fighting to enlarge their respective shares; they look for 
expansion, not in Europe but in Asia, and particularly in Africa.51 
What distinguishes “The African Roots of the War” from Darkwater is its more 
optimistic outlook.  In the earlier essay, Du Bois acknowledges more fully the potential 
for resistance that globalization affords oppressed peoples.  In order to reach this 
optimistic conclusion, Du Bois employs not only the rhetoric but also the very phrase 
world-salvation that Austin Phelps used to introduce Josiah Strong’s Our Country thirty 
years earlier, demonstrating just how powerful and pervasive that rhetoric truly was.  
Furthermore, in “The African Roots of the War,” Du Bois adopts Wilsonian logic and 
language—but only in order to turn Wilson’s argument on its head.  To begin with, Du 
Bois accepts completely the supposition that the sovereignty of the nation-state is the 
building-block of the international community and that all national communities possess 
the inviolable right to self-determination.  In fact, Du Bois goes a step further and claims 
that only through belonging to a sovereign nation-state, respected by the rest of the 
community of nations, can an individual or a people hope to achieve any measure of 
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wealth, respectability, or power in the 20th century.  He observes that the “national bond 
is no mere sentimental patriotism, loyalty, or ancestor-worship.  It is the increased 
wealth, power, and luxury for all classes on a scale the world never saw before” (645).  
Then, making the same appeal to self-determination that white nationalists in, say, Poland 
or Czechoslovakia were making, Du Bois argues that the privileges of nationhood should 
be extended to Africa:  “The principle of home rule must extend to groups, nations, and 
races.  The ruling of one people for another people’s whim or gain must stop” (649).  Du 
Bois’ appeal would go unheeded, naturally.  No one at the Peace of Paris would have 
taken seriously the suggestion that imperialism in Africa and Asia should end.  The fact 
that France and Britain divided the spoils of the German and Ottoman Empires among 
themselves, even after having informally promised home rule to the Arabs during their 
insurrection against the Ottomans, lends much credence to Du Bois’ claim that the war 
was about imperial rivalries after all. 
 Du Bois also shares Wilson’s interest in the act of remapping.  Whereas Wilson 
would work to remap the borders of Europe during 1919-20, Du Bois offers a conceptual 
remapping of the entire globe in 1915, one that places the continent of Africa at the 
center of all economic, cultural, and political interests.  Quoting the Roman writer Pliny, 
Du Bois opens his essay with a Latin phrase:  semper novi quid ex Africa [“everything 
new always comes out of Africa”].  At first, he is referring to the belief that the crucial 
developments in human history emerged out of Africa, but it becomes clear that Du Bois 
believes the truth of the quotation continues to obtain.  He writes, “Particularly to-day 
most men assume that Africa lies far afield from the centres of our burning social 
problems. […]  In the Dark Continent are hidden the roots, not simply of war to-day but 
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of the menace of wars to-morrow. […]  Nearly every human empire that has arisen in the 
world, material and spiritual, has found some of its greatest crises on this continent” 
(642).  And more emphatically later on:  “Africa is the Land of the Twentieth Century” 
(646).  What Du Bois means is partly that the vast economic resources of Africa (gold, 
diamonds, cocoa, rubber, ivory, etc.) offer the rest of the world “boundless chances” to 
increase its wealth and raise its standard of living (646).  In a sense, Du Bois echoes 
Strong’s arguments about the seemingly boundless resources of the American west and 
then inverts them geographically and racially.  According to him, the real center of 
human civilization is Africa—not just because human civilization began there but 
because, as Du Bois suggests, Africa can continue to sustain the global economy 
indefinitely. 
 By the end of the essay, however, when Du Bois repeats the Latin quotation he 
opened with, it is apparent that something else new can “come out of Africa,” and that 
new thing is the empowerment of non-white peoples.  Perhaps unsurprisingly for Du 
Bois, this empowerment comes about through a combination of modernization and 
education.  Along with regaining home rule and control over African resources, he writes, 
“we must train native races in modern civilization. […]  Modern methods of educating 
children, honestly and effectively applied, would make modern, civilized nations out of 
the vast majority of human beings on earth to-day….” (649)  And who does Du Bois 
expect to undertake this training?  He asks and then answers that question himself: 
In this great work who can help us?  In the Orient, the awakened Japanese and the 
awakening leaders of New China; in India and Egypt, the young men trained in 
Europe and European ideals, who now form the stuff that Revolution is born of.  
But in Africa?  Who better than the twenty-five million grandchildren of the 
  
 
72 
European slave trade, spread through the Americas, and now writhing desperately 
for freedom and a place in the world?  And of these millions first of all the ten 
million black folk of the United States, now a problem, then a world-salvation.  
(650, emphasis added) 
Although Du Bois’ solution is perfectly clear, the way he presents it is particularly 
adroit.  At the most basic level, he expects his fellow African-Americans to take up his 
call and teach their African comrades how to adapt themselves to modernization.  Du 
Bois’ commitment to modernization—and by extension to westernization—is striking.  
Much like Strong and Mahan, Du Bois seems to think that there is no alternative to 
modernization; the conditions of possibility demand it.52  Thus he refers to the children of 
elite Egyptian and Indian families, who were sent to Oxford and Cambridge to learn how 
to run their own countries based on European models of governance and bureaucracy, 
and he refers to the governments of Japan and China, which were similarly attempting to 
modernize.  American blacks, the descendents of Africans sold into slavery, are already 
westernized, Du Bois points out, and so they should be able to pass that knowledge on to 
Africans who have not yet modernized.  It is difficult not to be reminded of Du Bois’ 
famous “Talented Tenth” here.  Just as the most highly educated African-Americans (the 
top 10% of their race) bear a duty to lead the rest of the African-American community in 
their struggle for civil rights, African-Americans in general bear a duty to lead the 
peoples of Africa in their struggle for independence.  In a sense, then, Du Bois seems to 
imply that African-Americans make up the “Talented Tenth” of the entire non-white 
world. 
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But exactly how are African-Americans supposed to lead their African comrades, 
especially when Du Bois concedes that they are themselves still “writhing desperately” 
for their own civil rights and their own “place in the world”?  To answer that question, I 
turn finally to Du Bois’ use of the term world-salvation.  I suggest that Du Bois’ 
appropriation of this highly charged rhetoric is entirely purposeful.  For one thing, he 
clearly picks up on the missionary work that writers like Austin Phelps and Josiah Strong 
had in mind when they talked about world-salvation.  When Du Bois asks his fellow 
African-Americans to take up the responsibility of educating Africans, he has two 
methods of education in mind:  first, teaching by example, by achieving their own 
freedom and self-sufficiency; second, teaching by serving as “missionaries” to Africa.  
Instead of spreading Anglo-Saxon values, paving the way for American economic 
expansion, or even preaching Christianity per se, Du Bois’ missionaries will work 
towards the goal of achieving Pan-Africanism.  Like Strong’s Our Country, Du Bois’ 
essay contains echoes of Winthrop’s “Model of Christian Charity,” but like Strong, Du 
Bois preaches a more interventionist message. 
Finally, Du Bois also picks up on Strong’s goal of reshaping the world, and for 
Du Bois, world-salvation achieves its transformative power precisely because it embraces 
and celebrates multidirectional exchange.  Here, of course, he falls very much in line with 
Strong, Mahan, and especially Wilson.  While some of them undoubtedly wanted to 
reshape the world in the image of America rather than the other way around, all of them 
recognized that the burgeoning multiplicity of relations in America’s new global context 
made isolation and self-absorption impossible.  What distinguishes Du Bois from the 
other writers, however, is the paramount importance he places on this back-and-forth 
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exchange.  For it is only through their attempt to reshape Africa that African-Americans 
can find their “place in the world.”  That is to say, Du Bois acknowledges that “now” 
African-Americans are simply “a problem,” a promise unfulfilled; they cease to be a 
problem when they become “a world-salvation.”  Du Bois pointedly refuses to supply a 
midpoint between “problem” and “world-salvation” because one status ends when and 
where the other begins.  Thus the act of transforming and empowering others is 
simultaneously an act of self-transformation and self-empowerment. 
Is Du Bois’ view of America’s role in the world in 1915 so very different from the 
one Wilson espouses in his speech of the same year?  To some extent, it is.  Where 
Wilson finds “no racial momentum,” Du Bois sees nothing else.  Where Wilson thinks 
Americans are free to turn in any direction, Du Bois knows that African-Americans lack 
many basic kinds of freedom.  And where Wilson optimistically believes that, as an 
American, he can “know” and “comprehend” and “embody” all the peoples of the world, 
Du Bois more skeptically emphasizes the seemingly impassable gulf that already 
separates white and black Americans.  At the same time, however, Du Bois argues that 
African-Americans are indeed capable of representing all of Africa.  Extending Du Bois’ 
logic would transform African-Americans into the “Talented Tenth” of all non-white 
peoples—or at least all the descendents of black Africans—making them the “mediating” 
peoples of the non-white world.  Thus what we find in Du Bois’ writing is, in a sense, a 
form of African-American exceptionalism, an acceptance on behalf of African-Americans 
of as significant a role of mediation as the one Wilson envisions for the entire nation.  
What ultimately aligns Du Bois with Wilson and the other writers, therefore, is that all of 
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them knew that being American or African-American takes on meaning only when 
understood within a global context.
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2:  Preferred Courses and Queer Falsities:  The American 
and Henry James’ Re-Vision of a Global Cultural Economy  
 
 
 When Henry James began the long, laborious process of compiling and revising 
his fiction for inclusion in the New York Edition, he took the opportunity to revisit some 
of his earliest novels, including Roderick Hudson (1875), The American (1877), and The 
Portrait of a Lady (1881).  In some cases, over thirty years had elapsed since their 
composition, and upon rereading them toward the end of 1905, he was struck by the 
disjunction between his original aims for those novels and his more mature impressions 
of their status within his body of work.  The American in particular troubled him, as he 
later revealed in its 1907 preface:  “What I have recognised then in ‘The American,’ 
much to my surprise and after long years, is that the experience here represented is the 
disconnected and uncontrolled experience—uncontrolled by our general sense of ‘the 
way things happen’—which romance alone more or less successfully palms off on us.”1  
This realization triggers one of James’ finest and most extensive discussions of the key 
characteristics of romance and realism.  For James, “the real” represents “the things we 
cannot possibly not know, sooner or later, in one way or another,” while “the romantic” 
stands for “the things that, with all the facilities in the world, all the wealth and all the 
courage and all the wit and all the adventure, we never can directly know.”2  Or as he 
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phrases this distinction somewhat more glibly, romance equates to “the way things don’t 
happen” and realism to “the way things do.”3  By the time he initiated the New York 
Edition, James was a committed realist, an author who was attuned to “the conditions that 
we usually know to attach to [experience]” and to “the ‘related’ sides of situations.”4  
Consequently, the surprise James registers in his preface is due to his discovery that, 
despite his original intentions, the world of The American is a world of “romance” 
instead of “the real.”  “The way things happen,” James sheepishly admits, “is frankly not 
the way in which they are represented as having happened, in Paris, to my hero:  the 
situation I had conceived only saddled me with that for want of my invention of 
something better.”5 
 The situation to which James refers is what he labels “the queer falsity—of the 
Bellegardes.”6  Their “queer falsity” is, of course, the plot point upon which the entire 
novel hinges:  although impoverished, the aristocratic French Bellegarde family 
steadfastly refuses to allow their daughter Claire to marry the wealthy businessman 
Christopher Newman simply because he is American and therefore unsuitable.  In reality, 
however, impecunious European aristocrats frequently married into newly affluent 
American families, as even a cursory glance at Winston Churchill’s family tree confirms.  
In 1874, Churchill’s father Lord Randolph, the third son of the seventh duke of 
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Marlborough, married Jennie Jerome, the daughter of an American millionaire.7  How 
much easier, then, for the Bellegardes to unload an already married-and-widowed 
daughter?  James’ point is that, on the contrary, instead of opposing his courtship of 
Claire so vehemently, a real-life Bellegarde family would have compared the size of 
Newman’s bank account to the shabbiness of their own ancestral home and—perhaps 
reluctantly, perhaps not—would have accepted him as a potential husband for their 
daughter.  Far from “not finding Newman good enough for their alliance,” James admits 
in his preface, the Bellegardes’ “preferred course, a thousand times preferred, would have 
been to haul him and his fortune into their boat under cover of night perhaps, in any case 
as quietly and with as little bumping and splashing as possible, and there accommodate 
him with the very safest and most convenient seat.”8 
 If we take James at his word, then he had simply got it wrong in the 1870s, 
though his thinking was somewhat more complicated, as will be shown below.  He placed 
the blame for this mistake on his own stubborn commitment to “the theme to which I was 
from so early pledged.”9  That “theme,” as James describes it, was a “situation, in another 
country and an aristocratic society, of some robust but insidiously beguiled and betrayed, 
some cruelly wronged, compatriot:  the point being in especial that he should suffer at the 
hands of persons pretending to represent the highest possible civilization and to be of an 
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order in every way superior to his own.”10  In short, James’ topic was what is sometimes 
referred to as the “international theme” in American literature:  a conflict between 
individual American and European characters that reflects a larger, more symbolic 
contrast between two opposing cultures and sets of values.  James would make this 
subject his own, returning to it again and again in such works as Daisy Miller (1878), The 
Portrait of a Lady, and The Ambassadors (1903).  Yet significantly, when reevaluating 
his first foray into this topic (indeed, some scholars consider The American the first true 
“international novel,” as I will discuss in more detail), James believed that the specific 
situation he had imagined was unrealistic.  In the intervening thirty years, he had 
developed a far more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between American 
and European society, and that more advanced understanding was not reflected in The 
American.  Nevertheless, despite whatever reservations he may have held about the 
novel’s “queer falsity,” James neither excluded The American from the New York 
Edition, as he did The Europeans (1878) and Washington Square (1880), nor altered the 
outcome of its plot, as he had already done for his own stage adaptation of The American 
in 1891.11  Instead, he chose to revise extensively, claiming that “the way things don’t 
happen may be artfully made to pass for the way things do.”12 
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The resulting alterations to this novel go far beyond the largely superficial 
changes James made to the other works in the New York Edition, and they have long 
fascinated literary scholars.  Leon Edel, for instance, labels The American “the most 
rewritten of all [James’] novels.”13  James himself acknowledged the extensiveness of his 
revisions even as he dismissed his friends’ objections that those changes hurt the novel.  
Robert Herrick quotes passages from two letters in which James referred to the need for 
“close amendment (and even ‘rewriting’) of the four earliest novels” [by which he meant 
Roderick Hudson, The American, The Portrait of a Lady, and The Princess Casamassima 
(1886)] and, later, to the fact that “the re-touching with any insistence will in fact bear but 
on one book (The American—on R. Hudson and the P. of a Lady very much less).”14  To 
date, most critical studies of The American’s revisions have focused almost exclusively 
on one of two issues:  whether the changes actually improve or weaken the novel and 
what insights they offer into James’ thirty-year artistic evolution.  I, however, contend 
that the two versions of The American ought to be considered as wholly separate works 
and that no purely aesthetic comparison of the two versions can explain what motivated 
James to revise this novel so drastically.  To be sure, his desire to revisit his early fiction 
was guided, at least in part, by the appeal of compiling a definitive edition of his 
collected works that would reflect a certain degree of artistic uniformity.  Herrick 
confirms that much:  “To me he [James] emphasized the quality of selectiveness which 
the new edition was to exemplify; it was to be ‘severely-sifted,’ and also embellished.  
‘Indeed,’ he said, ‘it was only on that condition that I consented to its being undertaken at 
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all.’”15  And as already noted, James claimed that revising The American was a means of 
making its unrealistic story “artfully pass for” reality.  Yet James’ admission of a need to 
make the unrealistic “pass” as real simultaneously reveals that James keenly wished to 
downplay the false reality of his novel (“the way things don’t happen”) and reflect more 
accurately the external reality he knew (“the way things do”). 
In focusing solely on questions of aesthetics, then, critics have neglected the 
extent to which James’ revisions underscore his greater attentiveness in 1907 to wider 
social, cultural, and economic matters—all of which intersect in the sort of intermarriage 
that James refuses to allow in The American but that, in his preface, he admits really 
would happen.  I propose that it is just this attentiveness that informs and motivates 
James’ revision of The American.  The revised novel demonstrates an understanding of 
what I shall call the emerging global cultural economy, an understanding that simply was 
not possible when James wrote the original version of the novel.  Specifically, I argue 
that James’ regret over the “queer falsity” of his portrayal of the Bellegardes’ attitude 
toward Newman amounts to an admission on James’ part of misreading Euro-American 
relations in 1877.  What this “misreading” amounted to, however, was really a different 
reading in 1907—a newly global reading that had been made possible by all of the 
conditions that I explored in the previous chapter.  With his additional thirty years’ 
experience living as an American in Europe, James revised The American in order to 
downplay the earlier version’s insistently symbolic depiction of a chasm existing between 
the two cultures.  Coming in the wake of his 1904 return to the United States after a 
twenty-year absence, the revised version also reflects James’ awareness that his native 
country had emerged as a global power, with values and interests that increasingly 
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intersected with those of Europe.  James’ concepts romantic and real should therefore be 
read as avatars for his shift in thinking from the merely international to the global.  Thus 
I contend that James’ evolving aesthetic sensibility was imbricated in broader cultural 
and socio-economic changes occurring worldwide at the turn of the twentieth century and 
that, without abandoning its “international theme,” the 1907 version of The American 
provides an account of American identity and status in a newly global community.   
As noted above, The American is often regarded as the first “international 
novel,”16 and the rise of the international novel as a distinct literary genre is one of the 
features of Roland Robertson’s “take-off phase” of globalization.17  In this sense, James 
not only observed the emergence of globalization but also participated in it by writing 
The American itself.  In juxtaposing national identities and, even more importantly, in 
allowing this juxtaposition to drive both the novel’s plot and thematic concerns, the 
international novel encourages readers to reconsider their own national identity in 
relation to other nationalities.  Oscar Cargill drives home the importance of such 
juxtaposition in his definition of the genre:  “An international novel is one in which a 
character, usually guided in his actions by the mores of one environment, is set down in 
another, where he must employ all his individual resources to meet successive situations, 
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and where he must intelligently accommodate himself to the new mores, or, in one way 
or another, be destroyed.”18  The larger global context, then, is the genre’s raison d’etre, 
and the genre itself emerges, at least in part, because of another contributing factor of 
globalization:  the rise of an international tourism industry and what Christof Wegelin 
calls the new “phenomenon” of “the American in Europe.”19  Moreover, The American 
exemplifies the genre’s practice of establishing national identity through contrast in the 
way that it reifies American national identity.  By employing the definite article in the 
very title of his novel, James invites his readers to view Newman not just as a 
representative U.S. citizen but as the representative U.S. citizen.  Thus in addition to the 
symbolic weight Newman’s every action carries, his conduct embodies the behavior of 
all Americans.  Newman’s individual gaucheries, James implies, stand in for the 
gaucheness of his entire nation, just as his nobility and naivety also stand in for whatever 
nobility and naivety is to be found in the American people.20  Yet James’ portrait of 
national character makes no sense except within the novel’s international context.  Had 
Newman remained in the United States to carry out the wheeling and dealing he 
abandoned when he left for Europe, the novel’s title would have made little sense—
except perhaps as a condemnation of American business practices along the lines of 
William Dean Howell’s The Rise of Silas Lapham (1885).  In transporting Newman to 
Europe, James emphasizes his character’s national identity above all else; in Europe, 
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Newman becomes the American rather than the businessman or the Civil War veteran.  In 
other words, Newman’s American-ness is constituted in contradistinction to the 
Bellegardes’ (and most of the other characters’) European-ness.   
Nevertheless, neither the “international theme” nor individual international novels 
are globalization itself; they represent merely one important engine of globalization.  In 
fact, in employing juxtaposition as their means of developing plot, international novels 
rely primarily upon comparing and contrasting only two nations or national cultures 
rather than spinning a more multidirectional global web of cultural exchange.  
Furthermore, in practice, international novels all too often limit themselves to juxtaposing 
only European culture with American culture and thus, as recent scholars have pointed 
out, employ the word international in an overly restricted—and often misleading—way.  
Eva Zetterberg Pettersson, for example, makes the valid objection that “the designation 
‘international’ is actually a misnomer since the genre is not concerned with the encounter 
with all foreign countries but almost exclusively with the American encounter with 
Europe.  On closer scrutiny, ‘international’ refers to the particular relationship between 
America and Europe.”21  That objection depends largely upon which texts count as 
international novels.  Were Wegelin, Cargill, and other critics to include works by Jules 
Verne and Rudyard Kipling alongside the novels of Henry James and Edith Wharton, 
then our conception of the international novel might be somewhat broader.  In order to 
understand the importance of James’ revisions to The American and the evolution in his 
thinking from a merely two-directional international mode into a much more dynamic, 
multidirectional global mode, it is essential to adopt the lens of global theory.  Thus 
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James’ aesthetic explanation and justification of his revisions—moving from “romantic” 
to “real”—represent an emerging global consciousness, one that is attuned to intersection 
and web-like interconnection as well as to juxtaposition and contrast.  What we find in 
the revisions to The American, in short, is a newly global aesthetic. 
A side-by-side comparison of the two novels reveals how James went about 
rendering the “situation and subject” of The American global, though the very first 
revision that appears in the later edition of the novel is not particularly arresting.  In the 
second sentence of the first paragraph, James changes “the gentleman in question” to 
“our visitor.”22  Many of the revisions throughout the novel are similarly minor, and some 
readers who are familiar with the density of James’ later prose may be surprised to learn 
that some revisions serve to tighten individual paragraphs.  For instance, the first 
paragraph shrinks from 362 words in the earlier version to 355 words in the New York 
Edition.  As the novel progresses, however, the alterations become increasingly more 
significant, often making later paragraphs longer by several sentences.  (Indeed, so 
substantial is the cumulative effect of James’ revisions that no definitive catalog of all the 
differences between the two editions has yet been made; certainly, nothing as systematic 
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as F.O. Matthiessen’s study of the revisions of The Portrait of a Lady currently exists.23  
And I in no way pretend to offer such a catalog here.) 
The first truly significant alteration to the text appears in the first sentence of the 
second paragraph of the novel, and it supplies a striking illustration of how James’s 
revisions also serve to mute the original version’s emphasis on national contrasts and to 
acknowledge closer alignment between American and European values, views, and 
modes of expression.  In both versions of this passage, which begins the first detailed 
description of the novel’s protagonist, James immediately draws attention to Newman’s 
identity as an American.  The 1877 edition reads, “An observer, with anything of an eye 
for national types, would have had no difficulty in determining the local origin of this 
undeveloped connoisseur, and indeed such an observer might have felt a certain 
humorous relish of the almost ideal completeness with which he filled out the national 
mould.  The gentleman on the divan was a powerful specimen of an American” (N17-18).  
Already the novel’s insistence upon deriving conflict from juxtaposing “national types” is 
apparent, with James employing the adjective national twice.  In 1907, however, James 
removes national altogether, thereby deemphasizing the role of the nation itself in 
determining a person’s identity:  “An observer with anything of an eye for local types 
would have had no difficulty in referring this candid connoisseur to the scene of his 
origin, and indeed such an observer might have made an ironic point of the almost ideal 
completeness with which he filled out the mould of race.  The gentleman on the divan 
was the superlative American” (O17-18).  James’ decision to replace “national types” 
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with “local types” is prescient in terms of how he seems to anticipate the dialectical 
relationship between “local” and “global.”  More significantly, however, this particular 
revision also depoliticizes Newman’s Americanness by associating its obviousness with 
the happenstance of birthplace (“scene of origin”) and ancestry (“mould of race,” with the 
word race being equivalent to lineage in this instance).  With this early revision, then, 
James reinforces the importance of the definite article in the novel’s title by transforming 
Newman from “a powerful specimen of an American” into “the superlative American.”  
The more mature James is even more intent upon establishing Newman as the ne plus 
ultra of Americans.   
Several critics have gestured toward the need for just this sort of global reading of 
James’ novels.  John Carlos Rowe’s essay “Henry James and Globalization” is perhaps 
the most notable effort to reframe Jamesian criticism along this global line, though Rowe 
himself provides only a few cursory examples of what such analysis might entail.  In 
particular, Rowe aims to shift discussion from a primarily literary understanding of 
James’ cosmopolitanism (i.e., the “international theme”) to a more widely applicable 
appreciation of James’ engagement with the early manifestations of globalization.  As 
Rowe points out, “James was a witness to and participant in the early stages of today’s 
globalization wherein second-stage modernization, characterized by Taylorism and 
Fordism, developed together with the consolidation of the British Empire in its growing 
competition with lesser European imperial powers and the emergence of the United 
States and Japan as colonial forces, if not outright imperial powers.”24  That James was 
“witness” to the early stages of globalization becomes apparent when we stop to consider 
that he lived through most of the events that took place during the period Robertson 
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labels the “take-off phase” of globalization (c. 1870-1925):  the invention of the 
telephone, radio, and motion pictures; the creation of the Olympic Games and other 
global competitions; the widespread adoption of “world time” and the Gregorian 
calendar; the First World War; and so forth.25  Likewise, James’ 1904-05 return to the 
United States occurred shortly after the events that transformed the country into a global 
power, including the Spanish-American War and the formulation of the Open Door 
Policy.  James even dined with President Theodore Roosevelt less than eight months 
before Roosevelt negotiated the Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan, a 
diplomatic triumph that would win Roosevelt one of the earliest Nobel Peace Prizes 
(another of Robertson’s “global competitions”).  James’ awareness of America’s 
increased power and international prestige is apparent in The American Scene (1907), the 
record of James’ return visit to his homeland.  “James represents in The American Scene 
the shift in global power from Europe to America, with respect to both political and 
cultural economies,” asserts Rowe.  “Even as he criticizes American cultural deficiencies 
and capitalist excesses, James still takes pride in the growing centrality of the American 
as the type of the cosmopolitan, as the Italian had been in the Quattrocento and the 
Englishman in the Victorian era.”26  Not coincidentally, James composed The American 
Scene and revised The American concurrently, and I shall discuss how these two texts 
inform one another in more detail below. 
 According to Rowe, however, James was also a “participant” in the emergence of 
globalization, and for Rowe, this participatory role is most fully manifested in James’ 
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preoccupation with the problems and opportunities associated with the rise of global 
capitalism and the spread of U.S. influence abroad.  Explicit references to colonialism 
may be rare in James’ novels, but in focusing on the increased mobility of America’s 
economic elite as well as their aspirations for the sort of status and legitimacy that only 
their brushes with high culture could bring them, “James consistently implicates culture 
in the work of imperial expansion and domination.”27  In particular, Rowe argues that 
“James’ famous international theme frequently enacts new U.S. will-to-power in the 
polite drawing rooms, public gardens, galleries, and artists’ workshops of American 
expatriates in Italy, where they have traveled to study how to recapture the glory that was 
Rome and forget just what horrors are inscribed dimly on those pillars and capitals in the 
Forum and the Colosseum.”28 
Rowe’s understanding of globalization itself, however, is somewhat limited.  For 
instance, he defines globalization as “a process of modernization traceable to the 
European desire to ‘discover’ new lands.”29  As I established in the introduction, 
conflating globalization with modernization and westernization elides non-modern, non-
western contributions to the processes of globalization, such as the spread of Islam.  
Nevertheless, extending Rowe’s outline of what global theory might contribute to James 
scholarship, I do suggest that much of James’ fiction, including The American, can be 
viewed as an examination and critique of the links that are forged between the 
consumption of European history and culture and the extension of American imperialism.  
At the start of The American, for example, Christopher Newman, whose spectacular 
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business success James characterizes first as “an intensely Western story” and, in the 
revised version of the novel, as “a tale of the Western world” (N31; O33), approaches his 
sojourn in Europe as a process of acquisition.  He relies primarily on his purchasing 
power to obtain what he wants:  French lessons, copies of the Old Masters’ paintings, a 
wife.  Newman may have renounced his cut-throat business practices by the time he 
arrives in Paris, but he has renounced neither the resulting wealth nor the sense of 
entitlement that this wealth gives him.  The novel, as Rowe puts it, reveals “the legacy of 
Eurocolonialism […] in the figure of the cosmopolitan capitalist.”30  Over the course of 
the novel, however, James transposes Newman’s biography from “an intensely Western 
story” to a form of critique; The American, as James originally conceived it, is about 
what Newman cannot acquire, despite his enormous wealth.  In a sense, Newman 
encounters an economy he is unable to comprehend because money alone cannot procure 
for him his most desired objects of value (a wife and entry into Europe’s aristocratic 
society). 
 Newman’s frustration at encountering a different means of valuation reveals an 
alternative understanding of economics on James’ part:  what scholars now term cultural 
economy.  While several recent critics have invoked Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
cultural capital in their discussions of James’ fiction, cultural capital, which Bourdieu 
identifies as socially valued forms of knowledge, is only one element within the much 
broader and more dynamic framework of cultural economy.31  Broadly speaking, cultural 
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economy refers to “the processes of social and cultural relations that go to make up what 
we conventionally term the economic.”32  More specifically, the still emerging field of 
cultural economy acknowledges that cultural and economic practices are embedded in 
one another and examines the cultural facets and implications of economic activity (and 
vice versa).  Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke describe cultural economy this way: 
This particular understanding of economics as ‘culture’ focuses attention on the 
practical ways in which ‘economically relevant activity’ is performed and 
enacted.  It serves to show, in other words, the ways in which the ‘making up’ or 
‘construction’ of economic realities is undertaken and achieved; how those 
activities, objects and persons we categorize as ‘economic’ are built up or 
assembled from a number of parts, many of them supplied by the disciplines of 
economics but many drawn from other sources, including, of course, forms of 
ostensibly non-economic cultural practice.33 
At least in part, therefore, cultural economy accounts for how and why societies ascribe 
both monetary and non-monetary values to cultural objects and practices that do not 
otherwise appear to possess clear economic functions.  As such, cultural economy seems 
an eminently suitable framework for studying James’ fiction, for although James 
repeatedly and perhaps even pointedly refuses to supply hard economic data about his 
characters (the mechanics of Newman’s business success are deliberately vague in both 
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versions of The American, as is the nature of the industry that gives rise to the Newsome 
family fortune in The Ambassadors), few authors have been more concerned with the 
valuation of art and historical objects, the hierarchy of status, and the details of 
conspicuous consumption. 
Newman himself presents a textbook illustration of Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift’s 
central argument regarding cultural economy:  that “the pursuit of prosperity must be 
seen as the pursuit of many goals at once, from meeting material needs and accumulating 
riches to seeking symbolic satisfaction and satisfying fleeting pleasures.”34  The desire 
for the less tangible goals of “symbolic satisfaction” and “fleeting pleasures” is precisely 
what motivates Newman’s journey to Europe in the first place.  James writes that 
“Christopher Newman’s sole aim in life had been to make money; what he had been 
placed in the world for was, to his own perception, simply to wrest a fortune, the bigger 
the better, from defiant opportunity. […]  He had won at last and carried off his winnings; 
and now what was he to do with them?  He was a man to whom, sooner or later, the 
question was sure to present itself, and the answer to it belongs to our story” (N32).  To 
Tom Tristram, a fellow American and former friend Newman meets in Paris, Newman 
confides that he is “sick of business” and has “money enough” (N35).  Now, he 
announces, “I have come to see Europe, to get the best out of it I can” (N33).  Then, 
simultaneously acknowledging the limits of money’s power yet dismissing any doubts of 
his ultimate success, Newman adds, “Didn’t I say I wanted the best?  I know the best 
can’t be had for mere money, but I rather think money will do a good deal” (N35, 
emphasis added).  Newman’s pursuit of—and belief that he can obtain—this intangible 
“best,” which for him represents learning, cultivation, status, and eventually a family 
                                                 
34
 Amin and Thrift xiv. 
  93 
(Amin and Thrift’s “symbolic satisfaction”) but which exists somewhere other than in 
America, precipitates the novel’s plot and sets off what James had originally intended to 
be an exploration of contrasting societal values.  Thus reading The American in light of 
cultural economy alerts us to James’ attentiveness to the circulation of forms of cultural 
and symbolic capital that takes place on a global stage.  A national economy, where 
Newman excels, is not the only or even the most important source of valuation for James. 
At first, it may seem somewhat anachronistic to employ a relatively recent term 
like cultural economy when discussing James and The American, but scholars have traced 
the roots of the field as far back as Adam Smith, whose Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759) links economic value to moral value (i.e., social or cultural norms) and actually 
predates his more influential Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776), as Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift helpfully remind us.35  Amin and Thrift further 
suggest that a nascent form of cultural economy has always remained present within and 
occasionally in opposition to the more dominant discourse of political economy, 
emerging at times in the writings of Smith, Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, and F.W. 
Taylor.36  Du Gay and Pryke extend this list to include the works of Max Weber and 
Pierre Bourdieu, whose inquiry into the relationship between taste and social class in La 
Distinction (1979) surely has much in common with James’ novels.37  The most 
appropriate point of comparison for The American, however, is perhaps to be found in the 
works of Veblen, who was a contemporary of James’ and who, as Geoffrey Hodgson 
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points out, was heavily influenced by the writings of Henry’s elder brother William.38  
Indeed, Veblen’s descriptions of “conspicuous consumption” and “conspicuous leisure” 
in his Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) find their literary analogues within the social 
milieu of many of James’ novels.  Like Newman, James’ heroes are frequently 
independently wealthy and therefore part of Veblen’s “leisure class.”  Many of them are 
free to take long vacations abroad (an example of “conspicuous leisure”) or to purchase 
goods and services for no other reason than the simple fact that they can—just as 
Newman commissions functionless and apparently inferior copies of Old Masters’ 
paintings from Noémie Nioche (an example of “conspicuous consumption”). 
Even more relevant to Newman’s plight is Veblen’s 1898 essay “Why Is 
Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?”  Cited by Amin and Thrift in their genealogy 
of cultural economy, Veblen’s essay explicitly refuses to separate culture from 
economics; Veblen writes:  “Economic interest has counted for much in shaping the 
cultural growth of all communities. […]  There is, therefore, no neatly isolable range of 
cultural phenomena that can be rigorously set apart under the head of economic 
institutions, although a category of ‘economic institutions’ may be of service as a 
convenient caption.”39  More importantly, as far as James’ treatment of his characters is 
concerned, Veblen notes, “The economic life history of the individual is a cumulative 
process of adaptation of means to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, 
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both the agent and his environment being at any point the outcome of the last process.  
His methods of life to-day are enforced upon him by his habits of life carried over from 
yesterday and by the circumstances left as the mechanical residue of the life of 
yesterday.”40  Recognizing that economics is an ongoing social process that results 
directly from the relationship between a person and his or her environment, Veblen calls 
attention to the importance of habit.  A person’s economic well-being, like that of 
Newman’s, only comes about through a certain degree of comfort with a particular social 
environment.  Each change in that environment requires a response from the person, and 
economic life continues only through a process of continuous negotiation and 
renegotiation.  It follows, therefore, that a complete change in environment, such as the 
one James forces Newman to undergo when he leaves America and travels to Europe, 
would present a disjuncture with the “cumulative process of adaptation” experienced by a 
person up to that point.  The “habits of life” Newman developed in America, in other 
words, may not “carry over” in Europe.  At least, that is Newman’s dilemma—and the 
cause of conflict—in The American as James originally conceived it.  As already 
indicated, however, James’ views had changed drastically when he embarked upon his 
plan of revision, and in the following pages, I will demonstrate how James altered the 
1907 version of this novel to downplay the unrealistic aspects of its plot and align it more 
closely with the realities of the global cultural economy he was witnessing emerge. 
But first, I wish briefly to explain what I mean by the “global cultural economy.”  
I borrow the concept from Arjun Appadurai, who describes it as “a complex, overlapping, 
disjunctive order that cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-
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periphery models.”41  For Appadurai, disjuncture is the global cultural economy’s 
defining characteristic, arising as it does from “the tension between cultural 
homogenization and cultural heterogenization.”42  While economic forces of 
globalization (multinational corporations, the worldwide circulation of goods and 
products, etc.) tend to eliminate cultural difference by giving all societies a relative 
sameness, they simultaneously provide local forms of cultural expression with new 
resources and technologies, which are then “indigenized” and reshaped to suit the needs 
and tastes of the local community.43  Thus besides assigning culture itself a privileged 
role in the processes of globalization, operating variously in concert with and in 
resistance to economic factors,44 Appadurai underscores the fact that disjuncture occurs 
because of an underlying tension between similarity and difference.  In a global cultural 
economy, national forms of cultural valuation must coincide as well as deviate with one 
another, and it is this tension between agreement and variance that, in his preface, James 
suggests he failed to account for in the marriage plot of The American. 
What James perceived as a failure, however, may have been due to the nascence 
of the global cultural economy in the 1870s and to his own position, at the time he began 
writing The American, as a relatively new transplant to Europe.  For one thing, although 
James had spent several years of his childhood in Europe and had already toured the 
continent twice in adulthood, he had only just decided to relocate permanently to Europe 
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when he began the novel in 1875.  Perhaps not unlike Newman, then, James was most 
impressed by the differences between Europe and America and less attuned to the 
similarities.  In his preface, James recalls that, although the original idea for the novel had 
come to him while he was still residing in the United States, he had “dropped” it, only to 
experience its “resurrection” shortly after he had moved to Paris:  “Paris had ever so 
promptly offered me […] everything that was needed to make my conception concrete.”45  
As James settled down in Europe, he became more attentive to the intersections of 
American and European interests and values, and other critics have observed such shifts 
in focus over the course of James’ career.  For instance, Eva Zetterberg Pettersson notes 
that, “while James’s early international stories like Roderick Hudson, The American, or 
Daisy Miller construct the usual opposition between America and Europe, later texts like 
The Wings of the Dove, The Ambassadors, and The Golden Bowl problematize it [and] his 
depiction of the confrontation with European culture becomes gradually more 
multifaceted.”46  John Carlos Rowe similarly remarks that James eventually “refuses to 
worship either European cultural history or American futurity but sees them instead as 
parts of the same cultural history.”47  Just as significantly, as James was maturing 
artistically and intellectually, the United States was developing into an international 
power.  The thirty-year evolution in James’ attitude toward The American, in other 
words, runs parallel to the growing intersection of America’s cultural and economic 
values with those of Europe.  James’ aesthetic sensibilities, including his notion of what 
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counted as “real” or “false” about The American, thus may be said to have emerged 
alongside of the global cultural economy. 
Perhaps the most striking result of this evolution in James’ thinking is his 
treatment of Christopher Newman.  In the revised version of The American, Newman 
becomes a more mature, more sophisticated, even more likable character.  Through 
James’ revision to the opening of the novel, as noted above, Newman becomes a “candid 
connoisseur” of paintings rather than an “undeveloped” one, suggesting that James 
himself had grown to view Newman in a far more positive light by 1907.  Furthermore, in 
the New York Edition, Newman’s age rises from thirty-six to forty-two-and-a-half, which 
allows James to remove any stigma attached to Newman’s wealth, which itself swells 
exponentially, by clarifying that Newman made his fortune before the Civil War rather 
than during the era of the “robber barons” afterwards.  Just as he expands Newman’s 
economic capital in 1907, so too does James expand Newman’s cultural capital.  The 
frequency with which Newman utters Americanisms like I guess and the introductory 
interjection well may increase dramatically—in the revised version, he announces, “I 
really kind of pine for a mate” (O47), a line that is entirely absent from the 1877 edition.  
Nevertheless, James reduces Newman’s boorishness overall.  When arranging for French 
lessons with M. Nioche, for example, Newman originally took them up impulsively, as if 
on a lark:  “‘Oh yes, I should like to learn French,’ Newman went on with democratic 
confidingness. […]  ‘But if you learned my language, why shouldn’t I learn yours?’” 
(N25)  But the later Newman is more serious and thoughtful about the matter:  “‘Oh yes, 
I should like to converse with elegance,’ Newman went on. […]  ‘If you could catch on at 
all to our grand language—that of Shakespeare and Milton and Holy Writ—why 
  99 
shouldn’t I catch on to yours?” (O26)  This particular revision also subtly emphasizes 
both the fact that Newman is familiar with Shakespeare, Milton, and the King James 
Version of the Bible and the fact that he is aware that Americans share in the cultural and 
linguistic traditions of Europe.  Likewise, Newman not only takes his French lessons 
more seriously, but he apparently learns the language much faster in the New York 
Edition.  We even find him engaging in clever puns.  “‘Come,’ said Newman, ‘let us 
begin’” becomes the more impressive “‘Allons, enfants de la patrie [Come, children of 
the fatherland],’ said Newman; ‘let’s begin!’” (N54; O59)—indicating that Newman 
knows at least some of the lyrics of his instructor’s national anthem. 
Several of Newman’s other rough edges receive polishing, too.  He becomes less 
strident and less ethnocentric in his patriotism.  For example, when irritated by Tom 
Tristram’s criticisms of the United States, the 1877 version of Newman responds 
arrogantly by swearing “that they were the greatest country in the world, that they could 
put all Europe into their breeches’ pockets” (N40).  His 1907 self merely speaks “up for 
them quite as if it had been Fourth of July” (O43), an expression of pride that does not 
necessarily entail comparative evaluations.  Gone, too, are Newman’s other slightly 
xenophobic generalizations; James entirely removes Newman’s condescending opinion 
that “all Frenchman are of a frothy and imponderable substance” (N95; absent from 
O105).  Similarly, Newman’s appreciation for high culture increases dramatically.  
Before the revisions, his attitude toward the art and architecture he takes in while touring 
the Continent is largely dismissive.  In a letter to Mrs. Tristram, he writes, “Belgium, 
Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Italy—I have been through the whole list, and I don’t 
think I am any the worse for it.  I know more about Madonnas and church-steeples than I 
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supposed any man could” (N75).  After James’ revisions, however, that same passage 
reads, “Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Italy—I’ve taken the whole list as the 
bare-baked rider takes the paper hoops at the circus, and I’m not even yet out of breath.  I 
carry about six volumes of Ruskin in my trunk” (O82).  If the 1907 Newman is actually 
reading those volumes of Ruskin, then he is a mental heavyweight in comparison to his 
former self; at the very least, his mind is more open and more probing. 
On the whole, then, James’ revisions serve to make Newman a more serious 
protagonist, one who can hold his own among Europe’s aristocratic elite because he is 
now competent enough to appreciate what they hold dear.  In other words, we see James 
endowing this American with a mindset more closely aligned with that of the European 
milieu he infiltrates.  Newman now values what they value.  This closer alignment—or at 
least the softening of contrast—is reflected in the shifting attitudes of other characters 
toward Newman.  Instead of referring to Newman playfully as “horribly Western,” Mrs. 
Tristram now calls him “beyond everything a child of nature” (N39; O42).  This more 
positive comment on Newman’s rough edges suggests that they have less to do with 
where he comes from than with a certain leniency in his education, and in alluding to 
William Wordsworth with the newer appellation,48 Mrs. Tristram both indicates that 
Newman possesses enough knowledge and taste to understand her reference and 
announces that those rough edges are an asset rather than a liability. 
Claire’s perception of Newman undergoes a similar change in the revised version, 
and her more positive attitude toward her suitor seems to strengthen their relationship.  
Indeed, Claire is given what might be James’ most remarkable addition to the dialogue, a 
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new evaluation of Newman that, as one critic puts it, “has no parallel in the original” 
edition.49  Whereas in the earlier version, Claire pays Newman the doubtful compliment 
that he is “dismally inoffensive,” 1907’s Claire more emphatically states:  “You’re easier 
than we are, you’re easier than I am, and I quite see that you’ve reasons, of some sort, 
that are as good as ours. […]  It’s rather disappointing not to have anything to show you 
or to tell you or to teach you, anything that you don’t seem quite capable of knowing and 
doing and feeling” (N184; O214).  What we have in the New York edition, then, is a 
meeting of equals, a convergence between representatives of two cultures that might 
approach life differently but are equally “good” and “capable” in each other’s eyes.  In 
other words, in giving Claire and Newman mutual respect for one another and cultural 
and intellectual equality in the revised version of the novel, James creates a new global 
culture to which both of these characters can belong.  Despite coming from seemingly 
different backgrounds, their tastes, styles, values—in short, their ways of interacting with 
the world—converge in a newer and more flexible global consciousness and set of 
practices.  James drives home this convergence in the New York Edition by emphasizing 
the fact that, to Newman’s delight, Claire beings to adopt some of his Americanisms: 
1877 
“As regards your mother and your 
brother,” Newman added, “there is only 
one point upon which I feel that I might 
quarrel with them.  I don’t ask them to sing 
my praises to you, but I ask them to let you 
alone.  If I thought they talked ill of me to 
you, I should come down upon them.” 
1907 
“As regards your mother and your 
brother,” he added, “there’s only one point 
on which I feel that I might quarrel with 
them.  I don’t ask them to sing my praises 
to you, but I ask them to let you alone.  If I 
thought they talked against me to you at all 
badly”—and he just paused—“why I’d 
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“They have let me alone, as you 
say.  They have not talked ill of you.” 
“In that case,” cried Newman, “I 
declare they are only too good for this 
world.” (N16) 
have to come in somewhere on that.” 
She reassured him.  “They’ve let 
me alone, as you say.  They haven’t talked 
against you to me at all badly.” 
It gave him, and for the first time, the 
exquisite pleasure of her apparently liking 
to use and adopt his words.  “Well then I’m 
ready to declare them only too good for 
this world!” (O185) 
By changing “talked ill of me to you” to “talked against me to you at all badly,” James 
adds yet another colloquialism to Newman’s vocabulary, which in turn makes Claire’s 
willingness to “adopt his words” more indicative of her responsiveness to Newman’s 
character.  She even becomes more assertive in their relationship; elsewhere, when 
breaking the news of her family’s opposition to their union, she takes his hand rather than 
vice versa:  “but she checked him, pressing the hand that held her own” becomes “but she 
checked him, pressing the hand of which she had possessed herself” (N213; O249).  
While this newfound assertiveness on Claire’s part may make her inability to stand up to 
her mother and brother less credible than before—she is already a widow, after all—it 
underscores Newman’s charisma.  He seems to have won her heart, despite the presence 
of eligible European bachelors, such as Lord Deepmere. 
Further cementing Newman’s cultural savvy in 1907, James also reframes the 
other key relationship in the novel; Newman’s friendship with Claire’s younger brother 
Valentin also warms immensely, as nearly every study of James’ revisions has noted.  In 
the earlier version, for example, James writes, “During the next three weeks Newman 
saw [Valentin de] Bellegarde several times, and without formally swearing an eternal 
friendship the two men established a sort of comradeship” (N95).  In 1907, James revises 
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that passage this way:  “During the next three weeks they met again several times and, 
without formally swearing an eternal friendship, fell, for their course of life, instinctively 
into step together” (O105).  Like Mrs. Tristram and Claire, Valentin is also given a new 
line of dialogue in the revised version that paints Newman in a better light.  He states, “I 
shall have had a greater sense of safety with you than I have perhaps ever known in any 
relation of life” (O101; absent from N92).  Their intensified relationship helps James 
downplay the earlier version’s repeated emphasis on Newman’s inability to fathom 
foreign customs.  When the two men debate Newman’s chances of winning Claire, for 
instance, Newman is much quicker on the uptake regarding his lack of an aristocratic 
title: 
1877 
“Why, you are not noble, for 
instance,” he [Valentin] said. 
“The devil I am not!” exclaimed 
Newman. 
“Oh,” said Bellegarde, a little more 
seriously, “I did not know you had a title.” 
“A title?  What do you mean by a title?” 
asked Newman.  “A count, a duke, a 
marquis?  I don’t know anything about 
that, I don’t know who is and who is not.  
But I say I am noble.  I don’t exactly know 
what you mean by it, but it’s a fine word 
and a fine idea; I put in a claim to it.” 
(N105) 
1907 
“Well, for instance you’re not, as 
we call it, if I’m not mistaken, ‘born.’” 
“The devil I’m not!” Newman 
exclaimed. 
“Oh,” said his friend a little more 
seriously, “I didn’t know you had—well, 
your quarterings.” 
“Ah, your quarterings are your little 
local matter!” (O117) 
Newman still dismisses the objection that Claire’s nobility will stand in his way in 1907, 
but he has grown sophisticated enough to know what Valentin means when referring to 
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quarterings, a term in heraldry.  Furthermore, he is confident enough in his own social 
status not to lay claim to nobility but to dismiss it as a “local matter,” which in turn 
echoes James’ revised first description of Newman as a “local” rather than a “national” 
type.  And in 1907, Valentin seems more inclined to agree with him.  James removes 
from this same conversation an exchange that suggests Valentin himself may object 
initially to Newman as a potential brother-in-law.  When Newman asks for confirmation 
that he is “not good enough” for Claire, Valentin quickly gives it:  “Brutally speaking—
yes!” (N105)  In the revised version, however, we find Valentin telling Newman that he 
would make “as good a prince as another” (O118). 
 Finally, retouching the sections of the novel where Newman and Valentin 
interact, particularly chapters VII and VIII, allows James to continue deemphasizing the 
importance of national contrasts to their relationship.  In the revised version, Valentin’s 
role as a French foil to the American Newman is less pronounced, with James cutting 
down on a number of references to Newman’s Americanness in these two chapters.  For 
example, in the 1877 version, when Valentin asks if Newman is enjoying his stay in 
Paris, James writes, “Like any other good American, Newman thought it as well not to 
truckle to the foreigner.  ‘Oh, so-so,’ he answered” (N91).  In 1907, that response is 
simply “‘Well, I’m keeping my head’” (O100).  Significantly, the figure of Valentin also 
lets James switch from an essentialist view of national identity to a pragmatist one worthy 
of his brother William.  In 1877, Valentin is “a foreigner to his finger-tips” (N89), 
implying that his foreignness (i.e., his Frenchness) is commensurate with his body.  In 
1907, however, he is “a foreigner to the last roll of his so frequently rotary r” (O98), 
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suggesting that foreignness is now the result of something one does or says rather than 
something one is. 
 The recasting of the novel’s protagonist and his relationships with other 
characters is all the more striking when we consider that, despite James’ extensive 
revisions, both versions of The American adhere to the same plot.  Christopher Newman, 
the impoverished-orphan-turned-leading-industrialist, still abandons his business out of 
disgust with own increasingly cut-throat practices, and he still travels to Europe to 
expand his horizons and fulfill his empty life.  In both editions, Mrs. Tristram introduces 
him to Claire de Cintré, and Newman and Claire subsequently develop genuine affection 
for one another.  The outcome also remains the same.  Despite the fact that Newman 
would make an excellent match for Claire, their union is aborted in 1907, just as it was in 
1877.  Intimidated by a mother and elder brother who oppose the marriage, Claire cannot 
stand up for herself, and to escape their control, she enters a Carmelite convent. 
Yet what motivates the Bellegardes’ opposition in 1907 becomes more ambiguous 
and less clearly defined than it was in the earlier edition.  Before, the Bellegardes simply 
believed that, despite all his money, Newman was not good enough.  In the New York 
Edition, their standards are less explicitly stated.  Max Schulz has suggested that the 
Bellegardes’ personal animosity toward Newman is grounded upon the revised 
Newman’s greater self-assurance and increased success with their social circle, which 
arise “as a natural right of his abilities and accomplishments.”50  Between 1877 and 1907, 
Newman changes from being merely oblivious to the social niceties of the Bellegardes’ 
milieu to feeling positively entitled to belong to that milieu.  Thus it becomes Newman’s 
“air as of not having to account for his own place in the social scale” rather than his 
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“tranquil unsuspectingness of the relativity of his own place in the social scale” that is 
“irritating” to Urbain de Bellegarde, Claire’s older brother (O174, N152).  Perhaps more 
to the point, the Bellegardes’ animosity may emanate from their recognition that 
Newman represents not just America but that the arrival of people like him in Parisian 
society signals the inevitable triumph of democratic capitalism and their own irrelevance.  
For a nobleman like Urbain de Bellegarde, who in both versions believes firmly in “the 
divine right of Henry of Bourbon, Fifth of his name, to the throne of France” (N 153, 
O176), Newman likely represents what James calls in The American Scene “the 
monstrous form of Democracy, […] the huge democratic broom that has made the 
clearance and that one seems to see brandished in the empty sky.”51  When James revised 
The American, he capitalized on this fact, and at least one revision emphasizes Urbain’s 
distaste at the inevitable supremacy of this democracy that Newman represents.  From 
simply “holding his breath so as not to inhale the odour of democracy” in 1877, 1907’s 
Urbain “could but hold his breath so as not to inhale the strong smell—since who liked 
such very strong smells?—of a democracy so gregarious as to be unable not to engender 
heat and perspiration” (N153, O175, original emphasis).  James’ decision to retain the 
novel’s original setting—Paris in the late-1860s, in the closing years of the Second 
Empire—gives this particular revision an even sharper edge.  As a Bourbonite, Urbain 
may not approve of Napoleon III, but the advent of the Third Republic in 1870 and the 
even more radical Paris Commune of 1871 would dash whatever hopes a real-life 
Bellegarde might harbor for a return to monarchy. 
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Despite these changes in the Bellegardes’ attitude toward Newman, their 
interactions remain much the same, suggesting that James considered revising the 
characters, style, and tone of the novel far more important than altering its overarching 
plot.  Eventually, Newman obtains a note written by Claire’s late father that reveals that 
Madame de Bellegarde (Claire’s mother) either murdered or allowed the marquis 
(Claire’s father) to die.  Once again, the final third of the novel transforms from comedy-
of-manners into character study and morality tale.  Both versions end, of course, with 
Newman’s redemption and James’ refusal to give his readers the expected happy ending 
that is typical of these comedies.  After briefly attempting to blackmail Claire’s family 
into letting the marriage go on, Newman decides against exposing their dark secret.  
Although doing so would give him the satisfaction of seeing them shunned by society just 
as they have shunned him, Newman refuses to demean himself by stooping to the 
Bellegardes’ level of pettiness.  Instead, he casts the incriminating note into a fire in the 
final chapter of each edition, with Mrs. Tristram, the person who instigated the whole 
affair, as Newman’s only audience. 
 It is here, however, at the very end of the novel, that James’ most discussed 
revision appears.  After Newman casts the note into the fire in the earlier version, Mrs. 
Tristram suggests that the Bellegardes have won because his action is precisely what they 
would have expected him to do, which leads Newman to turn “instinctively”—and 
perhaps regretfully—to the fire to see if the note is still there (N309).  In the revised 
edition, on the other hand, Mrs. Tristram does not needle Newman.  Instead, she rises 
from her chair, takes and kisses Newman’s hands, and remarks that “I needn’t tell you at 
this hour how I’ve felt for you.  But I like you as you are” (O363).  Then the novel 
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concludes with her lament for “poor, poor Claire!” (O363)52  Like many of the other 
revisions, this one portrays Newman in a far better light.  His possible regret at burning 
the note is gone, and in its place is Mrs. Tristram’s affirmation of his goodness.  In other 
words, Newman’s action is not undercut in the New York Edition; he is no longer a dupe, 
and his act of selflessness is allowed to retain its dignity.  Nevertheless, many critics 
remain unmoved by the revised ending, dismissing it as overly melodramatic.53  Such 
concern with the question of whether this particular alteration improves or hurts the novel 
is emblematic of the approach that most other studies of the novel’s revisions take, with 
critics more or less evenly divided between which version is more coherent and unified in 
its vision—in short, which version is preferable or “better.” 
The problem with such back-and-forth squabbling is that the critics involved tend 
to seal off their aesthetic evaluations of the novel and James’ evolution as an artist from 
important cultural and historical questions instead of showing, as I do here, how deeply 
imbricated the two issues really are.  Robert Herrick set the tone as early as 1923, when 
he lamented, “One wishes that […] ‘The American’ might have escaped the too eager 
brush of the Re-toucher” and concluded that James’ revisions to the early novels 
amounted to a “fatal re-drawing.”54  Since then, a number of critics have attempted to 
second-guess James.  No less a James scholar than Leon Edel remarked, “The late 
revisions may be interesting to study for the light they throw on the novelist’s creative 
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process; but they are extremely artificial” in The American.55  Indeed, The American 
occupies a unique place in James scholarship; more articles, essays, and chapters have 
been dedicated to cataloguing and analyzing the changes James made to this novel than to 
any other of his revised works.  By my count, at least eleven different critics have 
published analyses of the differences between the two versions,56 and that’s not counting 
broad examinations of James’ revisions for the New York Edition as a whole or general 
interpretations of the novel that reflect on some key differences in passing.57  For those 
critics who view the revised version as an improvement, the appeal of learning what 
drove James in 1907 to make such drastic changes to the 1877 original is entwined with 
the allure of finding a key to the entire thirty-year arc of James’ artistic evolution.  Philip 
Horne, the most recent critic to take this tack, writes, “The history of the ‘growth’ may be 
James’s personal history as a writer—the development of his style over the years; but it 
may also be the process by which the revisions came into being.  This growth of the 
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immense array of revised terms takes place in the act of revision, in the reseeing of old 
stories ‘in other words.’”58  And a few pages later:  “There is an incremental relation and 
re-relation of expressive elements, progressively prompting and shifting and 
metamorphosing as each makes and settles into its place in the whole, altering that whole, 
but as part of a single evolution, each new link connecting with something in the old 
matter to form a continuity of intention.”59 
More recently, however, debates over the perceived superiority of either version 
have largely vanished from critical analyses.  In her 2001 essay “Between Communion 
and Renunciation:  Revising The American,” the most recent examination of the novel’s 
revisions, Naomi E. Silver ignores questions about James’ evolving aesthetic sensibility 
altogether, focusing instead upon James’ shifting ethical position.  In fact, most James 
scholars seem to have accepted James Tuttleton’s claim that, “whatever one may think of 
James’s revisions for the ‘New York Edition,’ it is clear that the 1907 edition of The 
American is so extensively revised that it is a substantially different book from the novel 
James composed in the mid-1870s.”60  Of course, the implications of viewing the two 
editions as distinct works are far-reaching.  Scholars have always needed to exercise a 
certain degree of caution when selecting a reprinted edition of one of James’ early novels 
to work with, lest they face the embarrassment of mistakenly citing one of James’ 
revisions as an example of his early style.  There is, however, a significant difference 
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between early and late works and early and late versions of a single work.  Should we 
now read the New York Edition of The American alongside other late works, such as The 
Ambassadors and The American Scene, rather than alongside early works, such as The 
Europeans and (the unrevised version of) Daisy Miller?61 
To answer this question, I now turn to the relationship between the revised 
version of The American and James’ other late works—a relationship so far overlooked 
by nearly all previous analyses of the novel’s revisions but one that helps explain how 
James became more conversant with the emerging global cultural economy and how that 
greater knowledge stimulated James to revise his early novels in order to accommodate 
new readings of those works.62  In other words, to trace down what is “global” about the 
later James’ aesthetics, I examine the process by which he revised his early novels to fit 
his new understanding of the world.  Thus in a sense, I suggest that understanding the 
major historical and cultural shifts that James takes part in and the emergence of a global 
consciousness that his writings—and revisions—both reflect and contribute to involves 
attentiveness to such seemingly unimportant details as altered articles, adjusted 
adjectives, and other literary emendations as it does attentiveness to the sorts of changing 
population patterns and routes of immigration that the next chapter will examine.   
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In his 1984 book Flawed Texts and Verbal Icons, Hershel Parker took all previous 
commentators on James’ revisions to task for ignoring “even the simplest biographical 
questions, such as what order James worked in,” and for not asking “what the 
chronological relationships were between James’s revising of his works and his writing 
of the prefaces for the volumes in which those works appeared.”63  Although he is overly 
dismissive of those previous studies (taken together, Isadore Traschen’s three essays on 
the revisions to The American constitute a thoughtful and largely consistent, though not 
definitive, examination of the revisions) and either overlooked or ignored James 
Tuttleton’s brief history of the text in the Norton Critical Edition of the novel, Parker had 
a point.  For instance, no analysis of the revised ending of The American has drawn what 
seems to me a fairly obvious comparison between its finale and those of The 
Ambassadors and “The Jolly Corner” (1908).  Published during a five-year time-span that 
also included James’ rewriting of The American, these two late works end with a 
similarly ambiguous relationship between a rather dense American man whose eyes are 
opened through travel and a very sensible American woman who serves as the man’s 
chief confidante.  The revised incarnations of Christopher Newman and Mrs. Tristram 
thus parallel Spencer Brydon and Alice Staverton in “The Jolly Corner” and Lambert 
Strether and Maria Gostrey in The Ambassadors.  Parker proceeded to put his money 
where his mouth was, though.  In a separate essay entitled “Henry James ‘In the Wood’:  
Sequence and Significances of His Literary Labors, 1905-1907,” he reconstructed a 
detailed chronology of the thirty-month period between June 1905 and December 1907 
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that comprised the most complicated phase of James’ work on the New York Edition.64  
Together, Tuttleton’s “Note on the Text” and Parker’s outline clarify the otherwise rather 
convoluted history of the novel. 
When most critics talk about his revisions to the novel, they typically refer to the 
alterations James made when he was preparing it for the New York Edition.  In point of 
fact, those revisions were merely the last and most significant in a series of revisions that 
occurred at intervals over the course of three decades.  For one thing, as Oscar Cargill 
points out, The American is itself a reworking of the plot of Home of the Gentry 
(sometimes translated as A Nest of Gentlefolk, 1859) by Ivan Turgenev, an author James 
greatly admired and met shortly after moving to Paris in 1875; Turgenev’s novel also 
ends with its hero’s love interest joining a convent.65  James started his novel only a few 
weeks after settling down in Paris.  When the first installments were rejected by The 
Galaxy, James sent them to William Dean Howells, who agreed to publish the novel in 
The Atlantic Monthly.  The American appeared in that magazine in twelve installments 
between June 1876 and May 1877; however, James did not complete the novel until early 
1877, well after the first few installments had already appeared in The Atlantic Monthly 
and shortly after James had relocated from Paris to London.  Thus James was composing 
the novel as it was being published, and he had no opportunity to proofread the material 
before it appeared in print.  The first book edition was published by James Ripley Osgood 
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and was released in April 1877.  According to Tuttleton, “there is no evidence to suggest 
that James […] prepared corrected copy for this first book edition.”66  When pirated 
copies of the novel appeared in Britain in 1878 due to weak copyright laws, James was 
troubled by their textual corruptions, and he arranged for an authorized English edition, 
which was published by Macmillan in March 1879.  The 1879 Macmillan edition marked 
the first time that scholars are certain James reviewed galley proofs of the novel, and 
while there are relatively few variants between Macmillan’s and Osgood’s editions, it is 
for this reason that the 1879 Macmillan is widely accepted as the definitive early version 
of The American. 
Between 1879 and the New York Edition, The American reappeared twice more, 
though in radically different guises.  First, in 1883, Macmillan included it among a set of 
James’ collected novels.  Again, Tuttleton notes that “there is no evidence to suggest that 
James played a role in the preparation of the 1883 text,” and although there are some 800 
variants between the 1879 and 1883 editions, all but one are accidentals.67  Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that, when James began revising the novel for the New York Edition, he 
utilized a copy of the 1883 edition.  More significantly, however, James returned to The 
American in the early 1890s, when he adapted it into a play.  In many ways, the changes 
that James eventually made to the story for this adaptation are even more radical than the 
revisions that appear in the 1907 edition of the novel.  At first, James merely reshaped the 
existing plot and characters into a four-act drama, but Edward Compton, who produced 
the play and starred as Newman, complained about the gloominess of the ending and 
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prodded James into writing a new fourth act.68  James reluctantly complied, supplying a 
happy ending in which Claire and Newman are allowed to marry and Valentin, who is 
killed in a duel in both versions of the novel, survives.  Other than James’ desire for 
success on the stage and his rather low opinion of theater audiences, there seem to be no 
overriding or aesthetically coherent reasons for these major changes, and they do not 
make it into the New York Edition.  Ironically, the changes do reflect the happy endings 
that were tacked on to several unauthorized translations of the novel that appeared in 
Germany and elsewhere in the late 1870s and early 1880s.  Equally ironic is the fact that 
the revised stage version of The American gave James his greatest theatrical success, 
though that success was modest at best. 
When James eventually rewrote The American for the New York Edition, the 
process was much longer and more arduous.  James began that process as early as 
October or November 1905, and at various times, his work on The American overlapped 
his labors on Roderick Hudson, The Portrait of a Lady, and The Princess Cassamassima 
as well as his composition of The American Scene, which he began in earnest in August 
1905.  By March 1906, James finished and submitted the revised version of Roderick 
Hudson to Scribner’s but continued working on The American.  In May 1906, he set The 
American aside to work on proofs of The American Scene, and the following month saw 
him submit the revised version of The Portrait of a Lady and return the proofs of the 
revised Roderick Hudson.  In August, James completed and submitted the prefaces for 
Roderick Hudson and The Portrait of a Lady, liking them so much that he decided to 
continue producing prefaces for his other works.  By November 1906, he finished and 
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submitted the revisions for the first half of The American, not completing and submitting 
the second half and the preface until February of the following year.  By the time he 
finished his work on The American, James had already begun revising The Princess 
Cassamassima, and he submitted the first volume of that novel in early March 1907.  He 
corrected proofs for The American in late April and for The Princess Cassamassima in 
early May.  In July 1907, he corrected the proofs of the prefaces for Roderick Hudson, 
The Portrait of a Lady, and The American, having already begun revising The Tragic 
Muse but not yet written the preface for The Princess Cassamassima.  By October 1907, 
James realized that he would never be able to write his envisioned second half of The 
American Scene, but he seems to have decided that the revisions and prefaces were an 
adequate trade-off.  In December of that year, Scribner’s sent him complimentary copies 
of the first two volumes of the New York Edition, which contained Roderick Hudson and 
The American. 
No previous analysis of James’ revisions of The American, however, has taken 
this brief history into account or inquired as to how James’ other literary activities at the 
time informed the novel’s alterations.69  Of course, it was not uncommon for James to 
return multiple times to a single novel; S.P. Rosenbaum informs us that James revised 
The Ambassadors three times in a span of about six years, including once for the New 
York Edition, though none of these revisions were as extensive as the revisions to James’ 
earliest novels.70  Nevertheless, the fact that James took fifteen months to ready The 
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American for the New York Edition is particularly striking when we stop to consider that 
he was capable of drafting even longer novels in less time.  There can be little doubt that 
he took both his efforts and the novel itself very seriously.  Just as important is that 
James’ rewriting of The American overlapped and continued on immediately after his 
efforts to write and see The American Scene through publication.  As I suggested earlier 
in this chapter, we should view The American Scene and the revised edition of The 
American as informing one another, each being the direct result of James’ 1904-05 return 
to the United States.  (James finalized arrangements for the New York Edition during his 
trip.)  The American Scene sheds further light on James’ revisions to The American, for it 
records his realization of his native land’s emergence as a global power in his absence. 
To be sure, in The American Scene, James does not entirely abandon his 
descriptions and analyses of national contrasts in favor of a vision of global homogeneity.  
As with many travelogues, much of the book is dedicated to cataloguing differences:  
different ways of life, opposing sets of values, and so forth.  In drawing attention to 
James’ awareness of an emerging global cultural economy, therefore, I wish to emphasize 
that the convergence of national values was—and continues to remain—gradual and that 
James’ later writings expand upon and problematize, without wholly discarding, his 
earlier concepts of how culture functions at the international level.  After all, even in its 
revised form, The American ends without rapprochement, despite Christopher Newman’s 
status as a more serious contender for Claire’s hand in 1907.  Likewise, The American 
Scene still echoes another, much earlier work of nonfiction by James in its decrial of 
America’s lack of history and high culture and Americans’ lack of discrimination; in 
Hawthorne (1879), written very shortly after the first version of The American, James 
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excuses the “extraordinary blankness [and] curious paleness of colour and paucity of 
detail” that characterize Nathaniel Hawthorne’s American diaries in contrast to his 
“warmer” and more detailed European diaries as the result of the absence of “items of 
high civilization” in America at the time.71  But whatever James’ opinions regarding the 
perceived shortcomings of American culture nearly thirty years later, The American 
Scene certainly displays no “paucity of detail.”  Its sheer length alone—some 150,000 
words and presumably only half the length of the project James originally conceived—
surely indicates that James now felt that the topic of America was anything but 
“blankness.” 
On the contrary, James freely admits that his fascination with his homeland had 
intensified during his twenty-year absence.  In what is perhaps the most confessional 
passage in The American Scene, James writes: 
It was “Europe” that had, in very ancient days, held out to the yearning young 
American some likelihood of impressions more numerous and various and of a 
higher intensity than those he might gather on the native scene; and it was 
doubtless in conformity with some such desire more finely and more frequently to 
vibrate that he had originally begun to consult the European oracle.  This had led, 
in the event, to his settling to live for long years in the very precincts, as it were, 
of the temple.  (654) 
Echoing the converging tastes and values that place Claire and Newman on equal footing 
in the revised version of The American, James here suggests that transforming from a 
merely American status into a global sensibility involves learning how to “vibrate” more 
intensely, not simply collecting bits of knowledge.  But the longer James had resided in 
Europe, the more had that “higher intensity” gradually worn off.  “The European 
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complexity,” he continues, “working clearer to one’s vision, had grown usual and 
calculable. […]  Romance and mystery—in other words the amusement of interest—
would have therefore at last to provide for themselves elsewhere” (654-55, original 
emphasis).  James’ emphasis of the word amusement is perhaps unfortunate, suggesting 
that he is little more than a dilettante, but it is his use of the word complexity that really 
matters, insofar as it implies that whichever “elsewhere” James selects would have to 
equal or supersede the complexity that James had already mastered in Europe.  As we 
know, James selected America:  “It was American civilization that had begun to spread 
itself thick and pile itself high, in short, in proportion as the other, the foreign exhibition 
had taken to writing itself plain; and to a world so amended and enriched, accordingly, 
the expatriated observer, with his relaxed curiosity reviving and his limp imagination 
once more on the stretch, couldn’t fail again to address himself” (655).  Ironically for the 
man who wrote disparagingly of his own country’s culture in Hawthorne, returning to the 
nation he had forsaken so many years ago serves as a means of aesthetic rejuvenation 
(“reviving” his “relaxed curiosity” and “stretching” his “limp imagination”), and this 
renewal is possible because that nation has “amended and enriched” itself.  In other 
words, James finds his own artistic regeneration in the “spread” of “American 
civilization.”  And this is James writing in 1905, shortly after he had returned to Britain 
and as he was embarking upon the New York Edition, perhaps the most notable outcome 
of this regeneration.  James must have felt his trip justified very quickly after he arrived 
in the United States because he began detecting differences everywhere, but here again, 
James problematizes these differences by acknowledging that “to be on the lookout for 
differences was, not unnaturally, to begin to meet them just over the border and see them 
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increase and multiply” (397).  His various encounters with difference in America, 
therefore, may be just a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
For James, however, the greatest challenge to his own preconceived notions about 
national identity appears in the form of the many thousands of immigrants who had made 
their home in America during his absence.  Their presence and the ethnic diversity they 
bring obsess James throughout the four chapters he devotes to New York City.  His 
concerns over these immigrants become most acute as he recounts his visit to Ellis Island, 
already the most famous point of entry for immigrants of the period.  James describes the 
scene as a “visible act of ingurgitation on the part of our body politic and social” and 
imagines that, like himself, “any sensitive citizen who may have happened to ‘look in’ 
[…] comes back from his visit not at all the same person” (426).  Shaken to its core is his 
certainty in what makes an American an American.  “One’s supreme relation, as one had 
always put it,” James writes, “was one’s relation to one’s country—a conception made up 
so largely of one’s countrymen and one’s countrywomen” (427).  With his visit to Ellis 
Island, however, “the idea of the country itself underwent something of that profane 
overhauling through which it appears to suffer the indignity of change” (427).  These 
immigrants have literally displaced James; their influx into the country occurred after his 
own expatriation.  But their presence also overturns James’ belief that ethnic, social, and 
cultural homogeneity forms the foundation of national identity—what he calls “the 
luxury of some such close and sweet and whole national consciousness as that of the 
Switzer and the Scot” (428, original emphasis).  These immigrants are—or shortly will 
become—Americans, too, and native-born Americans must “surrender and accept the 
[new] orientation” of nationality (427).  James’ vision is not very different from 
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Woodrow Wilson’s, though at first James is far less thrilled to realize that, as Wilson put 
it in the speech that opened the preceding chapter, America is “compounded of the 
nations of the world.”  Eventually, James takes comfort in realizing that immigration has 
always been integral to American history:  “Who and what is an alien, when it comes to 
that, in a country peopled from the first […] by migrations at once extremely recent, 
perfectly traceable, and urgently required?” (459)  Yet James is nagged by a lingering 
suspicion that these immigrants, poor and crude though they may be, are no less 
cosmopolitan than he, the son of privilege.  “Foreign as they might be, newly inducted as 
they might be,” he notes, “they were at home” (460, original emphasis).  What James 
seems to recognize, as the next chapter will explore more fully in the works of other 
writers, is that immigrants comprise a type of global citizenry, capable of being “at 
home” even in their foreignness, and that immigration is itself a contributing factor to 
globalization. 
James undercuts national contrasts in other ways, too.  In particular, he exhibits a 
tendency to relate what he finds to be different in America with what he is already 
familiar in Europe.  For instance, when walking the streets of New York, a city much 
transformed during his absence, his thoughts go “straight to poor great wonder-working 
Émile Zola and his love of the human aggregation, the artificial microcosm, which had to 
spend itself on great shops, great businesses, great ‘apartment-houses,’ of inferior, of 
mere Parisian scale,” and he wonders, “What if Le Ventre de Paris, what if Au Bonheur 
des Dames, what if Pot-Bouille and L’Argent, could but have come into being under the 
New York inspiration?” (424)  This new New York dwarfs even Paris in the material it 
might supply writers, and James assumes that Zola’s novels would be grander still had 
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Zola only been able to write them in—and about—New York.  Later, when James 
bemoans the bourgeois tastes of his fellow countrymen, he finds solace in reminding 
himself that his “vision has a kind of analogy; for what were the Venetians, after all, but 
the children of a Republic and of trade?” (507)  This Venetian analogy seems to have 
struck James as particularly appropriate because he returns to it in his chapter on the 
Bowery.  “As the Venetian Republic, in the person of the Doge,” he writes, “used to go 
forth, on occasion, to espouse the Adriatic, so it is quite as if the American, incarnate in 
its greatest port, were for ever throwing the nuptial ring to the still more richly-endowed 
Atlantic” (525).  Here, James is referring once again to the immigrants who had 
transformed the ethnic and cultural character of the city, but the images of trade and 
overseas expansion this passage simultaneously connotes drive home the fact that 
America, like Venice, was a republic that had acquired an empire.  Indeed, when James 
finally arrives in Washington, he remarks on how that city’s features “all more or less 
majestically [play] the administrative, or as we nowadays put it, Imperial part” (633, 
emphasis added). 
The city of Washington, with its manifestations of newly attained power, presents 
James with the greatest number of convergences and potential convergences between 
America and the more established imperial powers of Europe.  The architecture and 
landscape of Capitol Hill, for instance, provide evidence of “the democratic assimilation 
of the greater dignities and majesties” of the Roman model (650, original emphasis).  
Even when James notes that the similarities between America’s capitol and the capitols 
of Europe are as yet merely superficial—“Washington talks about herself, and about 
almost nothing else; falling superficially indeed, on that ground, but into line with the 
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other capitols.  London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, goodness knows, talk about themselves:  
that is each member of this sisterhood talks, sufficiently or inordinately, of the great 
number of divided and differing selves that form together her controlling identity” (635-
36)—he never doubts the inevitability of American hegemony.  Commenting on the 
ostensible “historic void” out of which U.S. power has sprung, he worries: 
 The danger “in Europe” is of their having too many things to say, and too many 
others to distinguish these from; the danger in the States is of their not having 
things enough—with enough tone and resonance furthermore to give them.  What 
therefore will the multitudinous and elaborate forms of the Washington to come 
have to “say,” and what, above all, besides gold and silver, stone and marble and 
trees and flowers, will they be able to say it with?  (648, emphasis added) 
James ends his chapter on Washington with the haunting image of three Native 
Americans “dispossessed of forest and prairie” (652).  Just as clearly as the “immaculate” 
streets of the city or the buildings on Capitol Hill, they offer physical proof of America’s 
emergence as an imperial power; for James, whose mind was “fed betimes on the 
Leatherstocking Tales,” their presence confirms that America, like the empires of Europe, 
has strode “the bloody footsteps of time” (652-53).  That James himself was haunted by 
these three Native Americans is evinced by the fact that he returns to them three chapters 
later, in the penultimate paragraph of The American Scene.  In a rather extraordinary 
moment of identification with their plight that perhaps grows out of his own sense of 
having been “dispossessed” by immigrants, James takes his American readers to task for 
not making that bloody imperial legacy amount to something more than it does: 
If I were one of the painted savages you have dispossessed […] beauty and charm 
would be for me in the solitude you have ravaged, and I should owe you my 
grudge for every disfigurement and every violence, for every wound with which 
you have caused the face of the land to bleed.  No, since I accept your ravage, 
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what strikes me is the long list of the arrears of your undone. […]  You touch the 
great lonely land—as one feels it still to be—only to plant upon it some ugliness 
about which, never dreaming of the grace of apology or contrition, you then 
proceed to brag with a cynicism all your own.  (734-35) 
In light of this meditation on the violence that has been suppressed in official and quasi-
official accounts of American history, such as the Leatherstocking Tales, some of James’ 
revisions to The American take on a slightly sinister tone.  I shall conclude with one such 
alteration that appears in the first chapter of the novel. 
 In both versions of The American, James withholds his protagonist’s name for 
several paragraphs after Newman’s initial description, allowing himself to drive home the 
symbolism of the name with a joke.  While making arrangements with Noémie Nioche 
for copies of the artworks that surround them in the Louvre, Newman presents her with 
his card.  The changes that James makes to their ensuing exchange reveals as profound a 
shift in his thinking about Euro-American relations as the one he discusses more directly 
in the preface to the novel: 
1877 
And she took it and read his name:  
“Christopher Newman.”  Then she tried to 
repeat it aloud, and laughed at her bad 
accent.  “Your English names are so droll!” 
“Droll?” said Mr. Newman, 
laughing too.  “Did you ever hear of 
Christopher Columbus?” 
“Bien sûr!  [Of course!]  He 
invented America; a very great man.  And 
is he your patron? 
“My patron?” 
1907 
And she took it and read his name:  
“Christopher Newman.”  Then she tried to 
repeat it aloud and laughed at her bad 
accent.  “Your English names are not 
commodes [easy] to say!” 
“Well, mine’s partly celebrated,” 
said Mr. Newman, laughing too.  “Did you 
never hear of Christopher Columbus?” 
“Bien sûr!  He first showed 
Americans the way to Europe; a very great 
man.  And is he your patron?” 
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“Your patron-saint, in the 
calendar.” 
“Oh, exactly; my parents named me 
for him.” (N21) 
“My patron?” 
“Your patron saint, such as we all 
have.” 
“Oh, exactly; my parents named me 
after him.” (O21) 
In both versions, James sets up his punchline through slippage.  Either Noémie genuinely 
does not know who Christopher Columbus was, or more likely, she is unable to 
communicate precisely what it was Columbus accomplished.  Either way, her mistaken 
assumption that Columbus is Newman’s patron saint makes it clear that our Christopher 
is as much on a voyage of discovery as his more famous namesake. 
James’ revision of Noémie’s muddled description of what Columbus did, 
however, is even more suggestive.  In 1877, James was content to create humor out of 
Noémie’s confusion of the verbs invent and discover.  Her confusion invites readers to 
consider momentarily the idea that America is a construction, a country that has been 
“invented” as opposed to one that has come into being organically through ethnic and 
linguistic homogeneity.  (This implication would align James with his contemporary 
Ernst Renan, whose views on nationality and the nation-state were discussed in the 
preceding chapter.)  In 1907, James’ humor results from Noémie’s inversion of direct and 
indirect objects.  She should have said that Columbus “first showed Europeans the way 
to America.”  Thus the joke remains an outgrowth of the vagaries of grammar, as 
highlighted by the conversation of two people who do not share the same mother tongue, 
but the implications of the revised sentence are richer, especially when considered in light 
of James’ comments on the plight of Native Americans in The American Scene.  After all, 
in a very real sense, Columbus did show (Native) Americans the way to—and the ways 
of—Europe.  He both transported captive American Indians back to Europe and laid the 
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foundation for the genocidal policies of European (and U.S.) imperial administrators.  
Newman’s facetious admission that Columbus is his patron saint is therefore also an 
admission that he is the beneficiary of the bloody imperial legacy that Columbus founded 
and James, in The American Scene, denounces through his own identification with the 
three Native Americans he encountered in Washington. 
 Finally, on an even more basic level, Noémie’s new response also evokes an 
image of transatlantic exchange:  that the way from Europe to America is simultaneously 
the way from America to Europe.  Consequently, while her answer may not be 
technically correct, it is entirely appropriate to the larger issues that concern James.  The 
ramifications of Newman’s presence in Europe, including his effect on the lives of Claire 
and other Europeans, reveal that the United States has its role to play on the international 
stage, too.  America, James demonstrates, is not simply an extension of Europe, nor does 
history and culture flow one-directionally westward.  At the same time, however, the fact 
that Noémie can confuse two continents, let alone two individual countries (she does 
assume at first that Newman is English because of his name), indicates how difficult it is 
to sustain simple national binary values in James’ fiction.  Both of these factors—the 
increased international importance of the United States and the convergence of national 
values—become more prominent in The American as a result of James’ revisions.  In the 
end, the world of the revised version of the novel is more than either “real” or 
“romantic.”  Like the world surrounding Henry James himself in 1907, it is global.
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3:  Circulating America:  Abraham Cahan, Knut Hamsun, 
and a Global Perspective on the Immigrant Experience 
 
 
“What, oh, what again, were he and his going to make of us?” – Henry James1 
 
  
As indicated in the preceding chapter, several passages in The American Scene 
(1907) are dedicated to Henry James’ attempts to come to terms with the changes to 
American society and culture that the vast influx of immigrants had caused during his 
twenty-year absence from the United States.  In particular, an encounter he has with an 
Armenian immigrant in the New Hampshire countryside leads James to consider what he 
calls “the great ‘ethnic’ question”:  “What meaning […] can continue to attach to such a 
term as the ‘American’ character?”2  Eventually, as I pointed out, James takes solace in 
the fact that the United States and its culture have been “from the first” the products of 
migration, but he remains troubled by his realization that these recent immigrants possess 
a cosmopolitanism equal to his own, that they are fully capable of being “at home” even 
in their foreignness.3  Part of this cosmopolitanism James attributes to large and 
seemingly self-sufficient immigrant communities already in place in major U.S. cities.  
He observes: 
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There awaits the disembarked Armenian, for instance, so warm and furnished an 
Armenian corner that the need of hurrying to get rid of the sense of it [his 
ethnicity] must become less and less a pressing preliminary.  The corner growing 
warmer and warmer, it is to be supposed, by rich accretions, he may take his time, 
more and more, for becoming absorbed in the surrounding element, and he may in 
fact feel more and more that he can do so on his own conditions.4 
James’ supposition that immigrants like the Armenian he meets in New Hampshire 
possess such a powerful degree of control over their own assimilation into their newly 
adopted country is in and of itself an extraordinary reading of the process of 
Americanization.  It is worth remembering that James published The American Scene 
only one year before the premiere of Israel Zangwill’s play The Melting Pot (1908), 
which argued for complete assimilation even to the point of sacrificing one’s own ethnic, 
cultural, and religious heritage.  James’ assertion that immigrants can and do approach 
assimilation largely on their own terms challenges the assumption that Americanization 
is—or should be—a fundamental goal of immigrants residing in the United States. 
Later in The American Scene, James’ recognition that immigrants make up a 
global citizenry becomes still more far-reaching.  After watching a Yiddish theater 
company perform, James comments on the linguistic inventiveness of the boss of the 
company and realizes that immigrant communities are never merely absorbed into the 
larger American culture but that they instead contribute to its continued formation and 
circulation.  In the passage that provides the epigram for this chapter, James writes of his 
encounter with the Yiddish theater impresario: 
What remains with me is this expression, and the colour and the quality of it, and 
the free familiarity and the ‘damned foreign impudence,’ with so much taken for 
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granted, and all the hitches and lapses, all the solutions of continuity, in his 
inward assimilation of our heritage and point of view, matched as they were, on 
our own side, by such signs of large and comparatively witless concession.  What, 
oh, what again, were he and his going to make of us?5 
By drawing attention to the likelihood that, just as he is trying to make sense of the 
culture of these immigrants, they will “make” something new “of us,” James 
acknowledges that the processes of immigration, assimilation, and Americanization work 
in more than one direction.  In other words, as immigrants adapt themselves to their new 
environment, taking on the linguistic and social characteristics of the United States, they 
simultaneously produce changes within the culture of that environment.  Their presence 
and activities here are enough to remake “us”; their Americanization is, in a sense, a re-
Americanization of native-born U.S. citizens. 
Recent literary scholars have become extremely attentive to these particular 
effects of immigrants upon American society and culture at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  In his groundbreaking 1985 study Beyond Ethnicity, for instance, Werner 
Sollors placed what were then ordinarily marginalized ethnic texts at the center of the 
American literary tradition by examining how they highlight “the conflict between 
contractual and hereditary, self-made and ancestral, definitions of American identity—
between consent and descent—as the central drama in American culture.”6  For Sollors, 
ethnic literatures are “codes for socialization [both] into ethnic groups and into 
America.”7  The constructions of ethnicity in such texts thus serve to explore and critique 
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the constructions of American national identity.  Immigrant texts in particular are 
predominantly about becoming American, and in drawing attention to the difficulties and 
ambivalences of assimilation, immigrant writers underscore the fact that Americanization 
frequently involves both inclusion into and exclusion from national and other communal 
and familial forms of belonging—as well as a form of exile from a homeland that is 
absent physically but present culturally.  Whereas Sollors’ analysis of the immigrant 
experience focuses largely on the point of view of immigrant authors themselves, Walter 
Benn Michaels has examined the anxieties of immigration as experienced by native-born 
observers.  In Our America, Michaels concentrates on what he terms “nativist 
modernism,” which is the discursive attempt to revise “categories of collective identity—
and, in particular, of collective national identity—[…] in terms of familial relations (as 
opposed, say, to economic relations or regional or even generational relations).”8  
Consequently, “nativist modernism” serves to racialize American identity as white, based 
on familial descent.  For adherents to this ideology, immigrants represent the ultimate 
impossibility of Americanization because being American is something that a person is 
born into rather than taught.  Michaels then goes on to explore how this ideology drives 
modernist authors’ treatment of race and ethnicity, revealing a shift away from the racial 
hierarchies of Progressive-Era politics and into forms of exclusion through the 
commitment to preserving difference.  More recently, in Barbarian Virtues, Matthew 
Frye Jacobson has drawn attention to the important relationship between immigration and 
overseas expansion.  “As modern American nationalism took shape within an 
international crucible of immigration and empire building,” Jacobson argues, “American 
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integration into the world economic system in this period of breathtaking industrialization 
exposed a rather profound dependence upon foreign peoples as imported workers for 
factories and as overseas consumers of American products.”9  Jacobson then 
demonstrates how the incursion of immigrants provided not only an economic basis for 
U.S. strategies of imperialism through their labor but also intellectual and symbolic ones 
by providing Americans with a means of conceptualizing—and hierarchizing—a variety 
of non-Anglo-Saxon peoples. 
While Sollors, Michaels, and Jacobson have made significant contributions to our 
understanding of the extent to which immigrants have influenced American history and 
culture, what remains largely absent from their and other scholars’ studies of immigrant 
literatures is the global nature of the immigrants’ own experiences and perspectives.  
Indeed, although Sollors, Michaels, Jacobson, and other literary scholars have provided 
thorough and thoughtful readings of the give-and-take relationship between newly 
formed ethnic communities and the larger American culture in which they became 
embedded, these scholars still tend to privilege the experiences of immigrants who 
underwent the process of naturalization.  Jacobson’s attentiveness to the implications of 
immigration for U.S. international policy notwithstanding, these scholars have 
overlooked many of the transnational dimensions of immigration, including the global 
networks that many immigrant communities maintained in order to preserve a means of 
returning, physically as well as culturally, to their homelands.  In short, by focusing on 
the problems and debates surrounding the question of Americanization, these scholars 
inadvertently reinscribe the traditional model of assimilation:  as a one-way process that 
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involves moving from some other country and settling permanently in the United States.  
In fact, not all immigrants remained in America for the rest of their lives.  Many returned 
to their homelands temporarily or permanently, after achieving or failing to achieve a 
variety of goals in America.  These immigrants, sometimes called sojourners or birds of 
passage, carried their experiences in—and memories of—America back with them, and 
even those immigrants who stayed and eventually naturalized as U.S. citizens often 
maintained close and sophisticated ties of travel and communication with their 
homelands. 
Scholars within other fields, such as history, sociology, and cultural studies, have 
been somewhat more attentive to the transnational dimensions of immigrant networks 
and communities, and while they have rarely focused upon the literary labors of the 
immigrants they study, they do provide important social and historical context.  
Sociologist Orlando Patterson, for example, has identified a phenomenon that he calls the 
“migration system,” which is “any movement of persons between states, the social, 
economic, and cultural effects of such movements, and the patterned interactions among 
such effects.”10  By definition, these systems follow specific routes of migration and thus 
extend beyond national borders, often encompassing multiple countries or regions of 
countries.  They also frequently result in ethnic and cultural enclaves in major cities, such 
as the Armenian “corners” that Henry James mentions in The American Scene.  Patterson 
himself locates such a system—the emerging West Atlantic system—around the present-
day Caribbean, with Miami serving as a major hub for immigrants (both legal and 
illegal), refugees, and migrant workers from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Columbia, 
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Mexico, and elsewhere—many of whom intend to return eventually to their respective 
homelands.  While Patterson’s West Atlantic system is a relatively new instantiation of 
the transnational formations of immigrant communities, Nancy Foner argues that such 
“transnationalism is not new” but is in fact a continuation of ongoing historical 
processes.11  Specifically examining Jewish and Italian immigrant communities in New 
York between 1880 and 1923, Foner reveals how those immigrants “maintained 
extensive […] transnational ties and operated in what social scientists now call a 
transnational social field” through regular communication, business transactions, return 
visits, and so forth.12  And as I shall discuss more fully below, various historians have 
demonstrated through statistical analysis that return migration was as common a goal for 
many immigrant groups as assimilation.  By far, however, the most famous and 
influential literary-cultural study of the intellectual exchange across and throughout such 
a “migration system” or “transnational social field” remains Paul Gilroy’s The Black 
Atlantic, which examines the history and culture of the African diaspora.  While the 
African diaspora’s most salient historical feature was its enforced migration, which 
distinguishes it from most other migrant experiences, Gilroy’s focus on “the middle 
passage, on the various projects for redemptive return to an African homeland, on the 
circulation of ideas and activists as well as the movement of key cultural and political 
artifacts” remains a model of transnational literary analysis.13 
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Taking these transnational considerations into account, I propose an alternative 
model for reading immigrant texts in this chapter, focusing on immigration itself as a 
process of circulation rather than absorption.  Specifically, I argue that these texts reveal 
the vital role immigrants played both in the emergence of globalization and the 
globalization of America and that, by establishing and maintaining transnational 
networks, immigrant communities in the United States facilitated—and, at times, 
challenged—the worldwide spread of American capitalism and culture.  This model of 
circulation therefore extends the multidirectionality of immigration, which James 
underscores in his question of what immigrants were “going to make of us,” to an even 
broader, worldwide stage by focusing on how immigrants simultaneously “remade” 
American culture at home and helped disseminate particular conceptions of American 
culture abroad.  In the following pages, I examine two authors for what they reveal about 
the international circulation of American money, products, and culture that resulted 
directly from the establishment of global immigrant communities and networks at the 
turn of the twentieth century:  Abraham Cahan, who chose to remain in the United States 
and whose The Rise of David Levinsky (1917) remains one of the classic novels of 
immigration, and Knut Hamsun, whose own attempts to settle in the United States met 
with failure and who later wrote a series of critical studies of the shortcomings of 
American society and culture, including most notably On the Cultural Life of Modern 
America (1889).14 
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In order to understand the critical importance of such immigrant texts to the 
globalization of America, it is also necessary to understand the full impact that the 
massive waves of immigration had on the United States at the turn of the century.  Henry 
James was hardly alone in contemplating the social and cultural ramifications of this 
influx of immigrants.  In fact, from 1880 onwards, Americans began framing 
immigration as a national problem and discussing it as never before.  In 1882, for 
example, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, the first of what would become a 
series of ever more restrictive anti-immigration laws that culminated in the Quota Acts of 
1921 and 1924.  In 1885, as I have already discussed more fully in the first chapter, 
Josiah Strong singled out immigration as the first and most pressing of the seven “perils” 
he identified as threatening American society in Our Country.  Although Strong himself 
refrained from suggesting that immigration needed to be curtailed, Nathaniel Shaler, a 
professor of paleontology and geology at Harvard and an adherent of Social Darwinism, 
felt no qualms about doing so in an 1893 Atlantic Monthly essay entitled “European 
Peasants as Immigrants,” one of the first explicitly anti-immigration screeds of any 
importance in American history.  Unambiguously tying the issue of immigration to 
assumptions about a nation’s need for racial and ethnic purity, Shaler claimed, “We have 
suffered grievously from the folly of our predecessors in recklessly admitting an 
essentially alien folk into this land. […]  They [our predecessors] have imperiled the 
future of their own race in the land best fitted for its nurture. […]  A true democracy 
cannot be maintained in the presence of a large alien class.”15  Among the many 
implications of Shaler’s argument was the belief that national identity and a democratic 
form of government are possible only through racial and ethnic homogeneity.  Citing as 
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evidence the recent disenfranchisement of African-Americans through Jim Crow 
legislation in the South, Shaler contended that the introduction of diversity into a 
community compels the already established members of that community to “maintain 
their authority in a forcible way.”16  “History makes it plain,” Shaler continued, “that a 
race oligarchy almost inevitably arises wherever a superior and an inferior variety of 
people are brought together.”17  As far as Shaler was concerned, the “superior” variety of 
people in the United States were not just white but “the Aryan variety of mankind” (by 
which he meant those Americans descended from Northern European or Germanic 
peoples).18  In other words, Shaler sought to limit American identity to those citizens who 
happened to descend from English and German settlers and, perhaps in a pinch, 
immigrants from the Scandinavian countries.  In identifying America as a “land best 
fitted” for Aryan peoples, Shaler racialized the nation and suggested that some races and 
ethnicities were simply incapable of becoming part of the body politic.  The final 
implication was, of course, that the body politic ought to begin excluding them by 
preventing them from immigrating into the country in the first place. 
If James, Strong, and Shaler exhibited greater degrees of ambivalence, anxiety, 
and outright hostility toward immigrants than did earlier American writers, such as 
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Benjamin Franklin and Margaret Fuller,19 it is important to remember that James, Strong, 
and Shaler were witnessing one of the greatest mass migrations in human history.  
Between 1881 and 1924, an explosion of migration took place, with literally millions of 
Germans, Italians, Scandinavians, and Eastern Europeans making new homes for 
themselves in the United States.  While foreign-born immigrants had always comprised a 
sizeable portion of the population, especially after hundreds of thousands of Irish and 
Chinese immigrants had flooded into the country during the 1840s and 1850s, the total 
number of immigrants rose dramatically during the final two decades of the nineteenth 
century.  For example, between 1845 and 1851, during and immediately after the Irish 
Potato Famine and shortly after the Taiping Rebellion began in China, the estimated 
number of immigrants entering the United States was 1,776,752.20  Thirty-five years 
later, during the relatively more stable 1880-1886 period, the estimated number of 
immigrants had more than doubled to 3,767,143, despite the fact that immigration from 
China was almost entirely halted from 1882 onwards.  In 1905, while Henry James was 
revisiting his homeland, the one-year total surpassed one million immigrants for the first 
time in U.S. history; when James made his visit to Ellis Island, well over 2,000 
immigrants were entering the country each day.  This spike in the total number of 
immigrants certainly mattered to men like Strong, who emphasized both the importance 
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of population size and, as previously demonstrated, the fact that “numbers tell.”21  The 
demographics of the United States were indeed changing in observable ways, with a 
greater number of immigrants from a wider range of countries arriving than ever before.  
Particularly troubling to Shaler and Strong was the increase in the number of immigrants 
from Southern and Eastern, as opposed to Northern and Western, Europe.  In short, the 
population of the United States was becoming increasingly more diverse, and 
immigration was playing its part in globalizing the nation and its culture, as James’ 
descriptions of Armenian communities in New Hampshire and Yiddish theaters in New 
York reveal.  Fears within some quarters that these demographic shifts indicated that 
America was in the process of becoming foreign to itself were perhaps to be expected.22 
Not all Americans shared these fears, however; in fact, some welcomed what they 
perceived to be the increased levels of cosmopolitanism that immigrants were injecting 
into American society.  Perhaps the most celebrated illustration of this alternative 
viewpoint remains Randolph Bourne’s 1916 essay “Trans-National America,” which 
unreservedly celebrates the diversity that the thirty-five-year influx of immigrants had 
brought to the United States.  In many respects, Bourne’s concept of a “trans-national 
America” is very much in tune with Woodrow Wilson’s vision of the United States as 
“the mediating Nation.”  Like Wilson, Bourne finds political empowerment for the 
American people in the nation’s newfound diversity.  Moreover, Bourne suggests that 
such diversity has provided the United States with the means of achieving a goal for 
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which the international community had been striving for decades:  a fully realized 
cosmopolitan identity.  Bourne writes: 
In a world which has dreamed of internationalism, we find that we have all 
unawares been building up the first international nation. […]  What we have 
achieved has been rather a cosmopolitan federation of national colonies, of 
foreign cultures, from whom the sting of devastating competition has been 
removed.  America is already the world-federation in miniature, the continent 
where for the first time in history has been achieved that miracle of hope, the 
peaceful living side by side, with character substantially preserved, of the most 
heterogenous peoples under the sun.23 
In other words, Bourne views America as an exemplary model of peaceful and 
multiethnic cooperation, a society that offers an alternative to the history of nationalist-
driven conflict that was continuing to engulf Europe in war and strife.  (Bourne’s essay 
was, of course, published as the First World War was raging but while the United States 
was still neutral.) 
What distinguishes Bourne’s “trans-national America” from Wilson’s “mediating 
Nation,” however, is that Bourne’s model does not subsume immigrants themselves into 
a larger national entity.  On the contrary, Bourne challenges assimilationist assumptions 
that “mere participation in the political life of the United States must cut the new citizen 
off from all sympathy with his old allegiance” and that “the immigrant whom we have 
welcomed escaping from the very exclusive nationalism of his European home shall 
forthwith adopt a nationalism just as exclusive, just as narrow, and even less legitimate 
because it is founded on no warm traditions of his own.”24  Instead, Bourne suggests 
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wider acceptance of “dual citizenship,” which transforms “masses of aliens, waiting to be 
‘assimilated,’ waiting to be melted down into the indistinguishable dough of Anglo-
Saxonism” into “threads of living and potent cultures, blindly striving to weave 
themselves into a novel international nation, the first the world has seen.”25  Thus rather 
than calling for complete assimilation and an end to “racial momentum,” as Wilson does, 
Bourne identifies ethnic and cultural diversity as the key constitutive characteristic of a 
globalized nation, wherein citizens may legally—and even necessarily—hold multiple 
national sympathies and allegiances.  In Bourne’s model, the nation-state assumes the 
status of a forum, a meeting-place of various cultures where nationalistic “wills-to-power 
are turned […] into learning how to live together.”26 
The optimism of this last point is no doubt an outgrowth of Bourne’s own 
pacifism, a feature of his writing that will be explored more fully in the Coda of this 
project; however, Bourne takes pains to clarify that the implications of his argument are 
immediate and not merely utopian.  Echoing the distinction between terms (historical 
conditions) and relations (consciousness of those conditions) drawn by William James, 
whose writings had influenced Bourne’s thinking tremendously, Bourne claims that his 
global vision already exists and that it only remains for Americans to recognize and 
embrace the fact:  “Already we are living this cosmopolitan America.  What we need is 
everywhere a vivid consciousness of the new ideal.”27  The reward for doing so, in 
Bourne’s opinion, is not just the political empowerment of the nation that Wilson 
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envisions, but also, crucially, the empowerment of the citizens themselves—both 
politically and creatively.  Bourne concludes that “the attempt to weave a wholly novel 
international nation out of our chaotic America will liberate and harmonize the creative 
power of all these peoples.”28  There are, then, both individual and cultural components 
to Bourne’s vision of a “trans-national” America, and it is Bourne’s acknowledgement of 
the interplay between the two—as well as the potential aesthetic payoff of such “creative 
power”—that separates his essay from the more monolithic insinuations of Wilson’s 
speech. 
Among the most notable aesthetic rewards that resulted from individual 
Americans maintaining multiple national sympathies and cultural practices are the novels 
and short stories that were written by immigrant authors, and of these immigrant texts, 
Abraham Cahan’s The Rise of David Levinksy ranks as perhaps the most sophisticated 
exploration of the sort of “trans-national” American identity that Bourne describes.  First 
published in 1917, near the tail end of the great wave of immigration, Cahan’s novel 
provides a retrospective look back at the entire period through the eyes of its titular 
protagonist.  Levinsky, who narrates his own life story, is born in 1865 into the Jewish 
community of Antomir, a town in what is now modern-day Lithuania but was then part of 
czarist Russia.  After the deaths of his mother and father, he emigrates from Europe to 
America in 1885 and begins to work his way up the social and economic ladder by 
entering New York City’s burgeoning garment industry.  Embracing the philosophies of 
assimilation and free-market capitalism, Levinsky eventually achieves spectacular 
business success, becoming on the surface a textbook example of the triumph of 
Americanization and the attainability of the American Dream.  At the same time, 
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however, Levinsky repeatedly acknowledges how unhappy he is, despite his wealth and 
success, and how much he regrets having lost contact with his ethnic and cultural 
heritage.  The novel opens and closes with Levinsky conceding that all of his 
accomplishments have come at the expense of having to conceal his “inner identity,”29 
his past and his status as a Jew and an immigrant.  (The distinction between Levinsky’s 
“inner” and “superficial” identities echoes “all the hitches and lapses” Henry James 
observed in the Jewish theater boss’ “inward assimilation of our heritage and point of 
view.”)  It is, in fact, this enforced rupture in the continuity between Levinsky’s past and 
present that has led many critics to read the novel primarily as a critique of the doctrine 
of assimilation, a process that, in effect, forces Levinsky—and other immigrants like 
him—to be inauthentic to half of his identity as a Jewish-American and thereby prevents 
him from achieving full self-realization.30  There is, however, much more to the novel 
than the element of critique. 
Perhaps the most beguiling aspect of The Rise of David Levinsky is how Cahan, 
who was a committed socialist at the time he wrote the novel, manages to make his 
protagonist, who is fairly cut-throat in his business practices, so sympathetic, insightful, 
and even likable.  Indeed, Levinsky seems to provide Cahan with a means of 
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demonstrating the extent to which immigrants, particularly Jewish immigrants like 
Levinsky and Cahan themselves, have helped shape American society for the better.  
Speaking of himself and his colleagues, Levinsky proudly points out that, collectively, 
they had 
marked the advent of the Russian Jew as head of one of the largest industries in 
the United States.  Also, it had meant that as master of that industry he had made 
good, for in his hands it had increased a hundredfold, garments that had formerly 
reached only the few having been placed within the reach of the masses.  
Foreigners ourselves, and mostly unable to speak English, we had Americanized 
the system of providing clothes for the American woman of moderate or humble 
means. […]  We had done away with prohibitive prices and greatly improved the 
popular taste.  Indeed, the Russian Jew had made the average American girl a 
‘tailor-made’ girl. […]  The average American woman is the best-dressed average 
woman in the world, and the Russian Jew has had a good deal to do with making 
her one.  (432-33) 
Levinsky takes delight in knowing that he and his fellow immigrants have assimilated so 
well into their adopted country that they, in turn, have contributed to the efficiency of 
American business, the growth of the American economy, and the comfort of the 
American lifestyle.  Although “foreigners” themselves, they have helped realize the 
American capitalist system, even to the point of “Americanizing” an entire industry. 
Whatever qualms Cahan might have had over his fellow immigrants’ 
contributions to rampant American-style capitalism, he seems to share Levinsky’s equal 
delight in how Jewish immigrants have helped develop and expand New York, the city 
where Cahan himself resided.  “Men like Volodsky,” writes Levinsky, 
with hosts of carpenters, bricklayers, plumbers—all Russian or Galician Jews—
continued to build up the Bronx, Washington Heights, and several sections of 
Brooklyn.  Vast areas of meadowland and rock were turned by them, as by a 
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magic wand, into densely populated avenues and streets of brick and mortar.  
Under the spell of their activity cities larger than Odessa sprang up within the 
confines of Greater New York in the course of three or four years.  (500) 
So massively have these Jewish newcomers transformed the city that Levinsky drives the 
point home by playfully calling the city’s five boroughs “the five Ghettos of Greater New 
York” (452).  Even more importantly, Cahan has Levinsky conclude his story by singling 
out the contributions of Jewish immigrants like Cahan himself to the cultural life of the 
United States.  Specifically, Levinsky admits that “I envy far more than I do a billionaire 
[…] the Russian Jew who holds the foremost place among American songwriters and 
whose soulful compositions are sung in almost every English-speaking house in the 
world” (517).  Here, of course, Levinsky is alluding to Irving Berlin, whose influence on 
American popular music from the composition of “Alexander’s Ragtime Band” (1911) 
onwards would be immeasurable.  By drawing attention to the fact that Berlin’s music is 
“sung in almost every English-speaking house in the world,” however, Levinsky also 
underscores the extent to which America’s immigrant culture has spread internationally.  
In coming to embody American popular music as much as any other composer had done 
before him, Berlin provides perhaps the most spectacular example of the potentially 
global dimensions of immigrant culture.  But there are other instantiations of these global 
dimensions throughout the novel, and it is this global perspective—what Orlando 
Patterson might call the “migration system” (or what Nancy Foner might call the 
“transnational social field”) that is evidenced by the novel—to which I now turn. 
In the biography he imagines for the Armenian he encounters in New Hampshire, 
Henry James acknowledges the existence of readymade Armenian communities within 
the United States.  Whether the newly arrived Armenian immigrant is already aware of 
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their existence or merely stumbles upon them, James never makes clear and perhaps 
simply did not know.  In The Rise of David Levinsky, however, Abraham Cahan indicates 
that, even if a particular immigrant had no specific personal ties to the United States, that 
immigrant probably had general communal or ethnic ties already in place.  When 
Levinsky arrives in New York in 1885, he finds a thriving community of Russian Jews 
who speak his language, take him under their wing, and initiate him into the garment 
industry and the benefits of rapid Americanization.  Toward the end of the novel, even 
after Levinsky has ruthlessly cut many of his former friends and associates out of his life, 
he still maintains social ties with other immigrants from his hometown:  “We mostly 
spoke in Yiddish, and our Antomir enunciation was like a bond of kinship between us” 
(497).  Yet as an orphan, Levinsky clearly has no family connections of any kind in 
America; he starts out only vaguely aware of the existence of Jewish communities there, 
and he more or less happens to stumble upon them after he arrives.  On the day of his 
arrival, it suddenly occurs to him to worry:  “How was I going to procure my sustenance 
on those magic shores?” (87) 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that some knowledge—or at least some conception—
of America is circulating in Antomir before Levinsky decides to emigrate and that he 
absorbs this knowledge for several months before he makes his decision.  In fact, a full 
fifteen percent of the novel’s length (including four of its fourteen books) takes place in 
Antomir, and Levinsky does not begin thinking seriously about emigration until Book III.  
These early sections covering Levinsky’s youth in the old country obviously serve as a 
contrast to the change in course his life takes in America, but they also give the novel a 
geographical and even a topographical complexity.  If information about recent émigrés 
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is somehow trickling back across the Atlantic to Antomir and influencing decisions made 
there, then the process of migration has created a connection between the two locations.  
Specifically, the twenty-year-old Levinsky already understands that America offers an 
avenue of escape from the increasingly violent anti-Semitic pogroms that were sweeping 
across Russia following the 1881 assassination of Czar Alexander II.  “Over five million 
people,” Levinsky says of the pogroms, “were suddenly made to realize that their 
birthplace was not their home. […]  Then it was that the cry ‘To America!’ was raised.  It 
spread like wild-fire, even over those parts of the Pale of Jewish Settlement which lay 
outside the riot zone.  This was the beginning of the great New Exodus that has been in 
progress for decades” (60-61).  For the young Levinsky, however, America offers more:  
“The United States lured me not merely as a land of milk and honey, but also, and 
perhaps chiefly, as one of mystery, of fantastic experiences, of marvelous 
transformations.  To leave my native place and to seek my fortune in that distant, weird 
world seemed to be just the kind of sensational adventure my heart was hankering for” 
(61).  Thus it seems that Levinsky has been acquiring multiple pieces of information 
about America while still remaining in Antomir:  it is a place of greater freedom, peace, 
and stability; a means of achieving social and economic security; and an opportunity for 
adventure and self-transformation. 
After Levinsky has resettled in New York, the novel supplies several illustrations 
of how immigrants, including those from Antomir, maintained ties with their homelands 
that involved communication, money, and even politics.  For instance, once he has 
become wealthy, Levinsky joins and donates to the “new Antomir Synagogue” in New 
York, which serves immigrants from his hometown (378).  But this “new” synagogue’s 
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connections to the old one do not exist in name only; the routes of exchange between 
New York and Antomir are strong enough to enable the newly formed congregation to 
bring a “celebrated” cantor from the old country:  “The contract that had induced him to 
come over to America pledged him nearly five times as much [as he had earned in 
Antomir].  Thus the New York Sons of Antomir were not only able to parade a famous 
cantor before the multitude of other New York congregations, but also to prove to the 
people at home that they were the financial superiors of the whole town of their birth” 
(380).  That Levinsky and the other members of his congregation were able to hire and 
transport this cantor indicates that they could conduct business across national borders; 
that they can boast of luring him away from Antomir indicates that at least some of them 
remain in communication with friends and family members who have stayed there.  Later 
on, Levinsky considers fulfilling a promise he had made to his boyhood friend Naphtali 
“to send him a ‘ship ticket’” once Levinsky had earned enough money (389), and 
although Levinsky never keeps his promise, the fact that both Levinsky and Naphtali 
would think of the idea suggests that it was a fairly common practice for one successful 
immigrant to pay for another’s immigration and that this practice was already known in 
European Jewish communities like Antomir by the time Levinsky leaves. 
Such connections with the homeland apparently extended well beyond friendship 
and religion.  In the novel, Levinsky also recalls how several left-leaning intellectuals 
within the Jewish immigrant communities of New York took part in or otherwise 
supported socialist political activities in czarist Russia, including the Russian Revolution 
of 1905.  “The revolutionary movement was then at its height in Russia,” Levinsky 
remarks, “and the Jews were among its foremost and bravest leaders” (372).  He then 
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goes on to claim that it was just this relationship between Jewish intellectuals and 
Russian revolutionaries that led to the pogroms of the 1880s, which “the Government 
inspired and encouraged quite openly” (372).  This repressive atmosphere in turn serves 
to stimulate “the great emigration of Jews to America,” to radicalize even more Russian 
Jews, and to gain sympathy and support for both the Jewish and socialist causes in Russia 
(372).  The Rise of David Levinsky thus reflects Cahan’s understanding of the cyclical 
nature of radical politics as well as the effects of local and national politics upon human 
migration, while also revealing how migration systems can elevate local or national 
political crises onto the geopolitical stage when immigrants themselves raise awareness 
of those crises elsewhere.  Indeed, it is worth noting that socialism was a transnational 
movement at the turn of the twentieth century, and Cahan, who was a socialist himself, 
takes pains to establish both its transatlantic dimensions and the Jewish ethnicity of many 
of its leaders.  Thus in his novel, Cahan links immigration and socialism, the two most 
important global currents in his own life, even though they do not converge in the 
capitalist Levinsky. 
Levinsky’s involvement with these Jewish socialists, both in New York and in 
Europe, is limited, but one of these activists, a woman named Matilda, turns out to be a 
former love-interest of Levinsky’s.  (Before Levinsky sets sail for America, Matilda gives 
him five dollars to help him land on his feet in New York.)  Still, Levinsky is aware that 
New York serves as an important hub for the socialist movement.  At least one “socialist 
Yiddish daily” advertises meetings for “an organization of Russian revolutionists” in 
New York, and Levinsky knows that political refugees from Russia frequently speak at 
those meetings in order to raise funds for further revolutionary activities in the homeland:  
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“From time to time some distinguished revolutionist would be sent to America for 
subscriptions to the cause. […]  They were here, not as immigrants, but merely to raise 
funds for the movement at home” (372-73, emphasis added).  In this way, Cahan, who 
founded and edited the “socialist Yiddish daily” Forward and whose political sympathies 
at the time certainly lay with socialist revolutionaries, draws attention to the global 
circulation of American money as well as to the presence of an internationally inflected 
and politically active intellectual movement among New York’s Jewish-American 
communities.   
However tenuous it might be, Levinsky’s involvement with these socialists also 
reveals just how dynamic his particular immigrant community is and how complex the 
migration system that connects his community with Jewish communities in Russia must 
be.  Levinsky’s acknowledgement that some of the Jews with whom he comes into 
contact in New York are merely travelers who have come to the United States “not as 
immigrants” but for very specific, short-term goals underscores an important feature of 
migration systems:  the phenomenon of return migration.  Quite simply, not all persons 
who moved along migratory routes or belonged nominally to immigrant communities fit 
the classic profile of an immigrant seeking a new life and a permanent home in America.  
Many “immigrants” eventually returned to their homelands, either planning to do so all 
along after having made their fortunes or encountering unexpected problems that 
necessitated their return, such as illness or even simple homesickness.  If The Rise of 
David Levinsky provides an account of how immigrants who settled permanently in the 
United States remained in contact with their homelands and established specific strategies 
and routes for bridging the distance between the two locations, then what of the 
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experiences and perspectives of those persons who underwent the equally global 
phenomenon of return migration?  Having examined the global dimensions that are 
immanent within what is often regarded as one of the classic texts of immigration and 
Americanization, I now turn to an important but relatively neglected aspect of the 
American immigrant experience that no less emphatically reveals the constitutive 
relationship between migration systems in the late-nineteenth century and the emergence 
of globalization and, by extension, the globalization of America. 
The phenomenon of return migration would appear to be one of the great 
unexplored dimensions of the immigrant experience, perhaps due to the myopia of 
American exceptionalism.  If the numbers compiled by the Office [later Bureau] of 
Immigration are correct, then the rate of return migration was extremely high during the 
years that mark the height of European migration to America.  Between 1908, when the 
government began recording the number of emigrants leaving the United States, through 
1913, the year before the outbreak of World War I, an estimated 5,490,877 immigrants 
entered America, while an estimated 1,760,429 emigrants exited the country, making the 
rate of return roughly thirty-two percent.  This statistic is borne out by historians who 
have studied return migration of specific nationalities.  For instance, the estimated rate of 
return migration ranged from about twenty percent for the Scandinavian countries to 
perhaps as much as fifty percent for Italy.31  These numbers suggest that a much broader 
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 Dudley Baines provides a brief but excellent summary of the historical research on return migration in 
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understanding of turn-of-the-century cosmopolitanism than what we tend to assume is in 
order, and they help explain why Henry James was taken aback by the sophistication and 
self-assurance of the well-traveled immigrants he encountered.  If working-class migrants 
were capable of traversing oceans on multiple occasions, then they certainly could lay as 
much of a claim to the title cosmopolitan as did travelers from more privileged 
backgrounds, such as James himself.  Moreover, the high rates or return migration would 
indicate that these people probably had a considerable impact upon their home cultures 
once they returned.  In the case of the Scandinavian countries, with their relatively small 
populations, how could some 400,000 returning emigrants not affect the local culture and 
influence their neighbors’ perceptions of the United States?32  In short, the phenomenon 
of return migration provides a potentially very rich historical example of cultural 
globalization. 
This potential importance was not lost on Randolph Bourne; he addresses the 
phenomenon of return migration explicitly in “Trans-National America.”  Unsurprisingly 
for a writer who proposes a policy of “dual citizenship,” Bourne views return migration 
as yet another instantiation of the sort of cosmopolitanism his essay extols.  Indeed, 
Bourne takes pains in “Trans-National America” to counteract those politicians and 
writers who “stigmatize the alien who works in America for a few years and returns to his 
own land, only perhaps to seek American fortune again”; according to Bourne, to adhere 
                                                                                                                                                 
follow Baines’ lead and usually refer to the phenomenon as return migration; Nugent uses the phrase birds 
of passage, and Spellman the term sojourners.  For a list of historians who analyze the rates of return 
migration by nationality, please consult either of Baines’ bibliographies.  Of particular note is Caroli’s 
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1914.  If his earlier estimate that twenty percent of them eventually returned is correct, then those return 
migrants numbered roughly 400,000.  See pp. 39-40.  I have singled out the Scandinavians here because I 
focus specifically upon Knut Hamsun throughout the rest of this chapter. 
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to this point of view is “to think in narrow nationalistic terms” and “to ignore the 
cosmopolitan significance of this migration.”33  Bourne’s argument for allowing and even 
encouraging return migration hinges upon the phenomenon’s global dimensions.  
Specifically, he claims that return migrants will help spread American culture, values, 
and social practices throughout the world and that doing so will make the world a better 
place.  Utilizing some of the same religious rhetoric that Josiah Strong and W.E.B. Du 
Bois do and perhaps anticipating parts of Marcus Garvey’s argument, Bourne writes: 
The returning immigrant is often a missionary to an inferior civilization. […]  
They return with an entirely new critical outlook, and a sense of the superiority of 
American organization to the primitive living around them.  This continued 
passage to and fro has already raised the material standard of living in many 
regions of these backward countries. […]  America is thus educating these 
laggard peoples from the very bottom of society up, awakening vast masses to a 
new-born hope for the future.34 
For Bourne, then, immigration and return migration is a key part of the United States’ 
rise to a position of international prominence and power.  Far from simply helping 
transform America into a truly “trans-national” nation by introducing—and weaving 
together—multiple cultures and national loyalties, immigrants also participate actively in 
extending American culture abroad by physically carrying it back with them to their 
homelands.  Thus like Du Bois and once again unlike Wilson, Bourne frames this 
particular “problem” as an opportunity to empower both the nation (through greater 
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influence in other countries) and the individual immigrant (through greater personal 
mobility).  And rather than viewing the various migration systems that extended across 
the United States at the turn of the century as a threat to national unity, as Nathaniel 
Shaler might, Bourne views them as a means of remaking other nations in America’s own 
“trans-national” image. 
There is, of course, some difficulty in establishing exactly what information these 
“birds of passage” circulated about America once they returned to their respective 
homelands.  As historian Betty Boyd Caroli points out in her study of Italian repatriation, 
very few return migrants published accounts of their American experiences because 
many of them were illiterate, and those who did, while often highly educated, were rarely 
professional writers.35  Thus the writings by return migrants that do exist are 
simultaneously atypical of the experiences of the unskilled laborers who made up the 
majority of all immigrants and unlikely to have been read by wide audiences in their 
respective homelands.  That is not to say that such texts are useless, uninformative, or 
entirely unrepresentative of most return migrants’ impressions of the United States; 
however, a survey of such literature extends far beyond the purview of this chapter.  
Instead, I now turn to the writings of perhaps the most prominent professional writer who 
underwent the process of return migration and who went on to record his experiences and 
impressions of America for his fellow countrymen:  the Norwegian Nobel laureate Knut 
Hamsun. 
Hamsun makes for a particularly salient point of comparison with Abraham 
Cahan and other classic immigrant authors of American literature because, like them, 
Hamsun established his literary identity through his writings about American culture.  
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(Cahan, however, wrote The Rise of David Levinsky and many of his other texts in 
English, while Hamsun wrote almost exclusively in Norwegian or Danish.  Thus whereas 
Cahan’s intended audience was American, Hamsun wrote primarily for his fellow 
Scandinavians.  On the Cultural Life of Modern America, for instance, was an outgrowth 
of a series of lectures Hamsun delivered in Copenhagen in 1888-89 and was therefore 
never intended for American consumption.)  Quite literally, in fact, the writer 
permanently adopted the name Hamsun in 1885, after a typographical error led to the 
accidental omission of the letter d from an essay on Mark Twain that he had signed 
Hamsund.36  More importantly, however, Hamsun signaled what he considered to be his 
formal entry into the Norwegian literary community with On the Cultural Life of Modern 
America, the first book that he published under his new name.  Even his most famous 
work, Hunger (1890), bears traces of his immigrant years; the inspiration for that heavily 
autobiographical novel was the months Hamsun spent living hand-to-mouth in 
Christiania [now Oslo] between his two sojourns in America, and like the author himself, 
Hunger’s protagonist ends his suffering only when he decides to leave the country in the 
final chapter of the novel. 
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Moreover, while Hamsun’s later career as one of the principal European architects 
of literary modernism37 and his iconoclastic attitude toward culture may separate him 
from the majority of immigrants of the period, the general outline of his experiences 
seem fairly representative of that of many Scandinavian immigrants.  Hamsun, who came 
from a poor rural area of Norway, first immigrated to the United States in 1882 in order 
to escape physical labor and put his education to better use.  Like many Scandinavian 
immigrants, Hamsun benefited from a well-established migration system between the 
Scandinavian countries and the American Midwest.  Hamsun’s elder brother had already 
moved to Elroy, Wisconsin, and Hamsun even convinced the Norwegian writer 
Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, who had visited America himself, to write a letter of 
recommendation for him.  Hamsun resided in various towns and cities in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota for two years, never quite finding a niche for himself, until a serious illness 
forced his return to Norway in 1884.  Two years later, in 1886, Hamsun once more 
decided to try his luck in the United States, though Richard Nelson Current suggests that 
Hamsun immigrated this time with the intention of returning to Norway again after 
having earned enough money to finance his literary career.38  Whatever Hamsun’s goals 
were, his second trip was no more financially rewarding than the first, and he returned to 
Norway for good in 1888, more or less completely disillusioned by his experiences in the 
United States and with the assumption that America was a land of opportunity for all. 
On the Cultural Life of Modern America and the other writings that resulted from 
Hamsun’s immigrant experiences reflect this disillusionment, and they could be read in 
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part as words of warning to future or potential emigrants not to expect too much out of 
America.  Indeed, Hamsun seems almost to be writing against the subgenre of emigration 
literature that was beginning to emerge among Scandinavian writers at the turn of the 
twentieth century.39  In his conclusion to On the Cultural Life of Modern America, 
Hamsun comments sarcastically on a trope that was beginning to emerge:  “When really 
free writers in this country have a hero whom they wish well but who has come to grief in 
his native land because he is a freethinker and a liberal, they send him to America in the 
last chapter of their book.  There is elbowroom there!”40  Nothing could be farther from 
Hamsun’s mind than accepting the implications of this cliché uncritically.  Nor does 
Hamsun wish to serve as the sort of “missionary” for “the superiority of American 
organization” that Bourne imagines of return migrants; the “new critical outlook” with 
which Hamsun returns to Norway is aimed squarely at American society itself.  On the 
Cultural Life of Modern America is, in fact, a sharp critique of American culture (or, 
more precisely, what Hamsun perceived as the lack thereof) and a vitriolic condemnation 
of what he viewed as most Americans’ blind commitment to patriotism, capitalism, and 
religious experience.  For Hamsun, America is ultimately “a nation of patriots hostile to 
foreigners, a people without a national literature or art, a corrupt society, a materialistic 
mode of life, and flourishing inanity!” (139) 
                                                 
39
 Probably the most famous practitioners of this subgenre are the Norwegian-American Ole Rølvaag, 
whose best-known work, Giants in the Earth:  A Saga of the Prairie (1927), is a compilation—and 
translation—of two earlier books that Rølvaag originally wrote in Norwegian, and the Swedish Vilhelm 
Moberg, who published a four-novel cycle that is known collectively as The Emigrants (1949-59). 
 
40
 Knut Hamsun, The Cultural Life of Modern America, ed. and trans. Barbara Gordon Morgridge (1889; 
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard UP, 1969) 139.  I cite the title of Morgridge’s edition as it appears on the title 
page; however, a more accurate translation is On the Cultural Life of Modern America, which is how I refer 
to the text throughout this chapter.  Subsequent citations are made in the text. 
  157 
Yet there is more to Hamsun’s grousing than mere sour grapes over his own 
disappointed expectations or, as some critics have proposed in light of Hamsun’s later 
collaboration with the Germans during their occupation of Norway in the early 1940s, 
some sort of anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, and proto-fascist political project.41  Barbara 
Gordon Morgridge argues persuasively that On the Cultural Life of Modern America 
should be viewed as a riposte to The Innocents Abroad (1869), Mark Twain’s equally 
iconoclastic skewering of European pretensions and American perceptions of high 
culture.  Morgridge claims that Hamsun’s “aesthetic appreciation and receptivity [of 
Twain’s] comic style of hyperbole, paradox, and wit […] helped to shape the tone and 
treatment of his American experiences in Cultural Life.”42  Hamsun’s other writings 
certainly bear this assertion out.  Of all the American writers Hamsun discusses, 
including Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman, Twain earns Hamsun’s fullest 
respect.  In his essay on Twain, Hamsun calls him “the greatest and most popular 
representative of American humor writing” and both “artistically secure” and “fair in his 
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judgments.”43  It is also possible that Hamsun felt a personal connection with Twain, 
having met Twain after one of Twain’s lectures and, as noted above, permanently 
adopting the name Hamsun after publishing his essay on Twain. 
Hamsun claims to draw the line at Twain’s travel writing, however, specifically 
singling out The Innocents Abroad and citing what he considered Twain’s lack of 
experience with European high culture as “poor qualification for rightly judging the 
conditions and human beings of Europe.”44  Nevertheless, in On the Cultural Life of 
Modern America, Hamsun is guilty of taking on the very same tone for which he 
criticizes Mark Twain in his essay on the humorist:  being “poised to make fun of 
everything that was foreign to him,” driving “his hosts to despair,” confusing historical 
figures with one another, and relying on “iconoclasm” and “polemic” to make his 
points.45  Indeed, what irritates Hamsun about The Innocents Abroad is precisely what 
many readers may find irritating about On the Cultural Life of Modern America; 
Hamsun’s book is a highly idiosyncratic, satiric, and impressionistic example of literary 
reportage, with an almost gleeful disregard for context or factual accuracy.  For instance, 
Hamsun regularly misquotes newspaper and magazine articles and even confuses 
President Zachary Taylor with the journalist Bayard Taylor, even as he takes Twain to 
task for confusing “Catherine with Maria de Medici and Raphael with Rubens.”46  To 
read On the Cultural Life of Modern America for an objective description of living 
                                                 
43
 Knut Hamsun, “Mark Twain,” in Knut Hamsun Remebers America, trans. and ed. Richard Nelson 
Current (1885; Columbia:  Missouri UP, 2003) 47, 49, original emphasis. 
 
44
 Hamsun, “Mark Twain” 51. 
 
45
 Hamsun, “Mark Twain” 52-54. 
 
46
 Hamsun, “Mark Twain” 52.  Morgridge provides an extensive catalogue of the inaccuracies of On the 
Cultural Life of Modern America in the endnotes to her translation of the book; see pp. 147-66. 
  159 
conditions in the United States, however, is to miss the point.  Instead, Hamsun is cannily 
inviting his readers to compare his writing with Twain’s, while simultaneously defusing 
potential criticisms of his book’s slipshod research.  Apparently, contemporary 
Norwegian reviewers picked up on both points; many acknowledged the suspect nature of 
Hamsun’s anecdotal evidence but still praised the author’s literary gifts, and several 
expressed admiration for the effectiveness of Hamsun’s American-style satire and self-
promotion.47 
Drawing attention to Hamsun’s indebtedness both to Twain’s literary style and, 
more generally, to recognizably American forms of self-promotion should not, however, 
serve to downplay the content of Hamsun’s writings about America.  In this regard, both 
Mogridge and, to a lesser extent, Current go too far in attempting to defang On the 
Cultural Life of Modern America for American readers.  At times, of course, some of 
Hamsun’s criticisms are trite and unoriginal even for a late-nineteenth-century European 
writer, as is his conclusion that America lacks a rich culture and unique art because the 
nation has no “long history behind it—a history that had given the people their 
characteristic stamp, that, in a word, had endowed the nation with an original intellectual 
heritage of its own” (15).  Here, Hamsun relies on the tired stereotype that “no cultural 
individuality has yet taken root [and] no distinctive intellectual character has yet taken 
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while Ibsen himself sat in the front row.  Although neither Ibsen nor Bjørnson seem to have taken these 
attacks very seriously, Lyngstad notes that, on this occasion, several newspaper editors criticized Hamsun 
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fellow Norwegians were savvy enough to recognize and criticize some of the values and practices of 
American culture that were beginning to spread globally through returning migrants like Hamsun. 
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shape” in America because it is a “pioneer society” (15).  Such assertions are relatively 
benign and easily dismissed.  More problematic, however, is that Hamsun occasionally 
takes a view of immigration that is worryingly similar to that taken by Nathaniel Shaler 
and other proponents of Anglo-Saxonism.  In his first piece of writing about America, an 
1885 essay entitled “From America,” Hamsun predates Shaler’s “European Peasants as 
Immigrants” by eight years in warning of “the danger that arises from the mixing of 
different kinds of people in a free, uncontrolled, capricious environment.”48  Indeed, 
Hamsun’s characterization of his fellow immigrants is even more condescending than 
Shaler’s—Hamsun calls them “diseased and degenerate human raw material”—and he is 
more explicit than Shaler in calling for America to put “a timely stop to immigration, or 
at least [to put] some restrictions on it.”49  It is worth noting that, unlike Shaler, Hamsun 
bases his objections on perceptions of class rather than of race; what concerns him is that 
the majority of immigrants in America are made up of “the dregs of the European 
population,” people who were incapable of contributing to the cultural life of their own 
countries in any meaningful way.50  And his attitude seems to have changed somewhat 
over time.  Four years later, in On the Cultural Life of Modern America, Hamsun writes, 
“The proposals to restrict immigration rest on shaky ground” (13).  In particular, Hamsun 
rejects the claim that immigrants are overcrowding the United States:  “The land is not all 
taken.  That is a pretext and a joke” (13, original emphasis).  The real cause for anti-
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immigrant sentiment in America, Hamsun writes, is that “foreign labor can neither be 
acknowledged as necessary nor recognized as superior to the country’s own” (13). 
At other times, however, Hamsun makes a number of insightful and sometimes 
biting observations about American materialism and ethnocentrism.  For example, he 
abhors America’s preoccupation with business and making money, and he attributes the 
rapidity with which many immigrants Americanize themselves to an economic cause: 
The same family that lived on two crowns a day here [in Norway] needs a dollar 
and a half a day there, and for the great majority it takes considerable doing to get 
hold of this dollar and a half; it really keeps you whirling to earn that money. […]  
Their inner calm is gone, but they have grown active; suddenly they have grown 
very light-footed.  A sojourn in America is very definitely an effective stimulant; 
people’s minds and energy are set in motion.  But one grows active and light-
footed from the instant one steps ashore and starts to earn money for one’s first 
meal—long before coming into contact with political freedom in the Republic. (6) 
According to Hamsun, then, Americanization is principally about achieving economic 
stability, not gaining an appreciation for democracy.  But if the trade-off for becoming 
American is losing one’s “inner calm,” then the process is not worth the effort for 
Hamsun.  There is no time for reflection when one is constantly “whirling,” and it is 
partly this constant bustle that prevents Americans from establishing the rich cultural 
traditions that flourish in the less money-obsessed European societies.  Even worse, in 
Hamsun’s opinion, is the fact that Americans’ exaggerated patriotism makes them 
unwilling to learn a different way of life from Europe or elsewhere.  He describes such 
national arrogance this way:  “There is one country, America; anything beyond this is no 
good.  Nowhere on earth is there such freedom, such development, such progress, and 
such intelligent people as in the land of America.  A foreigner often feels wounded by 
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this hulking smugness” (8, original emphsis).  Again relating the effect of this patriotism 
on immigrants like himself, Hamsun remarks that Americanization is really a byproduct 
of needing to accommodate oneself to Americans.  The immigrant “tries to become an 
American as best he can. […]  He learns the formal aspects of Americanism rapidly; he 
learns to speak English, he learns to wear his hat tilted over his right ear, he learns to 
surrender himself in every way according to the external patterns of behavior that 
characterize the Yankee in his own land.  Then American national pride has reached 
fulfillment:  there is one more American in America” (8).  Americanization is, in effect, 
loss of individuality.   
What is particularly striking about Hamsun’s depiction of Americanization is the 
degree to which it takes on the characteristics of a malignant force that spreads from 
person to person, threatening to level differences of habit in order to produce social 
uniformity.  Indeed, in his essay “From America,” Hamsun explicitly compares 
Americanization to a disease, remarking that Americans themselves “suffer from a 
national mania, an incurable disease, one that keeps spreading.”51  In this passage, 
however, Hamsun is discussing the threat that Americanization poses not just to 
Norwegians who relocate there, but also to Norwegians who remain at home.  America, 
Hamsun notes, already “provides Europe with its best instruments for dentists, midwives, 
and hospitals.  Indeed, when it comes to applied science or technology, the United States 
is ahead of all other countries.”52  In other words, Hamsun specifically links the spreading 
“national mania” of Americanization with the global reach of American capitalism and 
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culture.  This coupling of the processes of Americanization and globalization is  what 
makes Hamsun’s writings about America—and his status as a returning migrant—
particularly relevant to the study of the history of globalization.  Ultimately, his writings 
serve not only as words of warning to future Norwegian emigrants or as American-
influenced satire, but also as a calculated attempt to challenge and resist the global spread 
of American capitalism and culture.  In a sense, Hamsun utilizes one global network (the 
migration system that exists between Scandinavia and the American Midwest) to 
undermine another (the routes of exchange that help spread American products and 
culture), and Hamsun circulates a particular conception of America in order, 
paradoxically, to stave off its further spread.  That his efforts remain in interactive 
relation with the processes of globalization demonstrates that globalization is not solely 
an American phenomenon; as suggested in the introduction to this project, some 
processes of globalization emerge alongside of—and even in contradistinction to—
Americanization. 
It is, in fact, because Hamsun understands the global implications of American 
attitudes and actions that he harps so extensively upon Americans’ xenophobia and 
ignorance of the rest of the world.  America, he recognizes, is “the world’s greatest and 
richest country.”53  And he acknowledges that the United States is beginning to occupy 
an increasingly important position on the international stage.  “There is a greater crossing 
of cosmopolitan elements [in America],” he observes in On the Cultural Life of Modern 
America, “than in any other country in the world” (16).  Yet Americans themselves 
remain “systematically aloof,” refusing to engage in dialogue with the nations they are 
coming into contact with (16).  More troubling to Hamsun is their seemingly total lack of 
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awareness of the world outside of their own borders.  Writing years before the Jewish and 
Armenian immigrants that Cahan and James describe had been able to reshape American 
culture, Hamsun laments: 
Unfamiliarity with foreign peoples and foreign achievements is one of the 
national vices of the American people. […]  The authorized geography in [their] 
schools is American geography; the authorized history is American history—all 
the rest of the world is included in a mere supplement of a couple of pages. […]  
American children grow up with no other knowledge of the world than what they 
have learned about America. (9) 
This willful ignorance on the part of the American people frustrates Hamsun precisely 
because of the United States’ importance and power.  In his opinion, no sense of 
international context guides the decisions of U.S. policymakers or businessmen, and 
Americans are reshaping the world in their own image with little regard for the cultures 
they are eradicating elsewhere. 
Hamsun’s criticisms of Mark Twain’s The Innocents Abroad are likewise the 
outgrowth of his unwillingness to allow an American author to represent or, more 
accurately, to rewrite his own European heritage.  “To go to Europe and be a critic,” 
Hamsun writes of Twain, “requires other qualifications than his energy and generally 
sound instincts.”54  Instead, turning the tables on the American, Hamsun exoticizes Twain 
and his culture, thereby reducing him to little more than a local colorist: 
He is to be fully trusted only when he is dealing with the mining regions, where 
rich ores lie underfoot, where men shoot each other for sport, and where they fight 
their way through the impartial air, between outlaws and Indians, over ice fields 
and deserts.  Here he is at home. […]  His powers of invention, boundless 
imagination, and original style are precisely the qualities that are needed here.  
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They are less useful when it comes to studies of Greek antiques or European 
theories of government.55 
In a sense, Hamsun is attempting to render both Twain and the national culture that 
Twain represents local rather than universal.  What Twain knows about, where he is “at 
home,” is within America’s borders.  He may write perceptively and entertainingly about 
rough-and-tumble mining towns and frontier life, Hamsun argues, but he has no business 
forcing other countries and cultures to fit within his limited worldview.  When writing 
about European cultures, Twain carries his typically American ignorance of those 
cultures with him, and Hamsun is quick to link this ignorance with the narrow-
mindedness that European immigrants encounter in America.  Twain’s contact with 
Europeans on their own ground is characterized by “exactly the same kind of ignorance 
that foreigners suffer from when they go to America.”56   To Hamsun, then, Twain’s 
travel writing represents the extension of Americanization beyond the United States’ own 
borders.  Carrying his American attitudes with him as he travels and attempting to reduce 
European culture into something that his American readers will understand, Twain 
embodies the encroachment of an American cultural imperialism that Hamsun actively 
resists here and in his other early writings about America. 
After 1890, however, explicit references to America become rare in Hamsun’s 
writings.  Returning emigrants do appear as characters in several later novels that are set 
in Norway, including Vagabonds (1927), August (1930), The Road Leads On (1933), and 
The Ring Is Closed (1936), and although Hamsun pokes fun at them for the 
Americanisms that they have adopted, these characters are generally likable.  For the 
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most part, the social criticisms that appear in these novels are directed at Norway itself, 
not America.  By the time he published his last book, a memoir entitled On Overgrown 
Paths (1949), Hamsun’s retrospective attitude toward his sojourn in the United States had 
mellowed to such an extent that the only negative comments he can muster is of the 
homesickness he felt and of his preference for the company of other, equally homesick 
immigrants.  Hamsun did, however, produce one more significant essay about America in 
his old age, a 1928 newspaper article entitled “Festina Lente.”  More than any other of 
Hamsun’s later writings, this one indicates the degree to which his views on America had 
softened over the years.  He comments without irony on “the Americans’ great 
helpfulness, their sympathy, their generosity” and claims, “To my dying day I will 
treasure what I learned during my two stays there, and I will always cherish the fine 
memories of those times.”57  He even expresses admiration for William James. 
Nonetheless, in “Festina Lente,” Hamsun remains critical of American 
materialism and nervous of America’s long-term impact upon European culture and 
society.  Indeed, Hamsun’s vision of the future is one of America’s ever-expanding 
economic and cultural hegemony:  “God is forgotten, the almighty dollar seems to be 
taking His place, and machinery provides no relief to the soul. […]  In the face of these 
conditions, America only increases its speed.  America will not be stopped by any 
obstacle, but will move ahead, will force its way. […]  We in Europe have the word 
Americanism; the ancients had festina lente [hasten slowly].”58  By contrasting the 
Roman philosophy of approaching social change cautiously with the term Americanism, 
Hamsun acknowledges the centrality of the United States to the international community 
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but also the dangers of other countries adopting American social and cultural practices 
too quickly.  The solution, as Hamsun sees it, rests on American shoulders, and he makes 
a direct appeal to American readers (for, unlike Hamsun’s other writings about America, 
“Festina Lente” was translated into English immediately and appeared as an editorial in 
the 30 December 1928 issue of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch):  “No more than any other 
country on the planet can America stand alone.  America is not the world.  America is a 
part of the world and must live its life together with all the other parts.”59  At once 
challenging American isolationism and American global hegemony (the United States is 
neither “alone” nor “the world”), Hamsun calls for dialogue and mutual cooperation.  
Thus Hamsun, the returning migrant, completes the particular route of circulation he 
entered over forty-five years earlier; having experienced America firsthand and 
interpreted those experiences for his fellow Norwegians, he now transmits his particular 
conception of America back to America itself.  He leaves it up to America to respond. 
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Chapter 4:  “Freedom amongst Aliens”: Jack London, 
Lafcadio Hearn, and the Alternative Modernity of Japan 
 
 
 
On May 1, 1904, the Japanese army won a dramatic victory against Russia at the 
Battle of the Yalu River, the first major land battle of the Russo-Japanese War.  Over the 
next twelve months, Japan would follow up this victory by issuing a series of stunning 
blows to the Russian army and navy, which in turn precipitated the Russian Revolution of 
1905, until Czar Nicholas II was forced to sue for peace.  The Russo-Japanese War thus 
marked the first time in modern warfare that an Eastern nation defeated a Western one, 
and it helped transform Japan into an imperial power and the first non-Western member 
of the so-called Great Powers.  Just as importantly, however, Russia’s defeat sent 
shockwaves throughout the Western world, challenging long-held assumptions about the 
military, intellectual, and cultural supremacy of European (i.e., white) civilization and the 
inability of non-white peoples to resist, let alone adopt and exploit, Western imperialism.  
While the status of Russians as Slavs might call into question their “whiteness” in some 
racial hierarchies, Russia was an established member of the Great Powers and, 
consequently, a representative of Western imperial hegemony.  In The Rising Tide of 
Color against White World-Supremacy (1920), for example, the American anthropologist 
Lathrop Stoddard waffles between treating Russia as a white nation or as a Slavic one 
that had betrayed its white heritage; nevertheless, he singles out Russia’s defeat by Japan 
as a major failure and a dangerous precedent for white civilization.  “It was Russian Pan-
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Slavism,” Stoddard writes, “which dealt the first shrewd blow to white solidarity. […]  
Pan-Slavists boldly proclaimed the morbid, mystical dogma that Russia was Asiatic, not 
European. […]  The Russo-Japanese War, that destroyer of white prestige whose 
ominous results we have already noted was precipitated mainly by the reckless short-
sightedness of white men themselves.”1  In this passage, Stoddard reveals the conceptual 
crisis into which Japan’s rapid modernization and adoption of Western methods of 
warfare and imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century threw many Western 
intellectuals. 
At the same time, however, the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War also helped 
propel the United States into a more central role in the international community, as I 
mentioned in the first chapter and will discuss in more detail below.  One of the key 
moments in America’s rise to international prominence was Theodore Roosevelt’s 
negotiation of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which formally ended the Russo-Japanese War 
and earned Roosevelt the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize.  In addition to the prestige that 
Roosevelt’s mediation brought to American diplomacy (and the territory it gave to 
Japan), the Treaty of Portsmouth also ratified the secret Taft-Katsura Agreement, in 
which the United States agreed to recognize Korea as belonging within Japan’s sphere of 
influence in exchange for Japan’s pledge not to interfere with America’s presence in the 
Philippines.2  Thus the Russo-Japanese War also highlights the closely intertwined 
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histories of the United States and Japan, which at that time already extended back to 
1858, when, with the aid of a U.S. naval squadron, Commodore Matthew Perry signed 
the Kanagawa Treaty, forcibly opening Japan to trade with the West.  More importantly, 
it also reveals the extent to which America depended upon Japanese imperialism for its 
own rise to global power at the dawn of the twentieth century; the two nations’ 
emergence as Great Powers was both simultaneous and reciprocal. 
This uneasy relationship between Japan and America also registers in the writings 
of Jack London, who witnessed the Battle of the Yalu River firsthand as a war 
correspondent.  Immediately following the Japanese victory, London penned what is 
probably the most famous passage of his war correspondence.  Describing an encounter 
with a group of dejected Russian prisoners of war, he writes: 
The sight I saw was as a blow in the face of me.  On my mind it had all the 
stunning effect of the sharp impact of a man’s fist.  There was a man, a white 
man, with blue eyes, looking at me. […]  And there were other white men in there 
with him—many white men.  I caught myself gasping.  A choking sensation was 
in my throat.  These men were my kind.  I found myself suddenly and sharply 
aware that I was an alien amongst these brown men who peered through the 
window with me.  And I felt myself strangely at one with those other men behind 
the window—felt that my place was there inside with them in their captivity, 
rather than outside in freedom amongst aliens.3 
The shock (“blow”) that London records here—he, a “white man,” has been rendered 
“alien” by a situation that leaves him “free” and protected by the very same “brown men” 
who have imprisoned other “white men”—parallels the “first shrewd blow to white 
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solidarity” that Stoddard discusses, though London remains sympathetic to the Russian 
prisoners he encounters.  In fact, I suggest that we read London’s use of terms like white 
and white man—and, to a lesser extent, Stoddard’s use of white solidarity—as avatars for 
Western modernity.  As I explain more fully below, what both London and Stoddard 
lament is not just the defeat of a particular Western nation or even the defeat of whiteness 
per se, but rather the defeat of Western modernity by an Eastern nation with its own 
brand of modernity.  In other words, in referring ironically to his “freedom amongst 
aliens” even though he feels that his “place” is with the Russian prisoners “in their 
captivity” and their defeat, London attempts to distance himself from a relationship with 
the Japanese that benefits him in practical terms but that deeply troubles him as a 
representative of Western civilization.  In short, he feels threatened by Japan’s victory, its 
newfound modernity, and the potential implications of both for the future of America’s 
interests. 
Indeed, the conceptual crisis that London and Stoddard give voice to in their 
writings, growing as it does out their nation’s mutually beneficial but still extremely 
uneasy relationship with Japan, might suggest a Pacific Rim variation on Edward Said’s 
notion of Orientalism, notwithstanding Said’s claim that “to speak of Orientalism […] is 
to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise.”4  
After all, following the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the U.S. acquisition of the 
Hawaiian and Philippine islands, Japan and America entered into direct and increasingly 
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intense imperial competition with one another, and attempts to portray Japanese culture 
as “other” and the Japanese people themselves as non-American increased apace in 
American public and literary discourse, peaking during the 1940s with the wartime 
propaganda that helped justify the establishment of Japanese-American internment 
camps.  Understandably, we might be tempted to apply Said’s following description of 
the discursive practices of Orientalism to American discourse about Japan insofar as it 
corresponds to the two nations’ struggle for hegemony in the Pacific:  “Orientalism,” 
Said says, “depends for its strategy on [a] flexible positional superiority, which puts the 
Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing 
him the relative upper hand.”5  Nevertheless, Said’s conception of Orientalism is 
ultimately insufficient to account for the complexity of U.S.-Japanese relations or, even 
more significantly, for Japan’s historically unique position within the international 
community, and this insufficiency is distinct from the already well-known general 
criticisms of Said’s work.6  As Colleen Lye has pointed out recently, East Asia as a whole 
has always “signified an exceptional, rather than paradigmatic, Other,” especially in 
relation to America.7  Likewise, Rolf J. Goebel notes that, “despite the all-pervasive 
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influence of European and American technology, models of democracy, economic 
structures, literary conventions, and concepts of individual selfhood […], Japan continues 
to resist our urge to attribute universal validity to Western sociopolitical, philosophical, 
and aesthetic discourse.”8  More to the point, as indicated above, the United States and 
Japan, despite their growing imperial rivalry as the twentieth century went on, engaged in 
mutually agreeable empire-building.  This relationship between east and west simply 
does not fit an Orientalist model, which seems, at best, only tangentially relevant and, at 
worst, entirely inappropriate to Japan.  With its long history, seemingly unbroken cultural 
continuity, and ability to assimilate western technology without abandoning its own 
social practices, Japan has been the nonwestern nation that most confounds Eurocentric 
conceptions of “civilization” and “modernity.”  As such, Japan presents a political and 
imperial reality that goes beyond the traditional Orientalist discourse that Said examined.9 
In this chapter, I explore the confusion and anxiety over the nature of civilization 
and modernity that Japan’s status within the international community precipitated for 
Jack London and Lafcadio Hearn, perhaps the two most famous and widely read 
American authors to visit Japan at the turn of the twentieth century, study Japanese 
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culture, and write about their experiences and impressions.10  Both Hearn and London 
presented themselves—and were widely accepted—as experts on Japan; therefore, they 
provide especially important case studies of American attitudes towards Japan at key 
moments in each nation’s history.  Besides underscoring the United States’ unique and 
sometimes paradoxical relationship with the Empire of Japan, however, London and 
Hearn also highlight an alternate means of studying the history of U.S.-Japanese relations 
to the one proposed by Said.  I suggest that London and Hearn present us with a nascent 
recognition of what may be called “alternative modernities.”  This recognition emerges in 
both men’s writings not only when each one immersed himself fully and sometimes 
painfully in Asiatic culture, but also and even more importantly at key moments in 
Japan’s move toward modernization, including that nation’s development into a major 
imperial power in East Asia.  To be sure, London and Hearn responded in markedly 
different ways to their recognition of alternative modernities; Hearn embraced it, finding 
in Japanese culture a more effective means of coping with modernity, whereas London 
rejected it, attempting to allay his own anxieties by retreating into a position of presumed 
moral, rather than cultural, superiority as a white man.  Even so, both writers reached 
their respective conclusions by following the same form of racialist logic, a logic that 
could reconcile their lifelong experiences of western modernity with their observations of 
what seemed to them an exemplary counter-modernity in action. 
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Before going further, it is important to clarify what precisely such thorny terms as 
racialism and alternative modernities mean and how they relate to one another, if at all.  
Racialism, we must be clear, is not the same thing as racism.  As Anthony Appiah has 
pointed out, racialism is a “presupposition” of racism, but the discrimination that 
characterizes racism is not necessarily found in the doctrine of racialism; instead, 
according to Appiah, racialism is the view that “there are heritable characteristics, 
possessed by members of our species, which allow us to divide them into a small set of 
races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits and tendencies 
with each other that they do not share with members of any other race.”11  The ideology 
of racialism dominated nineteenth-century conceptualizations of nationhood and culture 
and led to a number of pseudo-scientific attempts to classify the world’s peoples into 
distinct races, each with its own supposed essential characteristics and dispositions.12  
These attempts to categorize individuals racially could—and often did—lead to 
organizing them further into hierarchies, in the mistaken belief that some races possessed 
inherent traits that rendered them superior to others; however, it was also possible for a 
person who subscribed to racialism to believe that, again according to Appiah, “provided 
positive moral qualities are distributed across the races, each can be respected, can have 
its ‘separate but equal’ place.”13  For instance, no less a civil rights activist than W.E.B. 
Du Bois himself subscribed to racialism.  In his 1897 essay “The Conservation of Races,” 
Du Bois writes, “What is the real distinction between these nations [i.e., races]? […]  
                                                 
11
 Kwame Anthony Appiah, “The Invention of Africa,” In My Father’s House:  Africa in the Philosophy of 
Culture (Oxford:  Oxford UP, 1993) 13. 
 
12
 Appiah traces a much longer and more involved history of racialism in “Race,” Critical Terms for 
Literary Study, 2nd ed., eds. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago:  Chicago UP, 1995) 
274-87. 
 
13
 Appiah, “Invention of Africa” 13. 
  176 
These eight great races of to-day follow the cleavage of physical race distinctions. […]  
Yet no mere physical distinctions would really define or explain the deeper 
significances—the cohesiveness and continuity of these groups.  The deeper differences 
are spiritual, psychical, differences.”14  Clearly, then, racialism was a pervasive and 
primarily descriptive worldview that did not necessarily entail a set of prescriptive rules 
for social behavior. 
Alternative modernities, on the other hand, is an idea expounded by the 
philosopher Charles Taylor at the conclusion of his influential essay “Two Theories of 
Modernity.”  In this essay, Taylor describes two ways of understanding the rise of 
modernity:  culturally and aculturally.  The acultural explanation takes a culture-neutral 
view of progress, assuming that the road to modernity is universal and that all cultures 
must eventually follow the same path.  Variations among cultures equate to different 
positions along the same path, with some cultures having reached farther distances than 
others.  Taylor rejects this explanation, claiming that “what this view reads out of the 
picture is the possibility that Western modernity might be powered by its own positive 
visions of the good, that is, by one constellation of such views among available others. 
[…]  What gets screened out is the possibility that Western modernity might be sustained 
by its own spiritual vision.”15  In other words, an acultural understanding of modernity 
tends to read the Western experience of modernity as universal, thereby eliding non-
Western experiences of modernity and imposing inappropriately uniform standards for 
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evaluating “progress.”  The cultural theory of modernity, however, is founded upon the 
realization that social change is tied to culture-specific values and practices.  Thus 
according to Taylor, “a cultural theory supposes the point of view in which we see our 
own culture [as] one among others” and which in turn leads to a fuller appreciation of 
“the full gamut of alternative modernities […] in different parts of the world.”16 
The similarities between Taylor’s culture-specific view of modernity and 
Appiah’s description of historic forms of racialism are striking.  Both ideologies 
presuppose that a given social group’s values, practices, and ways of understanding itself 
and its relationship to other social groups are unique and nontransferable because they 
have evolved within a specific context.  In other words, a social group (whether defined 
as a race or nation by racialist discourse or as a culture by Taylor) is unique because it 
possesses a unique and continuous history.  I would hasten to add that there are 
significant differences, too.  For one thing, racialist discourse carries with it all the 
baggage of the nineteenth century’s largely discredited race-science, some of which 
informed the writings of Nathaniel Shaler that appeared in the previous chapter.  The 
conception of alternative modernities, on the other hand, is an outgrowth of Taylor’s own 
multicultural values and his ties with philosophical communitarianism, which emphasizes 
the dialectical relationship between an individual’s understanding of his or her own 
identity and that person’s membership with a given social group as well as the link 
between a person’s sense of identity and sense of ethics.17  Likewise, I disagree with 
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those right-wing attacks on political multiculturalism that often uncritically and unfairly 
conflate multiculturalism and nineteenth-century racialism.  Multiculturalism and, by 
extension, the notion of alternative modernities are concerned primarily with political 
pluralism and empowerment through recognition of—and respect for—cultural 
differences.  What I am suggesting here, however, is that, far from being bad or simply 
racist, racialism can lead, under certain circumstances, to the recognition of a close 
cousin of multiculturalism:  Taylor’s concept of alternative modernities.18  As suggested 
above, we can see the workings of this logic in the writings of Jack London and Lafcadio 
Hearn, though the two men reached different conclusions about the place of Japan in the 
international community.  London employed racialism in order to warn Americans of the 
danger that Japan’s alternative modernity posed to U.S. imperial interests in the Pacific, 
while Hearn embraced that same alternative modernity to criticize what he viewed as the 
failures and shortcomings of American society and culture.  That two such different 
responses could exist side by side reveals that Americans living in the early twentieth 
century had access to a much wider range of possible attitudes towards Japan than the 
one Said characterizes categorically as “consequently racist, imperialist, and almost 
totally ethnocentric.”19 
                                                                                                                                                 
Appiah outlines several dangers that result from using forms of collective identity to guide ethical or 
political action, including most notably what Appiah calls the “politics of compulsion” (116).  It is worth 
mentioning that Taylor ran for the Canadian House of Commons on four occasions during the 1960s, the 
same decade that Canadian politics brought the word multiculturalism into common parlance.  In the latter 
volume, however, both Taylor and Appiah level several pointed criticisms at certain simplistic tendencies 
in contemporary discussions of multiculturalism. 
 
18
 I would stop short of suggesting that, in tracing the genealogies of racialism and of multiculturalism, we 
might find that they overlap, though I do think that such a historical study would be worthwhile. 
 
19
 Said 204. 
  179 
Properly speaking, Jack London’s experience with Japanese culture did not take 
place primarily in Japan.  In fact, the total duration of London’s stay in Japan was about 
two weeks—from January 25 through February 7, 1904.  London had been hired by 
William Randolph Hearst to cover what would become the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
05, and he was eventually attached to the Japanese army in Korea.  By this time, London 
was one of the most famous and highest-paid authors in America.  He had already 
published The Call of the Wild (1903) and The People of the Abyss (1903), and he had 
just completed The Sea-Wolf (1904) a few weeks prior to setting sail for Yokohama.  
Thus persuading London to write for the San Francisco Examiner must have seemed 
quite a coup for Hearst.  As war correspondence, however, the articles that London 
finally produced were widely regarded as failures, even by London himself.  They 
describe surprisingly little action and offer very little insight into the strategy of the 
Japanese army.  London himself ascribed these shortcomings to the amount of censorship 
he encountered, and there is some truth to his claim.  The Japanese military did indeed 
restrict foreign journalists’ access to information to a degree that many were unused to.20  
But much of the blame certainly rests upon London, too.  From his own letters and 
articles, it is clear that he lacked patience in his dealings with the sometimes indirect 
manners of his Japanese hosts, and he seems to have reveled in his own sarcastic persona, 
which clearly did not endear him to the Japanese authorities.  Taking pride in what he 
considered his self-reliance, he also describes traveling on his own initiative only to fall 
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behind his fellow correspondents.  In terms of journalistic skill, London also exhibits an 
almost naïve inability to write around the Japanese censors, and he comes nowhere close 
to the sort of genuinely newsworthy detail, such as troop movements and dispositions, 
that readers typically expect from war correspondence.  Still, London’s coverage of the 
Russo-Japanese War possesses ongoing significance because of the uniqueness of his 
position as a prominent American observer of a war of imperialism fought between two 
other global powers, not necessarily because of his accuracy as a reporter. 
London’s correspondence also reflects just how significant and deeply affecting 
the outbreak, prosecution, and result of the Russo-Japanese War was for the rest of the 
Western world in 1904 and 1905, even though the wars of the past century have 
somewhat lessened and obscured much of the initial impact of that war.  Beyond 
establishing Japan as a dominant power in East Asia, the Russo-Japanese War marked the 
first occasion in modern history in which a European power suffered a decisive military 
defeat at the hands of an Asian nation.  “The ramifications of Japanese victory over 
Russia in 1905,” David Wells and Sandra Wilson remark, “thus ranged from a 
fundamental change in the balance of power in Asia to a clear challenge to prevailing 
notions of white, European superiority throughout the world.”21  This “challenge to 
prevailing notions of white, European superiority” was what London registered most 
keenly in his correspondence, but some of the other important outcomes included the 
Russian Revolution of 1905 and, as has already been noted, the emergence of Theodore 
Roosevelt as a major diplomat.  Additionally, many historians cite the Russo-Japanese 
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War as an important precursor to the mechanized warfare of World War I,22 and there are 
striking parallels between Japan’s surprise attack on the Russian navy during the Battle of 
Port Arthur (February 8-9, 1904), which occurred before both sides issued official 
declarations of war on February 10, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  
The war itself was fought over control of Korea, Manchuria, and the important port city 
of Port Arthur [now Lushun],23 all of which Russia had begun to occupy in the late 1890s 
to forestall Japanese expansion.  After the naval attack on Port Arthur, the Japanese army 
launched a quick campaign through the Korean peninsula, across the Yalu River, and into 
southern Manchuria.  It was this campaign that London accompanied during the spring of 
1904. 
London’s attitude going into the war is rather puzzling.  It seems clear that he 
expected it to be something of an adventure, and he may have viewed it as a temporary 
escape from the strained relationship with his first wife Bessie, whom he had left in the 
summer of 1903 but would not divorce until the fall of 1904.  So eager was he to set sail 
for Asia, in fact, that he left America before proofreading copy of The Sea-Wolf from 
either Macmillan or Century Magazine, which was serializing the novel, though he 
apparently waited long enough to decide that Hearst’s was the “best offer” he received 
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from the press.24  In some of his earliest letters to his mistress and future second wife, 
Charmian Kittredge, and occasionally in his articles, he expresses concern that he is 
going to miss out on the action, as he had when the Boer War ended in 1902 before he 
could reach South Africa.  In a letter to Charmian dated January 21, while London was 
still aboard the S.S. Siberia, he writes, “I hope the war isn’t declared for at least a month 
after I arrive in Japan—will give my ankle a chance to strengthen” (6).  As that letter 
indicates, London was plagued by health problems throughout the winter, and one senses 
that the hypermasculine author may have taken on the role of war correspondent as a 
means of proving his continued vigor and allaying his fear of “getting old” (5).  (London 
celebrated his twenty-eighth birthday while en route to Yokohama.)  At any rate, London 
seems to have been so self-absorbed upon his arrival in Japan that he was oblivious to the 
seriousness with which the Japanese were determined to conduct the war. 
His very first article for Hearst (written February 3) illustrates just how much he 
misunderstood what was expected of him and how dismissively he tended to treat the 
Japanese authorities.  While waiting in Moji, Japan for transportation to Chemulpo 
[Inchon], Korea, London took a few photographs, not realizing that Moji was a restricted 
area and that photography there was forbidden.25  “Great excitement ensued,” according 
to London: 
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Captains, lieutenants and ordinary policemen all talked at once and ran hither and 
thither. […]  The populace clustered like flies at doors and windows [of the police 
station] to gape at the ‘Russian spy.’  At first it was all very ludicrous—‘capital to 
while away some of the time ere my steamer departs,’ was my judgment; but 
when I was taken to an upper room and the hours began to slip by, I decided that 
it was serious. (27) 
Despite London’s realization of the seriousness of his position, his account of his 
subsequent interrogation remains comic in tone, stressing what London perceived to be 
the absurdity of the situation.  For instance, he takes delight in recording the following 
piece of advice he received from an interpreter:  “Customs different in Japan from 
America; therefore you must not tell any lies” (31).  He also emphasizes his own 
sardonic, rather condescending attitude by noting the refrain of “traveling to Chemulpo” 
with which he responded to questions about his intentions, rank, and business (28).  A 
group of Japanese journalists quickly came to London’s aid, persuading the court to 
release him and return his camera for a nominal fine of five yen.  From that point on, 
however, London’s relationship with Japanese authority figures can only be characterized 
as strained.  He continued to resent the impositions and restrictions placed upon him and 
ignored them as much as possible.  Eventually, in an event in late May that he did not 
recount in any of his articles, London struck a Japanese groom whom he believed was 
stealing from him and was placed under arrest.  London avoided court-martial only 
because Richard Harding Davis reported the incident to Roosevelt, who apparently 
intervened in London’s behalf.  London was released a few days later on condition that 
he return to America, which he did almost immediately.26 
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Considering that his time in Asia was book-ended by two such serious encounters 
with the law, it is little wonder that London left with an overwhelmingly negative view of 
his experiences there.  But it is also unsurprising that the Japanese high command had 
little interest in accommodating him during the war.  Perhaps as a world-famous author 
London expected too much or was temperamentally unsuited to the demands of 
journalism?  Perhaps he chafed legitimately at the censorship he encountered or the 
Japanese military’s disregard for his needs as a correspondent?  Whatever the reasons, 
London’s frustrations are reflected in his war correspondence and contemporaneous 
letters to Charmian.  Tellingly, however, the letters and articles themselves reveal that his 
frustrations were not tied to any one event or series of events.  Indeed, what makes 
reading London’s articles and personal letters particularly interesting is that the sea 
change in his attitude toward the Japanese seems to have occurred incrementally over the 
course of about two months rather than all at once.  On a very basic level, to read his 
letters and war correspondence chronologically is to watch his personality change before 
our very eyes.  Far more importantly, these writings also reveal a man whose frame of 
reference is dislocated, quite literally, when he is plunged by the forces of globalization 
into a non-white, non-Western context in which he is unable to function. 
Exactly how specific London’s knowledge of Japan or, more generally, Asia was 
in 1904 is unclear.  Both Colleen Lye and Jeanne Campbell Reesman have discussed 
London’s depiction of Asians in the writings he produced after the Russo-Japanese War, 
including “The Unparalleled Invasion” and “Goliah” (both 1907), The Iron Heel (1908), 
and The Valley of the Moon (1913).  Japan features prominently in the title of London’s 
first published story, “Story of a Typhoon off the Coast of Japan” (1893), even though its 
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presence matters very little to the actual narrative.  This story—as well as The Sea-Wolf 
(1904)—was no doubt inspired by London’s own experiences aboard the sealing 
schooner Sophia Sutherland, which sailed along the coast of Japan in 1893.  In Lye’s 
opinion, however, “‘Japan’ simply designates the outer horizon of an expansive oceanic 
world, which is London’s stage for adventure” in his early stories.27  The San Francisco 
Bay area, where London grew up, possessed a large Asian populace and, according to 
Reesman, witnessed much racial strife at the turn of the twentieth century, including 
“burnings of Asian neighborhoods and even the lynchings of Asian men by armed groups 
of white hooligans.28   Moreover, ever-stricter immigration laws, such as the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 and an 1894 California law that denied citizenship to Japanese 
immigrants, specifically targeted Asians.29  Most importantly, London was already 
familiar with some of Lafcadio Hearn’s books about Japan, citing them prominently in 
some of his own essays. 
Going into the war, however, London’s attitude towards the Japanese was largely 
positive, even if his first article reveals that it was condescending.  Take, for instance, his 
fourth article, dated March 4 from Seoul, in which we find London’s most undisguised, 
most rapturous admiration for the Japanese army: 
I doubt if there be more peaceable, orderly soldiers in the world than the Japanese.  
Our own soldiers, long ere this, would have painted Seoul red with their 
skylarking and good-natured boisterousness, but the Japanese are not boisterous.  
They are deadly serious.  Yet no one of the civilian population is afraid of them.  
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The women are safe; the money is safe; the goods are safe. […]  The Japanese are 
a race of warriors and their infantry is all the infantry could possibly be. (41-42) 
These sentiments are echoed in a letter to Charmian dated the same day: 
I think as to the quietness, strictness and orderliness of Japanese soldiers it is very 
hard to find any equals in the world.  If it were our boys they would have gone 
lightheartedly to all the places and we would surely have heard for many a time 
about them kicking up a row, but such things never happen in Japanese and it is 
wonderful how they keep so orderly. […]  Japanese is the race who can produce 
real fighting men, and its infantry is simply superb. (13) 
London’s admiration for the prowess of these soldiers is clear; addressing his American 
audience, he goes so far as to compare them favorably to “our own soldiers,” whose 
“boisterousness” may very well be “good-natured” but still falls far short of the supreme 
discipline maintained by the Japanese troops.  Of course, in the same article, he goes on 
to disparage Japanese horsemanship, noting that “their cavalry would appear ridiculous to 
a western eye” (42).  This passing swipe, however, is softened somewhat by London’s 
conjecture that the relatively small size of Japanese horses may be to blame, and he 
concludes that “the cavalrymen, afoot or ahorse, are men, and fighting men, and anyway, 
ere long, they soon may be astride large Russian horses” (42).  (It is worth pointing out 
that, at the time, London was himself an inexperienced rider, and he is likely projecting 
his own anxieties upon the Japanese cavalry.  In his second article, dated February 26, he 
describes being laughed at when he failed to control a Chinese stallion, and he expresses 
pride several times at eventually procuring an Australian horse that was previously 
owned by a Russian minister and that was considerably larger than the other horses in 
Korea.) 
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Within the matter of four days, however, London’s attitude sours perceptibly, and 
he confides to Charmian on March 8, “How the letters [I have received] have roused me 
up!  Furthermore, they have proved to me, or, rather, reassured me, that I am a white 
man. […]  One can scarcely think whiteman’s thoughts” (14).  Pinpointing exactly what 
has so frustrated or disturbed him is difficult.  Michael S. Sweeney has suggested that 
London’s opinions of the Japanese changed once they began restricting and monitoring 
his movement, but that did not occur until Japanese soldiers detained him in Sunan on 
March 9, preventing him from reaching the front.30  Between March 4 and March 8, well 
before his detention at Sunan, London composed five more articles, each of which 
reflects his deteriorating respect for Asians in general and Japanese in particular.  On 
March 5, he writes about witnessing both Koreans and Japanese soldiers mistreating their 
horses.  He saves the bulk of his vitriol for Koreans but also indicts Japanese by virtue of 
their shared status as “Asiatic”: 
For the Korean is nothing if not a coward, and his fear of bodily hurt is about 
equal to his inaction. […]  The white man [i.e., London himself] knew nothing 
about horses, and probably the only thing to be said in his favor was that he was 
not a Korean. […]  The Asiatic is heartless.  The suffering of dumb brutes means 
nothing to him. […]  The Japanese may be the Britisher of the Orient, but he is 
still Asiatic.  The suffering of beasts does not touch him. (44, 46-47) 
Later the same day but in a different article, London begins to distance himself from his 
still admiring descriptions of the Japanese army.  Note his use of passive voice in the 
following sentences, which open this article:  “The Japanese soldiery and equipment 
seem to command universal admiration.  Not one dissenting voice is to be heard among 
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the European and American residents in Korea.  On the contrary, favorable comparison is 
made with our own troops and the troops of Europe” (47-48, emphasis added). 
By March 7, London has adopted a fully racialist attitude, in which the chasm 
separating each race’s world of experience extends even to horseshoes:  “To keep shoes 
on our horses was the great problem.  In the first place, our horseshoes were whiteman’s 
horseshoes, about which the Korean farmers knew nothing.  And as their knowledge of 
their own kind of shoes was the accumulated wisdom of centuries, it was beyond the 
wildest flights of imagination to dream that they could learn anything about whiteman’s 
shoes inside several centuries more” (56).  This passage is certainly condescending, since 
the basis for his complaint is the expectation that Korean farmers should be willing to 
accommodate his needs rather than vice versa; however, London’s comments are not 
explicitly racist.  He does not suggest that a “whiteman’s” horseshoes are inherently 
superior to a Korean’s.  Instead, the “problem” London identifies is the fact that the two 
races possess equally long and rich traditions of horseshoe-making (“the accumulated 
wisdom of centuries”) and that he just happened to bring the wrong horseshoes. 
But London’s racialism is not limited to his own personal experiences.  After 
recounting his horseshoe problem, he observes, “But horses’ feet were not the only feet 
that suffered on the Pekin Road.  Sore-footed soldiers were pretty much in the evidence.  
They trailed along for miles behind every marching company and battalion. […]  Many 
of them discarded the army shoe of stiff leather, and went back to their native gear, the 
soft straw sandal” (57).  A few days later (March 13), London returns to this theme, 
suggesting the following reason for the sore feet:  “These men, used to the straw sandal 
all their lives, had been summoned to join their colors and to incase their feet in the harsh 
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leather boot of the West. […]  The whole leg and foot action of a man who has worn 
sandals is different from that which comes of wearing boots.  And even if the boots had 
fitted the feet, the very action of the feet and the legs alone would have chafed and 
lacerated” (80).  Here, London is applying the logic of racialism to the physical 
experiences and bodily habits of others, and he ultimately arrives at a Lamarckian 
conclusion about the ways in which cultural practices can shape the physical body.  The 
Japanese soldiers’ feet are sore, he claims, because they have been forced to put on a 
foreign form of footwear with which they have had no previous experience and to which 
their manner of walking is indisposed.  Just as a society’s method of making horseshoes 
is based upon skills and techniques that have been passed down within that society (“the 
accumulated wisdom of centuries”), a people’s manner of walking is determined by the 
footwear that has traditionally adorned their feet (the accumulated walking of centuries, 
we might say).   
By March 8, the day of the second letter to Charmian quoted above, London has 
extended this racialist outlook to language and mental processes:  “The Japanese 
interpreter is Asiatic.  He no more understands a white man’s mental processes than a 
white man understands his” (61).  What gives London the most anxiety, however, is that 
he, a “white man,” is in fact beginning to understand “Asiatic” mental processes.  Also on 
March 8, he transcribes a press report from the Japanese army written in broken English, 
and he writes, “I understand every word of it” (62).  Elsewhere, London confesses, “I had 
become used to a people which was not of my kind.  My mind had settled down to 
accepting without question that the men who fought had eyes and cheek bones and skins 
different from the eyes and cheek bones and skins of my kind” (106).  What we are privy 
  190 
to, and what makes these articles so powerful to read, is a brutally honest first-hand 
account of the destabilization of London’s sense of his own racial identity as a “white 
man.”  As we have seen in his letter to Charmian of March 8, London’s belief that he has 
adopted—at least in part—Asiatic mental processes leads to his complaint that he can 
“scarcely think whiteman’s thoughts” and to his search for reassurance that he is, indeed, 
still “a white man.”  Two days later, he revisits these concerns with a lengthy discussion 
of the unease he feels at being able to function within the Korean economy without 
knowing “what anything costs me—at least in intelligible terms” (72).  By “intelligible 
terms,” London means whatever Korean currency is “equivalent to in terms of American 
coinage”—something that is “beyond” him (72).  In other words, London’s ability to 
relate his experiences in Korea to terms with which he is already familiar, namely his 
experiences in “white” America, is gradually breaking down, and his frustrations 
underscore a key characteristic of globalization:  the reformulation of relations or the 
creation of new relations between already existing entities or, in William James’ 
language, terms.31  In a sense, London’s journey to Korea, which had been made possible 
by Japanese imperialist expansion and the reach of the American news media, juxtaposes 
Japanese and American ways of understanding the world and thus brings two “terms” 
into “relation” with one another.  Perhaps nothing exemplifies this inability to reconcile 
his experiences in Korea with his experiences in America so much as his observation of 
the Japanese army’s stunning victory over the Russian army at the Yalu River, an event 
that shook London’s understanding of modernity itself. 
London conceives of modernity as a fall from some sort of superior human 
condition, as his description of modern combat clearly indicates.  “This is modern 
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warfare,” he writes somewhat gloomily about the long-range artillery engagements that 
the Japanese carry out so skillfully, continuing, “But it is long-range fighting which 
makes modern warfare so different from ancient warfare” (97).  Foreseeing a sort of 
“cold” warfare that primarily involves deterrence, London notes, “Killing decided ancient 
warfare; the possibility of being killed decides modern warfare.  In short, the marvelous 
and awful machinery of warfare of to-day, defeats its own end.  Made pre-eminently to 
kill, its chief effect is to make killing quite the unusual thing.  When the machinery of 
warfare becomes just about perfect, there won’t be any killing at all” (98).  Against this 
view of war as stalemate, London also envisions another, more threatening aspect of 
modern warfare:  industrialized death.  “In ancient warfare,” he writes, “the energy which 
drove death was generated in a man’s body. […]  But to-day the energy which drives 
home death is generated by the chemists in large factories and must be carted about by 
the soldiers who are to use it” (78).  According to London, these two developments result 
in a disjunction between a soldier’s experiences on the battlefield and his experiences 
throughout the rest of his life.  As opposed to ancient fighters, for whom warfare was part 
of everyday life, “the conscript of to-day lives a peaceable, industrious life, and has never 
heard war’s alarums until the moment he is jerked from out his little pigeon-hole and 
hurled onto the field of battle” (79).  The end result depresses London, for it removes the 
element of heroism from battle.  Modernity has deprived war of its human factor, which 
is its potential for glory. 
The fact that an Asiatic race has embraced this aspect of modernity alarms 
London.  When he witnesses Japan defeat Russia at the Battle of the Yalu River (April 
30-May 1), he realizes that Japan has managed not only to modernize its military 
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successfully without abandoning its own racially specific thought processes and customs 
but also to deploy that modernized military against a Western power with devastating 
effectiveness.  And as demonstrated in his May 1 article that opens this chapter, this 
realization throws London into a conceptual crisis, transforming him into “alien” who 
wishes to share in Russia’s defeat rather than Japan’s victory because Russia is white and 
Western and Japan is not.  By the time he was preparing to return to the United States, 
London could promise Charmian that “in the past I have preached the Economic Yellow 
Peril; henceforth I shall preach the Militant Yellow Peril” (24).  And this is precisely 
what London did in his infamous essay “The Yellow Peril,” which although not officially 
part of his war correspondence was written before he left Asia.  In that essay and, as 
Colleen Lye and Jeanne Campbell Reesman have argued, in portions of his subsequent 
writings for the next few years, London warned of the threat the potential combination of 
Japanese military and Chinese economic power posed to American hegemony in the 
Pacific:  “A new competitor,” London writes in his 1909 essay “If Japan Wakens China,” 
“and a most ominous and formidable one, will enter the arena where the races struggle 
for the world-market” (361).  Yet even while warning Americans of Japan’s ability to 
turn Western imperialism on its head, London simultaneously attempts to dismiss this 
anxiety by retreating into a position of moral superiority.  So he writes hopefully in “The 
Yellow Peril” that the “two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race” (i.e., the British and 
Americans) might “despoil [the Japanese] of his spoils” (346) because “we are a right-
seeking race” (349).  At this point, of course, it is clear that London has moved beyond a 
relatively neutral racialist outlook and adopted an outright racist attitude. 
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In defense of the argument he outlines in “The Yellow Peril” and “If Japan 
Wakens China,” London marshals the support of Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904).  At the 
time, Hearn was a popular journalist and author, though he has been largely forgotten in 
recent years.  Characterizing him as an “American” author, however, is somewhat 
problematic.  Hearn was born in 1850 on the Greek island of Levkas, the son of an Irish 
surgeon serving in the British army and a local Greek woman.  At the age of nineteen, he 
moved to the United States, where he lived for the next twenty years.  He became a 
journalist, working first in Cincinnati and then in New Orleans, though he never 
underwent official naturalization.  In 1890, he traveled to Japan on a brief assignment, 
but he quickly became so enchanted with the country and its people that he decided to 
stay.  He married a Japanese woman and eventually became a Japanese citizen in 1896, 
taking the name Koizumi Yakumo.32  He supported himself and his family by teaching 
English at various Japanese schools and universities, but he made a name for himself 
between 1894 and his death in 1904 by translating Japanese folk tales and poetry into 
English and by writing articles and sketches about his experiences for English-speaking 
readers.33  Probably his best-known work remains Kwaidan (1903), a collection of ghost 
stories, some of which were turned into a 1964 film of the same name, but he was a 
popular author throughout the late 1890s and early 1900s, publishing regularly in such 
high-profile American magazines as the Atlantic Monthly.  Critical opinion of Hearn’s 
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work mostly follows that of his earliest champions, including most notably Elizabeth 
Bisland and Malcolm Cowley, who considered Hearn’s writings about Japan to form his 
best work.34  Hearn, however, was an enormously prolific writer,35 and while in America, 
he produced twenty years’ worth of writing, some of it comparing favorably with the 
work of more famous local-color authors, including Hearn’s friend and occasional 
collaborator George Washington Cable.  All the same, Hearn’s reputation has always 
rested upon his books about Japan, and they were certainly what his contemporary 
readers, including Jack London, knew him best for. 
It is because of Hearn’s status at the time as one of the Western world’s foremost 
experts on Japanese culture that London calls upon Hearn to back his claim that Asians 
are ultimately unknowable to Westerners; however, London’s summary of Hearn’s 
conclusions are, in fact, a mischaracterization.  In Japan:  An Attempt at Interpretation 
(1904), the final book Hearn sent to his publisher before he died, Hearn admits that “I 
cannot understand the Japanese at all.”36  Yet what Hearn means by that is something 
akin to the Socratic position that only the person who claims to know nothing really 
understands anything.  Hearn draws attention to his early use of singular present tense (“I 
cannot”) only to move into plural future tense, arguing that mutual understanding is 
possible and necessary.  “We can know something about Japanese character,” Hearn 
                                                 
34
 See Elizabeth Bisland, The Life and Letters of Lafcadio Hearn, 2 vols. (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 
1906) and Malcolm Cowley, introduction, The Selected Writings of Lafcadio Hearn, ed. Henry Goodman 
(New York:  Citadel, 1949).  For the history of Hearn’s early critical reception, see Nanyan Guo, 
“Interpreting Japan’s Interpreters:  The Problem of Lafcadio Hearn,” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 
3.2 (2001):  106-18; and Simon J. Bronner, ed., introduction, Lafcadio Hearn’s America:  Ethnographic 
Sketches and Editorials (Lexington:  Kentucky UP, 2002). 
 
35
 In A Lafcadio Hearn Companion (Westport, CT:  Greenwood, 2002), Robert L. Gale notes that no 
definitive edition of Hearn’s collected works exists (ix-x).  Both Houghton Mifflin’s sixteen-volume The 
Writings of Lafcadio Hearn (1922) and Hokuseido Press’ eighteen-volume effort (1926-32) are incomplete. 
 
36
 Lafcadio Hearn, Japan:  An Attempt at Interpretation (1904; New York:  ICG Muse, 2001) 6. 
  195 
concludes, “if we are able to ascertain the nature of the conditions which shaped it.”37  
The potential for mutual intelligibility that London attempts to repress, Hearn wishes to 
embrace.  Indeed, as his biography suggests, Hearn was a consummate cosmopolitan who 
insisted on signing his English-language publications with a middle name (Lafcadio) 
instead of his given first name (Patricio, or Patrick),38 thus emphasizing his hybrid 
identity.  (Lafcadio derives from the name of the island where he was born:  Levkas or, 
sometimes, Lefcada.)  As early as 1874, at the age of twenty-four, Hearn could formulate 
the following statement on the values of pluralism:  “The multitude are, therefore, wiser 
than any man, from the very fact that diverse vocations diversify the gifts and powers of 
men, and give that variety to character which, securing the world unity in variety, 
redeems it from the dreariness and desolation of a dead monotony.”39  This appreciation 
for the richness that diversity can bring to a society and for the importance of the 
relations that secure “the world unity” certainly aligned Hearn with both Randolph 
Bourne’s cosmopolitanism and William James’ radical empiricism and made him an 
attentive observer of the juxtapositions of various cultures that the emergence of 
globalization was making possible. 
This attitude also prepared Hearn for his later career as a sympathetic interpreter 
of a non-Western culture for American readers.  In particular, an earlier book of Hearn’s 
entitled Kokoro:  Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life (1896) offers an instructive 
comparison to London’s war correspondence, in part because it was written just after 
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Japan’s previous war of imperialism, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.  Like the Russo-
Japanese War, this one was fought mainly for dominance over Korea and Manchuria, and 
just as in the later war against Russia, Japan beat China quickly and decisively.  So 
quickly and decisively, in fact, that Hearn was moved to write that it marked “the real 
birthday of New Japan.”40  (And Hearn wrote this before he took Japanese citizenship.)  
The Sino-Japanese War—sometimes referred to as the First Sino-Japanese War to 
distinguish it from the conflict between China and Japan (1937-45) that preceded and 
overlapped World War II—remains perhaps even more obscure to most Westerners than 
the Russo-Japanese War, though some historians have argued that Japan’s defeat of 
China carried more significance than Japan’s later victory over Russia.41  Certainly, the 
Sino-Japanese War shifted the balance of power in East Asia from China to Japan and 
gave Japan the island of Formosa [Taiwan], which at least one Japanese historian in the 
early twentieth century called “Japan’s first colony.”42  For reasons discussed above, 
however, the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War made a far greater international impact. 
In retrospect, Hearn’s glorying in Japan’s military victory, as well as in Japan’s 
increasing militarization, is somewhat unnerving, since he was witnessing and supporting 
the roots of both Japan’s militarization and Japanese imperialism.  For instance, he writes 
approvingly that Japan’s “educational system, with its twenty-six thousand schools, is an 
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enormous drilling-machine.  On her own soil she could face any foreign power” (83).  
Later, he offhandedly mentions that “free speech was gagged; the press was severely 
silenced;” but “the government really acted with faultless wisdom” (84).  Even after 
Hearn experiences misgivings when he sees the gaunt, somber faces of a group of 
returning veterans, he shrugs them off with the remark that “for all of that, the soldiers 
were better soldiers now” (92).  Hearn’s celebratory tone stands in stark contrast to 
London’s anxiety.  Hearn revels vicariously in his Japanese neighbors’ nationalistic 
pride.  For him, as for them, Japan’s spectacular victory proves them the equal of any 
Great Power.  Hearn quotes a Japanese seaman as saying, “The Chinese had European 
gunners helping them.  If we had not had to fight against Western gunners, our victory 
would have been too easy” (88, original emphasis). 
The war’s outcome also proves to Hearn that Japan has modernized its society 
successfully without sacrificing any essentially Japanese characteristics.  Thus can “the 
glories” of this war be celebrated by what Hearn calls “the various great industries of the 
country” (81).  But while Hearn identifies Japan as a fully industrialized nation, the 
industries he mentions are typically Japanese:  porcelain, lacquer-ware, silk, even 
chopsticks.  In fact, Hearn’s main concern is not that Japan will rival the West imperially 
or economically, but rather that Japan might become too westernized.  And so he warns 
against “a tendency to hardening,—a danger of changes” (31).  These worries were not 
without warrant in the 1890s.  Following the Meiji Restoration (1867-68), which ousted 
the Tokugawa shogunate and ended Japan’s centuries-old feudal system, Japan entered a 
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period of rapid modernization and industrialization.43  Prompted by concern over Japan’s 
future after the arrival of Perry and the signing of the Kanagawa Treaty, the nobles and 
politicians who instigated the Meiji Restoration believed that their nation’s survival 
depended upon its ability to compete economically and militarily with Europe and 
America and, reflecting an awareness of what John W. Meyer calls isomorphism within 
the “world society,”44 its ability to assimilate Western political and social practices.  
During the next forty-five years, known as the Meiji period (literally, the “period of 
enlightened rule”), Japan’s leaders began introducing land reform, compulsory education 
and military service, representative government, new tax and trade laws, and improved 
networks of communication and transportation.  Most importantly, they also rejected 
their nation’s former isolationist policies and encouraged contact and trade with the West; 
by 1902, Japan had entered into an alliance with Britain, and as we have seen, Japan 
signed the Taft-Katsura Agreement with the United States in 1905.  The rapidity with 
which the Meiji government transformed Japan from an isolated agrarian civilization into 
a powerful industrial one, however, created considerable concern among many Japanese 
that the country would lose too much of its cultural identity, as Hearn’s writings clearly 
demonstrate.  Hearn took part in a growing conservative movement in Japanese society 
that drew attention to the need for preserving as much of Japan’s landscape and native 
culture as possible.  (Indeed, Hearn’s continued popularity among many Japanese readers 
no doubt is due to his vivid, celebratory descriptions of a countryside still untouched by 
industrialization and urbanization and the nostalgic glimpses he offers of a Japan that no 
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longer exists.)  Thus although we may be tempted at times to write off some of Hearn’s 
writings as typical Western exoticization of Japan, his motives often arose out of—or 
coincided with—local Japanese politics and social activities. 
Hearn goes to great lengths throughout Kokoro to emphasize that he is witnessing 
a distinctly Japanese strand of industrialization and modernization.  In a chapter 
appropriately entitled “The Genius of Japanese Civilization,” he makes a point of 
comparing the modernity he experiences in Japan quite favorably to the modernity he 
knew in the West, which he calls “hard, grim, dumb” and “sinister” (14-15).  Hearn’s 
negative depiction of Western modernity is based on first-hand knowledge, for he was 
intimately familiar with the seedy underside of industrialization in both Britain and 
America.  Following an eye injury at the age of sixteen, Hearn lived for a time in poverty 
in London’s squalid East End.  Later, after a relative paid his fare to America, he became 
a newspaper reporter in Cincinnati, where he spent much of his time among black and 
white working-class communities.  Typical of the more sensational American journalism 
of the 1870s, Hearn’s stories often focused on criminals, prostitutes, and other social 
outcasts.  These early experiences in America left a deep impression on Hearn as a young 
man, and according to Simon J. Bronner, “America became for Hearn the epitome of the 
clamor of modernization.”45  For instance, in an 1874 article for the Cincinnati Enquirer 
entitled “Les Chiffonniers,” he recounts a visit to the rag-pickers at the local dump.  For 
Hearn, the conditions in which these people live and work become an urban hell:  “A 
wilderness of filthy desolation walled in by dismal factories; a Golgotha of foul bones 
and refuse; a great grave-yard for worn-out pots and kettles and smashed glasses, and 
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rotten vegetables and animal filth, and shattered household utensils and abominations 
unutterable.”46  Ten years later, when he was living in New Orleans, Hearn’s attitude 
towards American urban life had not changed.  In “The Roar of a Great City” (1884), 
originally published in the New Orleans Times-Democrat, he envisions the modern city 
as a “monstrous spider web” and the din of industrial machinery as “the last wail of a 
dying man, or the shriek of the angel of death as he clasps his victim to him.”47  Even 
four years after Hearn had relocated to Japan, the horrors of Western modernity still 
haunted him.  In “Growth of Population in America,” an article he published in the 
English-language Kobe Chronicle in 1894, he writes, “Altogether the condition of the 
working-classes in America has become almost as hard as in any part of Europe, and is 
going, in all probability to become harder.  Unlimited capital and unlimited power to use 
it, in the hands of a small class, will certainly produce conditions impossible in England 
or in Germany.”48  Hearn plainly shared London’s misgivings about modern life—insofar 
as he knew it in the West. 
The turn toward modernity in Japan, on the other hand, is not accompanied by a 
fall.  Nor, apparently, does it necessarily entail westernization.  Instead, Hearn writes in 
Kokoro: 
The land remains what it was before; its face has scarcely been modified by all 
the changes of [Emperor] Meiji. […]  In all the cities, with the exception of the 
open ports and their little foreign settlements, there exists hardly a street vista 
suggesting the teaching of Western ideas.  You might journey two hundred miles 
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through the interior of the country, looking in vain for large manifestations of the 
new civilization. […]  A Japanese city is still as it was ten centuries ago.” (12) 
Like London, Hearn recognizes that Japan has entered modernity without sacrificing its 
culture-specific values or social practices.  Japan remains—for now, at least—
fundamentally Asiatic and thus presents a model alternative modernity.  The primary 
reason for Japan’s ability to avoid the pitfalls of Western modernity, Hearn concludes, is 
the nation’s reliance on small industries rather than “vast integrations of industrial 
capital” (29).  Marveling at the ability of Japan’s textile manufacturers to operate out of 
modest, preexisting buildings, hence significantly reducing overhead and inefficiency, 
Hearn claims, “Japan is producing without capital, in our large sense of the word.  She 
has become industrial without becoming essentially mechanical and artificial” (27).  The 
resulting efficiency and mobility of Japan’s small industries, as opposed to the West’s 
“vast integrations of industrial capital,” is key to Hearn’s optimism regarding Japan’s 
future.  In “Growth of Population in America,” written shortly before Hearn began work 
on Kokoro, Hearn echoes the logic and concerns of Frederick Jackson Turner and Josiah 
Strong: 
Within a quarter of a century America has been totally changed.  The plains, the 
prairies of romance, can no longer be said to exist; they are covered with farms, 
villages, towns, cities.  The railroads have not only “built up” the West; they have 
forced the expansion of industrialism to its utmost limit. […]  Social conditions 
have hardened and stratified.  There are no more chances to make a fortune in a 
day.  Becoming more and more ordered, the West has also become more and 
more in all things like “the effete monarchies of Europe.”49 
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But while America’s economic and social prospects are stagnating, Japan’s remain 
dynamic.  In Kokoro, Hearn suggests that this dynamism not only gives Japan the 
capacity “to threaten Western manufacturers” (26), but even to “ruin foreign industries of 
far vaster capacity” (28).  One wonders what London made of the views expressed in 
Kokoro after his self-professed turn from preaching Economic Yellow Peril to preaching 
Militant Yellow Peril! 
Hearn’s preaching may carry a very different hue, but his understanding of Japan, 
like London’s, is based on racialism.  After praising Japan’s progress, Hearn explains its 
uniqueness this way:  “The explanation is in the race character,—a race character in more 
ways than one the very opposite of our own” (30).  Hearn is able to read Japan’s recent 
modernization as a story of continuity rather than discontinuity.  Despite having 
“changed the whole political face of the east” and having undergone “the so-called 
‘adoption of Western civilization,’” Japan has experienced “no transformation,—nothing 
more than the turning of old abilities into new and larger channels” (7-8, emphasis 
added).  But this continuity between past and present is also what creates the gulf 
between East and West:  “The more complex feelings of the Oriental have been 
composed by combinations of experiences, ancestral and individual, which have had no 
really precise correspondence in Western life, and which we [Westerners] can therefore 
not fully know.  For converse reasons, the Japanese cannot, even though they would, give 
Europeans their best sympathy” (10).  The Japanese possess their own history and 
traditions, which a Westerner like Hearn can never fully share.  As Daniel Stempel 
astutely observed in his early study of Hearn’s Japanese writings, Hearn’s theory of racial 
differences is really grounded upon an understanding of the “acquisition of cultural traits 
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through environmental influence,”50 which is precisely the link between racialism and 
Taylor’s “alternative modernities” I noted earlier:  that the uniqueness of specific culture 
is the direct result of its evolution within a stable environment and its emergence into 
modernity on its own terms.  In Japan:  An Attempt at Interpretation, Hearn’s musings 
upon his own difficulties in mastering spoken Japanese—even after more than a decade 
of total immersion, his mangling of the pronunciation was notorious—lead him to 
speculate: 
No adult Occidental can perfectly master the language.  East and West, the 
fundamental parts of human nature—the emotional bases of it—are much the 
same:  the mental difference between a Japanese and a European child is mainly 
potential.  But with growth the difference rapidly develops and widens, till it 
becomes, in adult life, inexpressible.  The whole of the Japanese mental 
superstructure evolves into forms having nothing in common with Western 
psychological development:  the expression of thought becomes regulated, and 
the expression of emotion inhibited in ways that bewilder and astound.  The ideas 
of this people are not our ideas; their sentiments are not our sentiments; their 
ethical life represents for us regions of thought and emotion yet unexplored, or 
perhaps long forgotten.51 
In a sense, then, Hearn rejects Woodrow Wilson’s concept of a “mediating nation,” 
pointing out its impossibility for anyone who subscribes to the philosophy of racialism, 
but Hearn simply accepts the gulf that such psychological development causes, even 
taking refuge in it, rather than allowing it to horrify him as it did London.  Hearn never 
faces the sort of anxiety over his racial identity that London does because he realizes that 
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he can never actually “go native.”52  The “freedom amongst aliens” he discovers is 
genuine rather than ironic, as it was for London.  Hearn is therefore able to embrace 
Japanese culture and, more importantly, learn from it instead of dismissing it as 
“Asiatic.”  Japan enables him to explore those “regions of thought and emotion […] long 
forgotten.” 
One such lesson that Hearn learns and discusses in Kokoro is worth mentioning as 
a final point of comparison between his views and London’s, for like London, Hearn 
meditates briefly on the differences between Japanese and Western footwear.  Both 
writers agree that Americans and Japanese behave differently—to some extent, at least—
because Americans wear leather shoes or boots and Japanese wear sandals.  Hearn writes, 
“The physical results are not limited to the foot.  Whatever acts as a check, directly or 
indirectly, upon the organs of locomotion must extend its effects to the whole physical 
constitution” (25).  The equation is simple for both men:  different traditions of footwear 
result in different manners of walking, which in turn results in different bodily habits and 
physical experiences.  Unsurprisingly, London comes down in favor of leather boots, 
ultimately dismissing the Japanese soldiers’ sore feet as “the breaking-in process” (57).  
The discomfort of learning to wear leather boots was merely part of the process of 
making them soldiers.  Equally unsurprising is the fact that Hearn favors sandals.  
Turning London’s logic of masculinity on its head, he considering “the habit of wearing 
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leather shoes” to be a sign of the need for “superfluous comforts” (24).  He goes on to 
argue, perhaps not entirely tongue-in-cheek: 
It [the leather shoe] has distorted the Western foot out of the original shape, and 
rendered it incapable of the work for which it was evolved. […]  We have too 
long submitted to the tyranny of shoemakers.  There may be defects in our 
politics, in our social ethics, in our religious system, more or less related to the 
habit of wearing leather shoes.  Submission to the cramping of the body must 
certainly aid in developing submission to the cramping of the mind. (24-25) 
This example—and perhaps each example Hearn supplies elsewhere—leads him to 
conclude that life in Japan reveals “the real character of some weaknesses in our own 
civilization” (26-27).  What Japan offers to Hearn, then, is a global perspective, a 
comparative understanding of the world and its nations and cultures. 
  *  *  *  *  *  
 In the years immediately following Hearn’s death and London’s return from the 
Russo-Japanese War, the primary source of tension between Japan and the United States 
was immigration.  Between December 1, 1905, and November 30, 1906, over seventeen 
thousand Japanese entered the United States.53  This surge of Japanese immigrants led to 
considerable anti-Japanese sentiment, particularly in San Francisco.  On October 11, 
1906, the San Francisco school board passed a resolution to segregate the city’s public 
schools and to send all Asian children to a separate Oriental Public School.  News of this 
decision quickly traveled to Japan, where it was decried in the press.  In order to save 
face, Roosevelt, who believed that stronger immigration policies would reduce anti-
Japanese feelings along the West Coast, worked to reach an agreement with Japan’s 
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foreign minister Hayashi Tadasu.  The resulting agreement, known as the Gentleman’s 
Agreement, ensured that the Japanese government itself would restrict emigration to 
America.  Simultaneously, the Immigration Act of 1907 gave Roosevelt the power to 
limit the entry of Japanese laborers.  Nevertheless, anti-Japanese sentiment remained 
strong, and two events in San Francisco in 1907 triggered a crisis between the two 
nations.  First, on May 20, a riot broke out, during which a mob attacked a Japanese 
restaurant and bath house.  The riot was widely perceived to be the product of racial 
strife, and in their attempt to sensationalize the event, Japanese newspapers played up the 
fact that the police failed to apprehend a single member of the mob.  Then, on June 27, 
the San Francisco Board of Police Commissioners refused to license six Japanese to run 
employment agencies.  This decision was a clear case of discrimination, since four of the 
licenses were simply up for renewal, and it, too, came to the attention of the Japanese 
press. 
 Although official relations between Japan and the United States remained cordial 
throughout these events, journalists in both countries exaggerated the seriousness of the 
situation and warned their readers that war-clouds were on the horizon.  American 
readers, who felt threatened by immigrants and Japan’s continued modernization of its 
military, and Japanese readers, who felt that the U.S.-negotiated Treaty of Portsmouth 
had robbed their nation of some of its spoils, were equally inclined to believe these 
reports.  Even before the license fiasco of June 27, Roosevelt was persuaded by Alfred 
Mahan, among others, that boosting America’s naval presence in the Pacific would calm 
these fears, though William L. Neumann has argued that Roosevelt and Mahan also 
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hoped to intimidate Japan and deter “any Japanese thought of war.”54  When plans for the 
Great White Fleet’s transfer to the Pacific were announced, American newspapers 
assumed the worst, and Roosevelt was forced to recast the fleet’s purpose as a peaceful 
circumnavigation of the world.  Eventually, Roosevelt sent Taft, then secretary of war, to 
Tokyo, where Taft helped defuse the crisis in September and October of 1907.  When the 
Great White Fleet reached Yokohama in October of 1908, it was greeted enthusiastically, 
and the following month the two nations signed the Root-Takahira Agreement, which 
reinforced the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905 and reaffirmed the two nations’ 
respective spheres of influence in the Pacific. 
 In responding to the 1907 crisis, Roosevelt apparently based his decisions on the 
same racialist logic that guided the thinking of Jack London and Lafcadio Hearn.  
According to Raymond A. Esthus, Roosevelt “deplored the manifestations of anti-
Japanese sentiment [but] was in agreement with the Californians that Japanese 
immigration should be checked.  He felt that the Japanese could not be readily 
assimilated—not because they were racially inferior but because they were racially 
different.”55  As a result, official U.S. policy, both foreign and domestic, became an 
outgrowth of racialism, though it owed more to London’s anxiety-producing vision of 
racial competition than to Hearn’s more pluralistic conception of cultural cross-
pollination.  In the minds of the American public, the relationship between Japanese 
imperialist expansion in the Pacific and inassimilable Japanese immigrants in America 
was clear and unnerving.  For many Americans, the presence of Japanese immigrants in 
California threatened to make the West Coast foreign to the rest of the nation, thus paving 
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the way for Japan’s total dominance of the Pacific Rim.  Perhaps the fullest expression of 
these fears can be found in Montaville Flowers’ The Japanese Conquest of American 
Opinion (1917).  Flowers, a Californian who ran an unsuccessful bid for Congress in 
1918, was one of many writers who predicted future war with Japan and opposed 
granting equal rights to Japanese immigrants on the basis of race.56  Flowers 
unequivocally proclaimed a connection not only between Japan’s expanding empire and 
America’s burgeoning Japanese population but also between the racial strife local to 
California in 1917 and the global impact of the Russo-Japanese War over a decade 
before.  He writes: 
When these Japanese first arrived upon our shores, they were as peaceable and as 
amicable as any immigrant, and their home government in Japan readily accepted 
the treatment accorded them.  But as they increased in numbers, and especially as 
their country rose in the rank of nations, their attitude became insistent—almost 
commanding. […  Japan] had gradually assumed control of Korea, and she had 
just whipped Russia!  It was then, when Japan, swollen with pride, and conscious 
of the power of conquest, announced herself as a World Empire, that the Japanese 
in the United States, although not citizens, began to demand all the rights and 
privileges of citizens; and it was then that we discovered we have in the United 
States an acute Japanese Problem.57 
These fears reached a head when, in 1913, the California legislature passed the Webb-
Heney Alien Land Act, which barred Japanese from owning land.  Tokyo protested this 
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measure, leaving Woodrow Wilson, who was more in tune with the anti-Japanese 
sentiment than Roosevelt had been, with no other option but to reassure Japan by openly 
opposing the new act.  With the outbreak of the First World War the following year, 
Japan shifted its energies to occupying those Pacific islands formerly held by Germany, 
thereby avoiding a replay of the 1907 crisis. 
 As the United States began closing its borders to the nation it had helped open to 
the West, however, Japan was rejecting its isolationist history and embracing its contact 
with the West.  This historical irony was not lost on Hishida Seiji, an American-educated 
Japanese historian who, as an apologist for Japanese modernization and imperialist 
expansion, served as a sort of Asian counterpart to Alfred Thayer Mahan.58  As early as 
1905, even before the Russo-Japanese War had officially ended, Hishida was responding 
directly to Jack London and other prophets of an impending “yellow peril.”  “An attempt 
is made,” he writes, “to create antagonism to [Japan’s] mission in China by invoking the 
apparition of the ‘yellow peril,’ which is supposed to endanger western civilization.”59  
Then, using London’s own language of “Economic Yellow Peril” and Japan “awakening” 
China, he continues, “From the economic point of view, the ‘yellow peril’ is interpreted 
to signify that all western trade would be excluded from China should the Chinese, 
awakened by Japan, develop their industrial resources with ‘cheap labor’ and thus supply 
themselves” (261).  In response to this concern, Hishida points out that the modernization 
of Japan has, in actuality, made the Japanese “better customers in European and 
                                                 
58
 Hishida earned his Ph.D. at Columbia University and often wrote in English.  He clearly intended his 
audience to encompass more than just his fellow countrymen.  I discuss Mahan’s writings in my first 
chapter. 
 
59
 Hishida Seiji, The International Position of Japan as a Great Power, Studies in History, Economics, and 
Public Law 24 (New York, Columbia UP, 1905) 261.  Further references are made in the text. 
  210 
American markets” and predicts that China will follow suit, under Japan’s guidance 
(262).  Hishida also addresses London’s fear of a “Militant Yellow Peril”:  “From the 
military point of view, it is suggested that […] the combination of Japan with an empire 
of four hundred million people will endanger the western nations just as the Mongol 
hordes threatened Europe in the thirteenth century” (262).  But he dismisses this fear, too, 
calling attention to the fact that Japan sided with the Western nations against China 
during the Boxer Rebellion and arguing that his nation would do likewise in the future in 
order to protect its interests.  He then takes a swipe at the parochialism of this sort of 
thinking and writes, “Modern nations really struggle against universalism in order to 
preserve their own consciousness.  So long as nations have no world-language or world-
literature and no universal consciousness of right and wrong, and so long as national 
patriotism is not converted into world cosmopolitanism, the world peace of universalism 
cannot come into existence” (266).  After that, he concludes almost sarcastically that “the 
commercial and colonial jealousies attending the imperial expansion of the great powers 
would be softened by observing the spirit of cosmopolitanism” (272). 
 Hishida’s goal here is to portray Japan as the true representative of 
cosmopolitanism, not any Western nation.  Indeed, he comes extremely close to 
prefiguring Wilson’s conception of a “mediating Nation”—except that Hishida casts his 
own land in that role.  Emphasizing Japan’s newfound hybridity as a modernized Asian 
nation that has joined the Western powers, he writes: 
It is the desire of Japan to preserve in the Orient the national status of those of her 
sister Asiatic nations which are not yet subjugated by foreign powers, and to lead 
them to that light of western civilization which she is now enjoying, without 
having abandoned her national individualism. […]  By reason of kindred ideas 
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and a kindred literature, the Japanese, as Dr. Hirth has remarked, are more 
capable than Europeans and Americans of educating the Chinese as not to destroy 
the “the old knowledge while familiarizing the students with the advantages of the 
new.” (258-59, 261). 
Hishida’s vision of Japan as a savior for all of Asia requires a careful balancing act.  On 
one hand, the Japanese must obtain enough of “western civilization” so that they can 
transmit it to their Asian neighbors; on the other, they must not entirely abandon their 
“national” culture, which makes them “kin” and, consequently, intelligible to China and 
Korea.  In short, for all his talk of cosmopolitanism, Hishida draws on the same racialist 
logic that London and Hearn did, though Hishida, like Hearn, uses this logic to challenge 
the accepted wisdom of the West.  But where Hearn merely suggested that comparative 
thinking might enable the West to learn useful lessons from Japan, such as the comfort of 
wearing sandals, Hishida argues that Japan’s status as “Asiatic” makes that nation more 
adept at spreading modernity throughout East Asia.  In other words, Hishida believes that 
Japan can beat the other Great Powers at their own game and become the dominant 
imperial force in the region. 
 If Hishida’s ambitions for Japan reveal themselves in his own writing, then the 
history of his nation reveals how dangerous these ambitions would prove, and unlike 
Hearn and London, Hishida, who continued publishing into the 1940s, would live to see 
the result.60  In hindsight, it is perhaps impossible for us today not to judge Hishida’s 
words in light of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though, to be fair, we might just as well judge 
them by whatever standards we use to judge Mahan’s.  For our purposes, however, I 
would like to close not by passing such a judgment but by returning to the subject of 
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footwear that so fascinated both London and Hearn.  Despite Hearn’s extensive praise for 
the sandal, the Japanese high command sided with London in the long run.  After 
imagining how much the Japanese soldiers “must have yearned for the pliant sandals to 
which they had been accustomed,” London simply notes that “it was a vain yearning, for 
sandals were prohibited under severe penalties” (80).  This final image from London 
evokes the central problem facing Japan at the dawn of the twentieth century:  entering 
modernity without necessarily accepting westernization.  Perhaps in their effort to 
modernize their army and carve out an empire of their own, the Japanese resolved too 
readily to march in the footsteps of the West. 
 
  
 
 
 
Coda:  American Literary Responses to the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19 
and to the Uncontrollability of Globalization 
 
 
“We had not known that we had carried the flu with us.” – Mary McCarthy1 
 
Among the many brief biographies of historical figures that appear throughout his 
U.S.A. trilogy, John Dos Passos includes one for Randolph Bourne in the second volume, 
1919 (1932).  Bourne, whose essay “Trans-National America” (1916) I have already 
discussed in the third chapter, was both a controversial public intellectual and one of the 
more prominent American victims of the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19.  Curiously, 
however, Dos Passos fails to mention either “Trans-National America” or the pandemic 
in his sketch of Bourne.  Instead, he focuses on Bourne’s unpopular antiwar stance, 
repeating Bourne’s famous pronouncement that “war is the health of the state” as if it 
were a refrain, and attributes Bourne’s death to “pneumonia.”2  Technically, of course, 
Dos Passos is not incorrect in citing pneumonia, which was a frequent complication—and 
often the immediate cause of death—for those who contracted Spanish Flu.  “When 
influenza kills,” notes historian John M. Barry, “it usually kills through pneumonia. […]  
It and influenza are so closely linked that [even] modern international health statistics, 
including those compiled by the United States Centers for Disease Control, routinely 
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classify them as a single cause of death.”3  Nevertheless, in this instance, Dos Passos’ 
preference for the word pneumonia smacks of euphemism.  In Epidemic and Peace, 
1918, still the classic historical overview of the pandemic, Alfred W. Crosby suggests 
that such euphemistic handling of Spanish Flu was purposeful and widespread—both 
during the pandemic and afterwards by survivors like Dos Passos.  It is certainly in 
evidence in Katherine Anne Porter’s Pale Horse, Pale Rider (1939), in which 
hospitalized soldiers “who were not visibly wounded invariably replied ‘Rheumatism’ if 
some tactless girl, who had been solemnly warned never to ask this question, still forgot 
and asked a man what his illness was.”4 
This tendency toward euphemism extended even to members of the medical 
establishment and their official documentation.  Noting the absence of any reference to 
the first wave of the pandemic in the index for The Journal of the American Medical 
Association’s 1918 volumes, Crosby writes, “Influenza wasn’t a reportable disease:  the 
only evidence of it that was registered with the various public health departments was the 
deaths, and most doctors ascribed them on the death certificates to uncomplicated cases 
of pneumonia. […]  Pneumonia was a perfectly normal way to die before the advent of 
sulfa drugs and penicillin.”5  Crosby attributes this reluctance to be explicit about the 
pandemic to influenza’s ordinariness:  “After all, influenza, flu, grippe, grip—whatever 
you called it or however you spelled it—was a homey, familiar kind of illness:  two or 
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three days in bed feeling downright miserable, a week or so feeling shaky, and then back 
to normal.  Call it a bad cold or call it flu, it was an annual occurrence in most families 
and not a thing of terror like smallpox or typhoid or yellow fever.”6  In other words, those 
who survived the pandemic may have been most shocked by the seeming banality of such 
a contagion, and subsequently, they may have felt disinclined to apply a run-of-the-mill 
word like influenza to a disease that had felled so many of their friends and family. 
Considering the scope of the U.S.A. trilogy, however, Dos Passos’ use of a 
technicality to elide the name of one of the great cataclysms of his generation remains 
surprising.  Only once in a trilogy that purports to cover life in America during the first 
third of the twentieth century does he refer to the pandemic explicitly; in “Newsreel 
XXIV,” he excerpts the following line from a newspaper article:  “persistent talk of peace 
is an unsettling factor and the epidemic of influenza has deterred country buyers from 
visiting the larger centers.”7  Elsewhere in 1919, “The Camera Eye (34)” contains an 
impressionistic account of a fellow soldier’s bout with the disease, though once again 
Dos Passos describes the victim’s death throes as “pneumonia breathing.”8  (Dos Passos 
had contracted Spanish Flu himself while serving in Europe and, in a letter at the time, 
described the experience more complexly—though not entirely accurately—as a seeming 
combination of “pneumonia, T.B., diphtheria, diarrhea, dyspepsia, sore throat, whooping 
cough, scarlet fever and beri-beri.”9)  Considering some of the trilogy’s stylistic 
flourishes, it is doubly surprising that Dos Passos decided against exploiting the disease’s 
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ubiquity in order to create further internal rhymes or an additional montage effect.  For 
instance, in The Big Money (1936), the final volume of the trilogy, one of the fictional 
characters, Charley Anderson, succumbs to peritonitis a few chapters after Dos Passos’ 
biography for Rudolph Valentino, who died of the same disease.  In 1919, however, none 
of the major characters so much as contract influenza.  In the chapter immediately 
preceding “The Camera Eye (34),” Joe Williams contracts dengue instead.  The pandemic 
plays a similarly miniscule role in Dos Passos’ Three Soldiers (1921), with only a passing 
reference in “Part Four:  Rust” to the rapidity with which the disease claimed the 
strongest member of an army unit; far more space in that novel is dedicated to an 
outbreak of meningitis. 
Dos Passos was hardly unique in paying scant attention to the Influenza Pandemic 
in his fiction; he and other authors of his generation were evidently more preoccupied 
with the First World War, even though the pandemic lasted almost as long as America’s 
direct participation in the war and almost certainly affected more American lives.10  Both 
Crosby and Barry have remarked upon the relative paucity of literature devoted to the 
pandemic by the writers who lived through it.  Crosby writes, “It is especially puzzling 
that among those Americans who let the pandemic slip their minds were many members 
of that group of supposedly hypersensitive young people who were to create some of the 
greatest masterpieces of American literature, i.e., ‘the lost generation’ for so many of 
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whom World War I, the other great killer of the era, was the central experience of their 
lives.”11  Barry concurs and offers the following explanation:  “But the relative lack of 
impact it left on literature may not be unusual at all. […]  People write about war.  They 
write about the Holocaust.  They write about horrors that people inflect on people.  
Apparently they forget the horrors that nature inflicts on people, the horrors that make 
humans least significant.”12 
In fact, Crosby and Barry overstate their case somewhat.  Many of the writers 
who survived the pandemic did at least mention it at some point in their careers, 
sometimes indicating only years after the fact the degree to which their brushes with 
Spanish Flu had marked them.  For instance, watching someone suffer with the disease 
apparently made such an impression on Ernest Hemingway that he vividly, albeit briefly, 
recalled it as “the only natural death I’ve ever seen, outside of loss of blood, which isn’t 
bad.”13  In the “Natural History of the Dead” section of Death in the Afternoon (1932), 
his book-length study of bullfighting, Hemingway described the process of dying from 
influenza this way:  “In this you drown in mucus, choking, and how you know the 
patient’s dead is; at the end he shits the bed full.”14  The distaste he obviously felt for 
such a “natural” death is so palpable that it may offer a clue to his fascination with—and 
morbid attraction to—violent death in his fiction and personal life.  Likewise, however 
regretful F. Scott Fitzgerald may have been at not seeing action during World War I, he 
seems to have realized that his own minor bout with influenza probably saved his life in 
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the long run by delaying his embarkation long enough that the war ended before he could 
participate in it.  He suggests as much in his autobiographical second novel, The Beautiful 
and Damned (1922), in which the disease is described as “providential” for the 
protagonist; the resulting quarantine saves him from “the interminable massacre” in 
Europe.15  A few authors of the period were willing to give the pandemic even more 
prominence in their writings.  About half of Book Four in Willa Cather’s One of Ours 
(1922) is devoted to a shipboard outbreak of Spanish Flu, and the pandemic is integral to 
the plots of two of Wallace Stegner’s novels, On a Darkling Plain (1940) and The Big 
Rock Candy Mountain (1943).  Thomas Wolfe devotes the entirety of chapter XXXV of 
Look Homeward, Angel (1929) to a thinly-veiled autobiographical account of his 
brother’s death from influenza.  Edmund Wilson concludes A Prelude (1967), his account 
of his early life, with his experiences in an army hospital during the pandemic, and Mary 
McCarthy, who was orphaned by the disease, meditates for several pages on her family’s 
misfortune in Memories of a Catholic Girlhood (1957).  Although never explicitly stated, 
memories of the pandemic also seem to hang over both Sinclair Lewis’ Arrowsmith 
(1925) and John Steinbeck’s Cannery Row (1945), which deal with different epidemics.  
And of course, two short novels revolve wholly around the pandemic:  William 
Maxwell’s They Came Like Swallows (1937) and Porter’s Pale Horse, Pale Rider. 
The Influenza Pandemic is not, therefore, a glaring omission on the part of the 
American high modernists collectively, but the fact that only a handful of them dedicated 
more than a few passing references to a catastrophe of such magnitude is indeed 
puzzling, especially in view of their general interest in the breakdown of social order.  
Based on the few texts that do explore the details and ramifications of the pandemic, I 
                                                 
15
 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Beautiful and Damned (1922; New York:  Collier, 1986) 352-53. 
  219 
suggest that the reluctance of Dos Passos and many of his contemporaries to address 
Spanish Flu more fully in their writings had little to do with any supposedly universal 
psychological barriers to discussing the ravages of a widespread pandemic or even with 
the challenges of creating art out of something as seemingly undramatic and inaesthetic 
as influenza.  (On the contrary, Porter employed influenza-induced fever-dreams to great 
effect when recreating the subjectivity of a Spanish Flu patient in Pale Horse, Pale 
Rider.)  Rather, I argue that the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19 presented American 
authors with chilling and incontrovertible proof that they now lived in a globalized world 
and that the processes of globalization, once started, were neither entirely controllable nor 
commensurate with any enforceable definitions of Americanness.  By its very nature as a 
pandemic (literally affecting all populations), Spanish Flu enacted a terrifying test-case 
scenario of a global event that could occur precisely because of newly emergent 
technologies and officially sanctioned routes of international exchange but that also could 
not be controlled by individual nation-states at their now all-too-permeable borders.  
Thus the various literary responses that the pandemic elicited from the American writers 
who lived through it, including those who chose to ignore it in their subsequent work, 
represent an attempt to come to terms with the outcome of all the processes, technologies, 
events, and conceptual repositionings I have discussed in the preceding chapters:  a 
nascent global identity, or rather, a globalized American identity.  In other words, having 
established how American writers, intellectuals, and public figures of a previous 
generation contributed simultaneously to the history of globalization and to the United 
States’ own transformation into a globalized nation, I now close this project by 
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examining the responses from several writers of the succeeding generation to a calamity 
that proved, quite literally, that Americans were not immune to global events. 
Priscilla Wald has partly laid the groundwork for just such an understanding of 
the pandemic’s impact upon American social, cultural, and political life.  In an essay 
entitled “Imagined Immunities,” she draws attention to Americans’ historical 
preoccupation with what she calls “carrier narratives,” which are “fictional and 
nonfictional stories that take as their central conceit the spread of contagious disease and 
the efforts of the state and medical establishments to control it.”16  These stories derive 
much of their power from their ability to raise and then allay their readers’ or listeners’ 
fears.  Although they invoke the specter of a community’s annihilation through disease, 
they typically find hopeful resolution in the state’s ability to “safeguard its citizens, 
reclaiming its own as it reestablishes the stability of the community.”17  Wald, however, 
is primarily concerned with the role these narratives have in constituting or reinforcing a 
particular image of “a national community against the backdrop of […] changing 
demographics” by projecting that community’s “anxieties about strangers and contacts” 
onto a diseased Other.18  For Wald, these carrier narratives offer “a vivid analogue for a 
less easily defined and justified anxiety about immigrants”:  “strangers bring the threat of 
new microbes that can introduce a destabilizing element, manifested as a disease 
outbreak.”19  Thus carrier narratives “attest to a biological dimension of community:  a 
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group of individuals in sufficient contact to adjust to each other’s germs.”20  At the same 
time, these stories also draw attention to “the precariousness of the imagined community” 
because “they depict global connections that implicitly underscore the constructedness—
and the arbitrariness—of national borders.”21  In focusing on the influx of immigrants and 
their germs, these stories reveal not only the difficulties of a state policing its borders but 
also one of the most basic facts of globalization:  that what happens in one nation (such 
as a disease) is determined to some extent by what happens in another (germs). 
For the most part, Wald offers a persuasive account of how these carrier 
narratives highlight the tension between the forces of globalization on one hand 
(immigration, technologies of travel and communication, etc.) and the forces of national 
solidarity on the other (state-run or –sanctioned medical agencies, border checkpoints, 
etc.), especially in her discussions of “Typhoid Mary” and more recent fictional films and 
novels about potentially apocalyptic pandemics, such as Outbreak (1995), The Stand 
(1978; film version 1994), and Invasion (1997).  Nevertheless, her assertion that “the 
state remains at the center of such imagining in spite of the pressures exerted on it by the 
relations of globalization”22 is belied by the historical realities of the Influenza Pandemic 
and the nature of American literary responses to it.  Like typhoid, a disease Wald 
examines in great detail, Spanish Flu also “confounded American—and, in general, 
Western—chauvinism, which evoked epidemics in nonindustrialized nations and regions 
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to mark Western progress and superiority.”23  But the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19 
seems to invert Wald’s “carrier narrative” model, demonstrating the ultimate 
ineffectuality of both the state itself and various imaginings of national solidarity in the 
face of a particular global event.  Thus although she introduces a global perspective to her 
discussion of contagion, Wald tends to pose the “global” in opposition to the “national” 
and thereby significantly underestimates the degree to which national modes of spreading 
and containing disease are imbricated in global ones. 
For example, for the people who lived through the Influenza Pandemic, the virus’ 
most salient and most terrifying characteristic was the peculiar susceptibility of the 
healthiest, least likely members of the communities where it struck.  Whereas influenza 
epidemics historically tend to claim the lives of the very young, the very old, and the 
already weakened, the 1918-19 pandemic preyed equally on young adults between the 
ages of twenty and thirty-five.24  This latter fact was not lost on the authors who wrote 
about the disease.  Both Adam and Miranda, the central characters in Katherine Anne 
Porter’s Pale Horse, Pale Rider, are twenty-four when they contract Spanish Flu, and 
only Miranda survives.  In One of Ours, Willa Cather underscores the irony that it was 
often the healthiest who succumbed:  “Tod Fanning held out better than many of the 
stronger men; his vitality surprised the doctor.  The death list was steadily growing; and 
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the worst of it was that patients died who were not very sick.  Vigorous, clean-blooded 
young fellows of nineteen and twenty turned over and died.”25 
Paradoxically, such widespread susceptibility may ordinarily work to reinforce a 
sense of community, as Wald points out:  “common susceptibility, even more than 
immunity, at the same time reaffirms relatedness.”26  Again, however, the realities and 
literary depictions of the Influenza Pandemic present us with a somewhat more 
complicated picture, for during the pandemic, community itself was the cause of 
contagion.  In The Big Rock Candy Mountain, for instance, Wallace Stegner focuses 
extensively on the fear that gripped small towns during the pandemic and the extremes to 
which people went in order to avoid contact with their neighbors.  Businesses close 
down, and store owners refuse to help carry what they sell to their customers’ cars.  
“Gregariousness,” Stegner writes, “had suddenly ceased to be pleasurable in Whitemud,” 
and one of the novel’s characters tells another, “If you’re not scared you’re the only 
person in Saskatchewan that isn’t.”27  Such fears were far from uncommon, and many 
towns and cities in the United States issued ordinances specifically prohibiting communal 
gatherings and even handshaking.  And as Pale Horse, Pale Rider indicates, survivors of 
the disease felt that they had reemerged into a community drastically changed by the 
pandemic.  After regaining consciousness near the end of Porter’s novel, “Miranda 
looked about her with the covertly hostile eyes of an alien who does not like the country 
in which he finds himself, does not understand the language nor wish to learn it, does not 
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mean to live there and yet is helpless, unable to leave it at his will.”28  Since Miranda has 
pulled through, she is no longer a “carrier,” in Wald’s sense; therefore, her new status as 
“an alien” is not founded upon any threat she herself poses to the community, but upon a 
transformation that she perceives in the larger community.  It is, in other words, the 
nation, “the country in which [she] finds [herself],” that has been destabilized. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge that literary responses to the Influenza Pandemic 
present to the particularities of Wald’s model, however, is that the “carriers” of Spanish 
Flu were often the very people who could and did produce narratives about the pandemic 
afterwards.  Mary McCarthy drives home this point in the epigram that heads this coda:  
“We had not known that we had carried the flu with us.”  Due to its ubiquity, the cause 
and spread of this disease, unlike typhoid, could not be blamed on immigrants or other 
marginalized members of American society; if there had been a counterpart to “Typhoid 
Mary”—an “Influenza Mary,” if you will—then that Mary was McCarthy herself.  (And 
if McCarthy’s or F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Irish Catholic background, a background they 
incidentally shared with “Typhoid Mary,” presents itself as a possible candidate for just 
such a marginalized status, then it is worth remembering that other “carriers” included 
authors with even more mainstream roots, such as Dos Passos, Porter, Cather, and 
Dashiell Hammett.  At any rate, McCarthy’s degree from Vassar and Fitzgerald’s 
bourgeois upbringing and prep school and Ivy League education would make it difficult 
to portray either of them as a marginalized figure.)  Furthermore, John M. Barry has 
demonstrated that, in comparison to most epidemics, immediate reactions to the 
pandemic in America in 1918 were largely devoid of racist, ethnocentric, and class-
conscious rhetoric.  He writes: 
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Those historians who have examined epidemics and analyzed how societies have 
responded to them have generally argued that those with power blamed the poor 
for their own suffering, and sometimes tried to stigmatize and isolate them.  (The 
case of “Typhoid Mary” Mallon, an Irish immigrant in effect imprisoned for 
twenty-five years, is a classic instance of this attitude; if she had been of another 
class, the treatment of her might well have been different.) […]  The 1918 
influenza pandemic did not in general demonstrate a pattern of race or class 
antagonism. […]  The disease was too universal, too obviously not tied to race or 
class.29 
In fact, when initial blame for the pandemic was being assigned during its early 
stages, it was assigned to an obvious external enemy:  imperial Germany.  The following 
conversation from Pale Horse, Pale Rider, while darkly amusing in its wrong-headedness 
and blind patriotism, is a representative and historically accurate example of the wilder 
theories that were bandied about during the autumn of 1918: 
 “They say,” said Towney, “that it [the disease] is really caused by germs 
brought by a German ship to Boston, a camouflaged ship, naturally, it didn’t come 
in under its own colors.  Isn’t that ridiculous?” 
 “Maybe it was a submarine,” said Chuck, “sneaking in from the bottom of 
the sea in the dead of night.  Now that sounds better.” 
 “Yes, it does,” said Towney; “they always slip up somewhere in these 
details … and they think the germs were sprayed over the city—it started in 
Boston, you know—and somebody reported seeing a strange, thick, greasy-
looking cloud float up out of Boston Harbor and spread slowly all over that end of 
town.  I think it was an old woman who saw it.” 
 “Should have been,” said Chuck. 
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 “I read it in a New York newspaper,” said Towney; “so it’s bound to be 
true.”30 
According to Alfred W. Crosby, such “interweaving of the war and the pandemic” 
revealed “a pattern of complete insanity” in a war-addled populace,31 but the inclination 
to make that particular connection was not in itself unsound.  In point of fact, the war and 
the pandemic were linked, though that link was forged by the United States’ own 
participation in the war and not by fictitious biological warfare.  (As the pandemic 
continued to drag on months after the war ended and as the number of victims of the 
disease rose as rapidly in Germany as elsewhere, rumors of German responsibility lost 
whatever tenuous credibility they had initially possessed.) 
 There seems to be little doubt among historians and epidemiologists that the 
particular strain of influenza commonly referred to as Spanish Flu (a variant of subtype 
H1N1 of Influenzavirus A, most likely a form of swine flu that crossed over to humans in 
January or February of 1918) originated in the United States; Edwin O. Jordan, editor of 
The Journal of Infectious Disease, first proposed this scenario in Epidemic Influenza, a 
comprehensive 1927 survey of the pandemic that was sponsored by the American 
Medical Association.32  The appellation Spanish Flu was, of course, a misnomer based on 
the fact that, due to routine war-time censorship of the press among the belligerent 
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nations, neutral Spain was the first source of detailed information about the disease and 
its devastation.  Notably, that appellation was far more common in Europe than in 
America during the pandemic, again suggesting that Americans were reluctant to assign 
blame for the disease randomly to a foreign Other.  (In Pale Horse, Pale Rider, for 
instance, no character mentions “Spanish Flu.”  On the contrary, in the passage quoted 
above, Towney assumes that the virus originated in Boston, and earlier in the novel, 
Adam refers to it generically as “this funny new disease.”33)  The first recorded cases of 
the disease occurred in early March of 1918 at Camp Funston, a training camp near Fort 
Riley, Kansas.  A first wave of the disease spread rapidly over the next three months as 
troops were sped by rail to eastern ports and then transported in steamships to Europe.  
Sometime in August the virus mutated in Europe, giving rise to the second—and 
deadliest—wave of the pandemic during the autumn months of 1918.  It is this second 
wave that dominates Pale Horse, Pale Rider, with its endless parade of funerals.  The 
French city of Brest, a key point of entry for the American Expeditionary Force, appears 
to have served as the hub for this second wave, transmitting the disease across the rest of 
Europe, back to North America by way of Boston, and throughout the world by way of 
Freetown, Sierra Leone.  By the end of the year, the pandemic had become truly global, 
striking virtually every community on the planet.  The few exceptions were islands, such 
as American Samoa and New Caledonia, where effective quarantines could be enforced.  
The pandemic eventually subsided over the winter, though a third, less virulent wave 
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took place during the early months of 1919, affecting, among others, Woodrow Wilson at 
the Peace of Paris. 
 This history of the pandemic provides stark and startling evidence of the degree to 
which official U.S. policy went hand-in-hand with the processes of globalization and, 
more generally, of the complementarities between national and global modes of linking 
together—and potentially destroying—disparate communities.  That a virus originating in 
the American Midwest could encircle the globe within a single calendar year is itself a 
powerful illustration of the interconnectedness of the world’s communities already in 
place in 1918; that the virus most likely mutated in Europe before returning to the United 
States and traveling elsewhere exemplifies a characteristic of globalization I have 
emphasized throughout this project:  its web-like multi-directionality.  Moreover, the fact 
that the initial dissemination of the disease was so closely tied to the United States’ 
participation in the First World War, another global event already underway at the time, 
underscores the potentially global ramifications of specific national policies.  Had the 
Wilson administration been less intent on supplying U.S. troops for the Allied cause as 
soon as possible or had the U.S. Army been more attentive to the conditions of its 
training camps, health officials might have contained the spread of influenza more 
quickly and reduced the likelihood of a pandemic considerably.  War-time urgency and 
existing means of travel and communication, however, provided an ideal situation for just 
such a pandemic, as Howard Phillips and David Killingray point out: 
The virus spread rapidly along the conduits of war. […]  A modern system of 
global communications, of steamships and railways, along with the constant and 
large-scale movement of men and materials for the war, provided the conditions 
for the easy and speedy spread of the virus.  Military encampments and the close 
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concentration and movement of men provided ideal conditions for the 
transmission of a respiratory infection.34 
These conditions and their contribution to the pandemic were not lost on Edmund 
Wilson, who was serving in France during the second wave of Spanish Flu.  For his 
earliest published book, The Undertaker’s Garland (1922), which he coauthored with the 
poet John Peale Bishop, Wilson composed a short story entitled “The Death of a Soldier.”  
The story follows an eighteen-year-old soldier named Henry who contracts the virus in 
France while en route to the front lines.  Wilson makes a point of emphasizing the 
urgency with which troops were sped by rail to the front and the resulting poor conditions 
they faced; Henry and his comrades travel in box-cars “just like a lotta goddam cows,” as 
one of them puts it.35  Once they have piled into the box-cars, Wilson continues, 
“Everybody felt angry and ill and they began to quarrel among themselves. […]  It was 
the final wound to self-respect, the last indignity of the Army, which, although the fact 
was plain enough, had never before confessed that it put American soldiers on a level 
with animals!”36  Wilson’s choice of words here is telling, with its emphasis on the 
language of disease and suffering (“Everyone felt […] ill”; “It was the final wound”).  
Indeed, Henry becomes ill during the journey and, as the title forewarns us, dies at an 
army hospital shortly afterwards, drowning in mucus just as Hemingway described in 
Death in the Afternoon.  But Wilson does not end his story there.  He makes room for a 
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short postscript in which a doctor and nurse comment on Henry’s death and then, more 
uneasily, on what his death signifies:   
“But seriously, they ought to isolate these cases.  It begins to look like an 
infection.” 
“I should think so,” said the nurse.  “And when you consider that the 
Army’s hardly over here yet—”37 
The nurse’s abrupt breaking off at this point leaves unspoken what Wilson’s readers in 
1922 already knew:  that, as the pandemic’s second wave got started in Europe, the 
disease literally fed on incoming U.S. troops before spreading elsewhere.  Wilson’s story 
thus reveals the imbricated relationship between official U.S. policies, such as troop 
movements, and a larger global event.  But the doctor’s exasperated lament that the U.S. 
Army “ought to isolate these cases”—something that did not happen—also reveals an 
anxiety over what neither he personally nor the U.S. Army at large could control:  first 
epidemic and then, ultimately, global pandemic. 
 As I suggested earlier, this sort of anxiety over the uncontrollability of the 
processes of globalization that had made the pandemic possible is precisely what 
constrains American literary responses to Spanish Flu, including those responses that 
amounted to silence.  It is for just this reason that I called attention not only to Dos 
Passos’ elision of the pandemic from his biography for Randolph Bourne but to his 
failure to mention Bourne’s “Trans-National America” as well.  In choosing to focus 
exclusively on Bourne’s antiwar writings, Dos Passos also chooses not to address the 
other global dimensions of Bourne’s career and writing:  the pandemic that claimed his 
life and the issues of immigration that drive “Trans-National America.”  In a sense, Dos 
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Passos suppresses two global events that often prove difficult for any nation to control 
(immigration and pandemic disease) in order to privilege another global event that the 
United States could have continued to avoid (world war) but that provided the state with 
an even greater degree of control over its citizenry.  As Bourne himself argues in the 
essay from which Dos Passos quotes, during times of war, “the minorities are either 
intimidated into silence, or brought slowly around by a subtle process of persuasion. […]  
The nation in wartime attains a uniformity of feeling, a hierarchy of values culminating at 
the undisputed apex of the State ideal, which could not possibly be produced through any 
other agency than war.”38  Even as he joins Bourne in condemning the United States for 
its decision to go to war and its subsequent efforts to enforce conformity and to silence 
dissent, Dos Passos effectively reinscribes an ambivalent faith in the nation’s ability to 
control external pressures by eliminating from his narrative explicit references to global 
forces that existed outside the United States’ control and by suggesting that Americans 
could have taken Bourne’s advice to heart and acted otherwise.  By contrast, in Pale 
Horse, Pale Rider, Porter manages to combine both a vivid account of the Influenza 
Pandemic and a stinging condemnation of wartime small-mindedness.  Indeed, for 
Miranda, the protagonist of Porter’s novel, the pandemic is a form of divine punishment 
for America’s involvement in the war; it is “‘a plague,’ said Miranda, ‘something out of 
the Middle Ages.’”39  And it only ends, within the context of the novel, on Armistice 
Day:  “No more war, no more plague, only the dazed silence that follows the ceasing of 
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the heavy guns.”40  Unlike Dos Passos, then, Porter exploits the connections between the 
war and the pandemic and accepts the pandemic’s uncontrollability as a means of 
criticizing the dangers and limitations of enforced national solidarity. 
 There is, however, yet another facet to Bourne’s writing that makes Dos Passos’ 
simultaneous elision of the pandemic and Bourne’s “Trans-National America” a 
revealing index of wider concerns over America’s newly globalized status.  In the 
opening pages of “Trans-National America,” Bourne sets up a contrast between the 
vitality that ethnic and cultural diversity brings to American life on one hand and, on the 
other, the enervation that results from a blind commitment to Anglo-Saxonism, the belief 
in the innate superiority of English culture and the English language.  Responding both to 
the xenophobic premise that pride in one’s ethnic background amounted to “hyphenated 
Americanism” and to the increased suspiciousness English-descended Americans 
exhibited toward their German-born or -descended neighbors during the war, Bourne 
writes: 
If there were to be any hyphens scattered about, clearly they should be affixed to 
those English descendants who had had centuries of time to be made American 
where the German had had only half a century.  Most significantly has the war 
brought out of them this alien virus, showing them still loving English things, 
owing allegiance to the English Kultur, moved by English shibboleths and 
prejudice.  It is only because it has been the ruling class in this country that 
bestowed epithets that we have not heard copiously and scornfully of “hyphenated 
English-Americans.”41 
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Bourne’s depiction of this Anglo-Saxonism as an “alien virus” echoes Knut Hamsun’s 
characterization of his own experiences on the receiving-end of such ethnocentric 
Americanization as an “incurable disease,” a point of comparison that certainly bolsters 
Bourne’s argument.42  Otherwise, there is no need to read too much into Bourne’s 
coincidental choice of words; in 1916, Bourne had little reason to suspect that a virus 
originating in the American heartland would claim over half a million lives, including his 
own, only two years later.  Still, that irony would not have been lost on Dos Passos when 
writing 1919 over a decade later.  More to the point, however, is Bourne’s recognition of 
a turn within powerful political and social spheres toward a more restricted definition of 
American culture—one that Bourne considers to be antithetical (i.e., “alien”) to the 
openness of the American way of life.  While perhaps initially stimulated by a deeper 
sense of connectedness to Britain during the war, this turn persisted and even gained 
momentum after the war ended, developing eventually into outright isolationism.  For 
even as the Influenza Pandemic entered its final stages in 1919, Henry Cabot Lodge and 
other prominent Republican Congressmen began spearheading a campaign to prevent the 
United States from ratifying the Treaty of Versailles and joining the League of Nations.  
And as I have already demonstrated in my first and third chapters, the Wilson 
administration itself advanced a series of policies that, in effect, served to federalize Jim 
Crow, and succeeding administrations enacted more severe checks on immigration, 
culminating in the establishment of quotas during the 1920s. 
In focusing solely on Bourne’s antiwar writings, Dos Passos thus elides all of 
these other issues that concerned Bourne but that, like Spanish Flu, offered evidence of 
the United States’ limited ability to control external events.  In other words, Dos Passos’ 
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decision to ignore the full extent of Bourne’s writings is part and parcel of his decision to 
ignore the full extent of the Influenza Pandemic.  In light of the wider turn to isolationism 
in American society, both decisions also reveal a general reluctance to accept the full 
extent of America’s globalized status. 
 Not all American writers, however, shared Dos Passos’ reluctance to face up to 
the United States’ newly-emergent globalized status or to the destabilization of American 
identity such a status might entail.  Nor did they all share Porter’s cynical acceptance of 
that status as a means of criticizing the dangers of unquestioning patriotism and 
conformity.  Some displayed enthusiasm instead, finding in their experiences during the 
war and the pandemic an unforeseen source of liberation and empowerment.  Having 
opened my first chapter by quoting a passage from a speech by Woodrow Wilson in 
which Wilson offers a celebratory evocation of a globalized America (the “mediating 
Nation”) but one that is problematic in its outright suppression of racial and ethnic 
diversity (“no racial momentum”), I now close this project by turning to a different 
Wilson altogether—one whose cause for celebration arises in the wake of Spanish Flu 
and in recognition of the vitality of diversity that globalization brings. 
 Apart from “The Death of a Soldier,” which he incorporated wholesale into A 
Prelude, Edmund Wilson discusses the Influenza Pandemic only once in his memoir of 
his early life.  Writing nearly fifty years after the pandemic, however, Wilson still 
accords the pandemic special prominence; it ushers in the concluding passage of the book 
and Wilson’s final remarks on his entry into adulthood.  Since Wilson was working at an 
army hospital at the time, it is unsurprising that his description of the pandemic at first 
focuses primarily on his own sense of being overwhelmed by the event: 
  235 
Before I had left Vittel, the flu epidemic of 1918 had taken, I think, as heavy a toll 
of our troops as any battle with the Germans had done.  The hospitals were 
crowded with flu patients, many of whom died.  I was on night duty and on my 
feet most of the time. […]  We would put them [the dead bodies] on a stretcher 
and carry them down to a basement room, where we sometimes had to pile them 
up like logs.  They were buried in common ditches.  This was much the busiest 
time in our hospitals.  We never had a chance to think—though doctors and 
nurses also died—about catching the disease ourselves.43 
Although Wilson did not contract the disease himself, the stress of caring for so many ill 
and dying men took its toll on him.  “When the worst of it was over,” he continues, “I did 
collapse, although I had not caught the flu.  I was allowed to go to bed for a day or so in a 
hospital room by myself.”44  As he rested, Wilson found the time and quietude to 
contemplate his recent experiences in the army, and in his memoir, he describes reaching 
a deep understanding of what the global events in which he had participated (the war and 
the pandemic) signified.  “I also had the leisure to think,” he writes, “and it suddenly 
became very clear to me that I could never go back to my former life—that is, that I 
could never go back to the habits and standards of even the most cultivated elements of 
the world in which I had lived.  I felt now that I had never quite belonged in that world, 
that I had never, in fact, quite belonged to it. […]  My experience of the army had had on 
me a liberating effect.”45  For Wilson, this “liberating effect” is a newfound ability to 
connect with others and a willingness to accept and even seek out variety:  “I could now 
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get on with all kinds of people,” he claims, “and could satisfy my curiosity about aspects 
of life that otherwise I should not perhaps so soon have known.”46 
 What Edmund Wilson means here is something akin to what Woodrow Wilson 
was getting at in his 1915 speech.  In essence, Edmund Wilson is claiming that his 
experiences in the army enlarged the scope of his imagination by bringing him into 
contact with a wider range of types of Americans than he had ever known in his insular 
world of East Coast prep schools and Princeton.  He writes that “many of my friends in 
the American army had been born in other countries than America:  they had been 
Irishmen, Swedes, Danes, Swiss, Belgians and cockneys. […]  My association with all 
these had given me a strong contempt for the complaints about the ‘foreign’ immigrants 
on the part of old-line Americans and for the talk about the necessity for getting them 
‘Americanized.’”47  He then goes on to individuate his friends in a way that Woodrow 
Wilson never bothered to do:  an Italian-American he spent Christmas with, a Danish 
immigrant named John Andersen, and the son of a poor English farmer named Roy 
Gamble who had found an independence and social mobility in America that was 
impossible in his native Britain.  Thus whereas Woodrow Wilson speaks of 
understanding these immigrants “in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but 
unitedly as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all” and thereby erases 
whatever cultural, ethnic, or personal idiosyncrasies they may exhibit individually, 
Edmund Wilson attempts to name the immigrants he met in the army, relate their 
individual histories, and explain what these encounters meant to his own life.  And 
whereas Woodrow Wilson’s insistent use of the first-person plural pronoun we 
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paradoxically reveals the failure of his vision—in attempting to give voice to a common 
American identity, he in fact merely ventriloquizes—Edmund Wilson allows his friends 
to speak through him.  In a sense, then, far from giving him a means of blaming 
immigrants and excluding them from the body politic, the Influenza Pandemic and its 
aftermath helped convince Edmund Wilson of the centrality of immigrants to American 
society. 
In giving voice to those immigrants through his writing, Wilson also finds a 
source of creative empowerment.  In the final paragraph of A Prelude, he writes, “When I 
was back in New York at first, my habits did not change very much, but my life began 
soon to take a different direction in a way that, I think, otherwise it would hardly have 
ever done. […]  I was by that time as a much a product of the world of the war as of that 
of my earlier years, and I had to live now in the world in which I found myself after the 
war.”48  That “different direction,” of course, would ultimately lead Wilson to a 
distinguished career as one of the most influential literary critics of the twentieth century.  
By specifying that that shift in his life’s course occurred during a few moments of 
reflection in the aftermath of the First World War and the Influenza Pandemic, however, 
Wilson assigns to those two events an importance that is striking.  Looking back on the 
start of his career from near its very end—he would die within five years of A Prelude’s 
publication—Wilson casts the war and the pandemic not so much as a rupture with the 
past, which he still acknowledges he is partially a “product” of, but rather as a moment of 
transition into something irrevocably new.  The “world of the war” prepares Wilson for 
the “world [...] after the war.” 
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Like Dos Passos and Porter, Wilson recognizes this new “world” as a global 
one—where immigrants have destabilized his understanding of American identity; where 
world war has introduced him to new places, people, and ways of life; and where a 
pandemic has prodded him into taking stock of his life, his future, and his relationship to 
his country.  But unlike Dos Passos, Wilson embraces the implications of this 
recognition, and perhaps even more so than Porter, Wilson transforms this recognition 
into a basis for critique.  While neither Wilson’s story “The Death of a Soldier” nor A 
Prelude may match the artistry of Porter’s Pale Horse, Pale Rider, Wilson’s experiences 
before, during, and after the pandemic provide him with a means for both condemnation 
(through his criticism of narrow-minded definitions of American identity) and 
regeneration (through his expanded imaginative powers).  After all, at the end of Pale 
Horse, Pale Rider, Miranda is left alive but with the morbid certainty that she is set “once 
more safely in the road that would lead her again to death.”49  At the end of A Prelude, 
however, the reader is left with the knowledge that Wilson still had the bulk of his career 
left before him—a career that, as much as any other, helped to define the place of 
American literature and culture in the twentieth century.
                                                 
49
 Porter 314. 
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